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EDITORIAL 
LAURINCE W. WOOD 
This issue of the Asbury Theological Journal honors one of our recently retired 
professors, Dr. Robert Lyon, who was a professor of New Testament Studies for 
more than 30 years. His influence on students has been remarkable. These 
essays are written by his students and admirers who have learned from him as a 
scholar and as a friend. Dr. Lyon has been particularly gifted in challenging stu-
dents to be serious scholars, and as a result many of his students were motivated 
to do further studies. This collection of essays is a sampling of those whom he 
inspired to pursue a Ph. D. degree in some aspects of religious thought. 
One of Dr. Lyon's well-known ministries among students was the formation 
of a student organization in the 70s known as the "Loyal Opposition." This asso-
ciation reflects Dr. Lyon's vision to get students involved socially and politically 
in contemporary practical affairs . In Bob's communications with them, he cus-
tomarily signs off with "Peace- and Towels!" The authors of these essays pay 
tribute to Dr. Lyon's success in influencing them in this regard-to be both seri-
ous scholars and community-minded believers whose primary responsibility is to 
be a faithful and loyal witness concerning the difference that Jesus makes for the 
whole world in every aspect of life. 
It is with highest respect for Dr. Lyon and the cause of Christ for which he 
has embraced throughout the course of his long career at Asbury Theological 
Seminary that we offer these contributions in his honor. 
Laurence W Wood is the Frank Paul Morris Professor of Systematic Theology at Asbury Theological 
Seminary and Editor of The Asbury Theological Journal. 
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THE DEUTERONOMISTS AS 
LOYAL OPPOSITION 
JOEL H. HUNT 
I. INTRODUCTION 
One could cite a plethora of Pentateuchal passages that suggest "Loyal 
Opposition" in the Torah. ! These passages counter what appear to have been com-
monly held ideas of the time. A narrative telling of a younger brother surpassing the 
eldest son, as in the case of Jacob and Esau, allows the reversal of apparently normal 
inheritance rights for the larger purposes of God. The traditions of Exodus, in which 
slaves are freed from terrible bondage and consequently formed into a nation, 
bespeak a view of life that centers on hope for hopeless people to find a new exis-
tence in relationship with God. Even the legal corpora of the Torah, with, for exam-
ple, their emerging concern for the status of women, suggest the stirrings of basic 
principles of fairness by which faithful people express commitment to Cod and soli-
darity with persons. 
We will narrow our purview considerably, however, and examine two related 
themes of the Torah: love of God and love of persons. Perhaps there is no more 
natural place to focus than Deuteronomy, a book that, in ways similar to the conno-
tation of the phrase "Loyal Opposition," uses political rhetoric to express religious 
obligations. If the twin ideas of love of God and love of persons are central to the 
identity and mission of the Church, as this symposium suggests, then it is fruitful to 
consider again this document as foundational for the Loyal Opposition. 
The covenantal language of Deuteronomy clearly declares the correlating con-
cepts of love of God and love of persons. Deuteronomy understands Israel's identity 
as inextricably bound to the nation's exclusive devotion to Yahweh. Deuteronomy 
also requires that Israel demonstrate covenantal solidarity with others. Within the 
expression of these companion concepts one may recognize the early stirrings of a 
Loyal Opposition understanding of Christian obligation, for life within the Kingdom 
Joel H. Hunt is the D. Wilson Moore Associate Professor of Ancient Near Eastern Studies at Fuller 
Theological Seminary in Pasadena, California. 
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of God entails both whole-hearted allegiance to God and whole-hearted affection for oth-
ers. 
At least two additional features of Deuteronomy suggest that this text is applicable for 
an understanding of Christian discipleship along the lines of Loyal Opposition. First, the 
rhetorical features of the Deuteronomic sermons contemporize the message for its hear-
ers. This technique requires faithful readers of the text in any age to draw near to listen to 
these ancient, and yet appropriate, demands for exclusive devotion to God and for com-
passionate living among people. As if it is being uttered for the first time, Deuteronomy 
addresses "us, "today' and "now' to respond to its demands for an unswerving love of 
God and an unstinting love of others2 
As an example of this contemporizing movement, note the emphasis on "today" in 




This verse may be translated rather woodenly, "Not with our ancestors did Yahweh 
cut this covenant, but with us, we, these ones here today, all of us alive."J As Patrick Miller 
comments in reading this verse, 
The text uses seven words heaped one upon another to stress the contemporary 
claim of the covenant. The effect is clear. The hortatory character of the chapter 
and the book combines with the actualizing language of this verse to cut across all 
the generations and renew the covenant afresh with all hearers of these words.4 
In addition to this contemporizing rhetoric, the development of Deuteronomy itself 
also suggests that there may be points of contact between Deuteronomy and a view of 
Christian discipleship as Opposition. The Deuteronomic writers or editors, as outlined by 
Weinfeld and others, stood apart within a plurality of religious expressions in their own 
day5 In like manner, the contemporary Loyal Follower of God may at times stand over 
against both the so-called secular views of life and the prevailing, and comfortably familiar, 
patterns of religious thinking. Thus, we suggest that in the promulgation of the book of 
Deuteronomy one may see an incipient Loyal Opposition party, a group asserting the dis-
tinctive ideas of the love of Yahweh alone and of the love of others despite competing 
concepts. We will review briefly these twin mandates to love as they occur in 
Deuteronomy.6 
II. COVENANT LOVE OF GOD IN DEUTERONOMY 
It is well known that Deuteronomy resembles Ancient Near Eastern treaties in general 
and the Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon (VTE) in particular. By means of these Vassal 
Treaties, dated to 672 Be, Esarhaddon imposed loyalty oaths on his vassals to assure their 
continued fidelity to Esarhaddon's successor Assurbanipal. Significantly, both VTE and 
The Deuteronomists as Loyal Opposition 9 
Deuteronomy demand wholehearted devotion to the suzerain? Of course, Deuteronomy 
stretches the model of these fealty oaths by extracting a pledge to Yahweh as suzerain 
and by placing the stipulations of the agreement in the category of divine law. 
Clearly a political model was pressed into service to express religious ideology, a 
proposition familiar to those who would discuss Christian life in terms of a Loyal 
Opposition Society. Weinfeld affirms this connection, and its peculiar appropriateness for 
ancient Israel, when he writes, 
The pattern that served a political need in the ancient Near East came to serve a 
religious need in Israel. The religious use of this pattem was especially possible in 
Israel, for only the religion of Israel demanded exclusive loyalty to the God of Israel, 
a jealous God, who would suffer no rival. The religion of Israel therefore precluded 
the possibility of dual or multiple loyalties, such as were permitted in other religions 
in which the believer was bound in diverse relationships to many gods. So the stipu-
lation in political treaties demanding exclusive loyalty to one king corresponds strik-
ingly to the religious belief in one single, exclusive Deity.8 
Such an unrivaled loyalty to God, a loyalty precluding other potential commitments, 
appears to be the point of Christian discipleship as well. As in the case of the 
Deuteronomists in ancient Israel, this loyalty may even place the modern believer in con-
flict with prevailing religious practice as well. 
Deuteronomy reflects a change in the spiritual life of ancient Israel in the seventh cen-
tury BC9 Deuteronomy achieved a new status during the reforms of losiah (2 Kings 22-
23). The ancient Loyal Opposition gained enough power with the Josianic Reform and 
"discovery' of the "book of the law' to institute its vision of religious life. With losiah, the 
Reform Movement received the royal imprimatur and this led to the execution of the 
ideals of DeuteronomyW 
As an aside, the question of the changing dynamics when the Opposition becomes the 
Govemment, as in the case of Josiah's reforms, is beyond the immediate scope of this paper. 
In light of texts describing the conduct of Holy War or the coercive imposition of the 
Deuteronomic reforms, one must consider how the Opposition, as Government, can or 
should wield power in a righteous manner when the opportunity is presented. Our purpose 
here is to look at the losianic Reform as indicative of the kinds of concerns the 
Deuteronomic authors had and the implications of these concems for Christian discipleship. 
The impact of losiah's promulgation of Deuteronomy is seen most clearly in the nar-
rowing of the Israelite cult." With centralization, and the requisite elimination of provin-
cial cult centers, the Reformers institute the Opposition's idea that Yahweh alone should 
be worshipped in the manner and in the place of Yahweh's choosing. This cult restriction 
coincided with the development of the "name theology" combating the idea of God actu-
ally dwelling in any shrine, even the divinely appointed place from among the tribes. This 
emphasis on the spiritual dwelling of Yahweh, which perhaps lessened the importance of 
cui tic performance, was joined by an enlargement of humanistic expression within the 
covenant, a matter that we shall take up later in this paper. 
For the moment, we wish to focus on the requirement of complete loyalty to Yahweh. 
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In this regard, the adaptation of a treaty structure for Deuteronomy is decisive. The YTE 
included strong words regarding loyalty to the suzerain followed by stipulations outlining 
the responsibilities of the loyal subject. In Deuteronomy, where the sovereign is Yahweh, 
some of the stipulations deal with proper worship and religious observances as issues 
reflecting loyalty to the divine suzerain. These loyalty stipulations are joined by concerns 
for the treatment of human beings. 
As an example of the basic stipulation of allegiance to Yahweh, let us consider briefly 
the Shema, a familiar segment dealing with loyalty. The section 4:44- 1 I :32 begins with a 
review of the Ten Words, principles that center on the primary relationship to Yahweh 
alone and on proper relationships within the community. 
Deuteronomy 6:4-9, the Shema, expounds upon this first idea, the fundamental rela-
tionship with Yahweh. These verses read, 
Hear, 0 Israel: The LORD is our Cod, the LORD alone. You shall love the LORD 
your Cod with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might. Keep 
these words that I am commanding you today in your heart. Recite them to your 
children and talk about them when you are at home and when you are away, 
when you lie down and when you rise. Bind them as a sign on your hand, fix them 
as an emblem on your forehead, and write them on the doorposts of your house 
and on your gates. 
These verses place at the forefront one of the main concerns of Deuteronomy and, 
derivatively, of the Loyal Opposition. The first matter is a strong reiteration of the princi-
ple that there should be no gods but Yahweh. The people of Cod find their identity in 
their attachment to this deity alone and this commitment shapes the way in which they 
are to live in the world.' 2 The Shema is a positive restatement of the first commandment 
against the worship of other gods. This affirmation will set the inner compass of the indi-
vidual and guide daily conduct in the world. Thus, for the faithful person in ancient Israel, 
as with the Loyal Opposition today, the challenge becomes the reapplication of the pri-
mary loyalty to Cod in ever-new situations in life.'l 
The connection of the Shema to the basic concerns e nunciated in the Ten 
Commandments in particular and Deuteronomy in general provides a starting place for 
life in the Kingdom. As Miller suggests, 
Focusing on the Creat Commandment and the Decalogue identifies a center 
around which other things revolve. It enables a reduction of the whole to its most 
important point, spelling it out in specifics and implications. A theological structure 
is thereby given to the covenantal community, one that continues throughout its 
life. It operates on two axes: the relation of faith and love or obedience, as succinct-
ly set forth in the Shema, and the relationship to Cod and others as embodied in 
the Ten Commandments. Readers of the Book of Deuteronomy, therefore, are 
constantly being given clues to what matters most for those who live under and 
with this Cod.'4 
The Shema expresses the requirement of allegiance to Yahweh, which echoes the first 
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commandment, after affirming Yahweh's uniqueness and unity. A syntactic connection joins 
the command to "hear" (sm<) the declaration of Yahweh's uniqueness in verse 4 and the 
verb requiring the faithful person to "love' (w)hbt) Yahweh uniquely in verse 5. ' 5 The unity 
of Yahweh requires an undivided love from Yahweh's subjects; Yahweh is "one" therefore 
you shall love Yahweh "with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your might." 
This whole-hearted love excludes any rival for the affections of the Beloved One. In VTE, 
Esarhaddon entreats his vassals to love the king as one loves oneself, or, in other words, to 
be completely loyal to the suzerain. ' 6 Though it is possible, albeit highly unlikely, that the vas-
sal could have had a measure of affection for the sovereign, the primary usage of the term 
"love," rdamu in VTE and )hb in Deuteronomy, has to do with the faithful expression of 
loyalty by means of obedience to the covenant stipulations. In fact, to make the connection 
between the political and spiritual arenas, the treaty language used in Deuteronomy 6:5 
"contains all of the elements found in the treaties: devotion with all the heart, with all the 
soul (i.e., readiness to give one's life), and provision of might and force when necessary" 17 
The following verses of the Shema, Deuteronomy 6:6-9, complement this call to 
unmitigated fidelity, Verse 6 demands that the faithful take "these words" to heart as a 
constant companion reminding one of the need for loyalty. '8 Verse 7 requires the inculca-
tion (wesinnantam) of the next generation by means of constant recitation of "these 
words." This theme, the education of the children, reappears in 6:20-25 to end this seg-
ment. Verses 8-9 prescribe the use of external anchors to complement and strengthen the 
internal reminders of verse 6-7. 
The Shema's theme of total fidelity continues in Deuteronomy 6: I 0-25, These verses 
demanding allegiance are particularly applicable to our concern for the Loyal Opposition. 
Deuteronomy 6: 10-19 recognizes that Israel has received freely a fully appointed resi-
dence. This grant of plenty, contrasting with a past of poverty, should cause the Israelite to 
remain always faithful to Yahweh, According to 6: 13-15, the people must serve Yahweh, 
a jealous Deity, with steady devotion and guard against faltering fealty. One notes that the 
abundance of material blessing provides a challenge for the faithful to remain faithful and 
not to test the limits of the Suzerain's patience. 
These warnings against complacency in the face of promised plenty indicate that 
Deuteronomy understands that comfort may conflict with the performance of the injunc-
tion to love Cod and love persons. This warning provides a parallel for Christian ethics 
today, for the Loyal Opposition may need to live against a tide of material blessing, ignor-
ing the inducements of enjoyment and excess, if good fortune leads to vacillation. 19 
The evidence could be multiplied many times over to demonstrate that Deuteronomy 
attempts to foist upon Israel a restricted reverence for the one Yahweh. The existence of 
this program, coupled with other biblical and extrabiblical evidence, indicates that the reli-
gious climate of ancient Israel was more pluralistic than the writers of Deuteronomy sanc-
tioned.2o In such a climate, those who held to the ideas of Deuteronomy appear to have 
been an opposition party asserting their brand of monotheistic and Yahwistic faith upon 
the people. 
This Deuteronomic ideal, the stipulation of undivided allegiance to God in a time of 
pluralism, forms an interesting link to the concept of Christian ethics as Opposition. The 
notion of love of Cod in Deuteronomy arises out of the political climate of the Ancient 
12 Hunt 
Near East, in which the term "love" in the covenants generally denotes uncompromising 
loyalty to the suzerain by means of severing all other ties and by abiding by the specific 
stipulations of the loyalty oath21 In this vein, the political idea "Loyal Opposition' may be 
a useful way to express a view of Christian ethics in which the believer adheres exclusive-
ly to God as Sovereign, even in the face of competing loyalties. 
III. COVENANT LOVE OF PERSONS IN DEUTERONOMY 
Beside the love of God, the love of persons forms a corollary issue of life in the 
Kingdom of God. Generally speaking, chapters 12-26 of Deuteronomy take up this topic. 
One notes, however, that, despite the humanistic emphasis of Deuteronomy 12-26, care 
for others is a subsidiary theme to loyalty to Yahweh. The first of the stipulations outlined 
in these chapters has to do with the proper worship of Yahweh. This placement of the 
topic forces one to recognize again the primacy of this issue for Deuteronomy and for the 
faithfu l reader today. 
Having noticed the continued emphasis on the proper regard for Yahweh, the reader 
also notes the peculiar tone of Deuteronomy in its stipulations for daily life. Predictably, 
the ethical demands of Deuteronomy 12-26 deviate from the politically oriented stipula-
tions of the vassal treaties, which have much to do with the preservation of the dynasty22 
Deuteronomy uncompromisingly demands the faithful to love all, including disenfran-
chised persons on the fringe of society, such as the poor, the outsiders and the widows. 
This ethical demand to love others entails doing the right thing for others. One notices 
this particular humanistic tendency of Deuteronomy when comparing the social laws of 
Deuteronomy with parallel injunctions in Exodus.23 
For example, note the change in the law regarding the relationship between an 
Israelite and a stranger. Exodus 22:20 (Eng. 22:21) reads, "You shall not wrong or 
oppress (l6' - toneh wel6' til!:ta?ennUl a resident alien, for you were aliens in the land of 
Egypt." Similarly, Exodus 23:9 records, "You shall not oppress (16' a resident alien; 
you know the heart of an alien, for you were aliens in the land of Egypt." Both of these 
verses prohibit the Israelite from wronging or afflicting the stranger. The memory of the 
affliction of former bondage serves as the motivation. 
In contrast to these two laws prohibiting wrongful action, Deuteronomy 10: 19 exhorts 
the Israelite to a more difficult response toward the stranger. Once again, the experience 
of slavery is to motivate the action of the Israelite. The verse reads, "You shall also love 
(wa'ahabtem) the stranger, for you were strangers in the land of Egypt." 
This shift from preventing malevolence to prescribing beneficence displays the 
inchoate humanism of Deuteronomy. The loya l subject of Yahweh will exceed the 
requirement not to harm another and, reflecting the character of the suzerain described in 
Deuteronomy 10: 17-18, love the resident alien by actively seeking the alien's welfare in 
matters such as provision, inclusion and justice.24 
A particularly clear case revealing the distinctive flavor of Deuteronomy is the law con-
cerning the release of slaves. These laws deal with those who have been subjected to 
servitude due to economic misfortune beyond the help a loan could provide.25 The mate-
rial of Deuteronomy IS: 12- 18, when compared w ith the similar material in the 
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Covenant Code (Exodus 21 :2-11), reveals some of the distinctives of Deuteronomy. 
Both passages begin with a statement of the setting. Both Exodus 2 1:2 and 
Deuteronomy 15: 12 declare that a Hebrew slave must be freed in the seventh year. 
Deuteronomy surpasses Exodus by including a female slave in this requirement for 
release.26 Essentially the initial point of the laws is the same: Hebrew slaves must be 
released in their sabbatical year. 
The humanitarian nature of Deuteronomy, in contrast to Exodus, is displayed in the 
respective descriptions of the status of the individual about to be released. In Exodus 
2 I :3-6, the freed slave reverts to his original state before he was enslaved. Specifically, if a 
previously single male was given a wife while in servitude, he faces a difficult choice. He 
may gain freedom, in which case he must leave his wife and any children behind, or he 
may choose to stay with his family and in slavery for life. Deuteronomy I 5: I 6 does not 
deal with the matter of the slave's marital status, but suggests that a slave may freely 
choose to remain in the master's household out of a sense of love or loyalty. 
The manner of manumission also declares the contrast between Exodus and 
Deuteronomy. According to Exodus 2 I :2, the slave is released in the seventh year, with-
out debt (hinnaml. Deuteronomy 15: 13-14 expands this injunction by requiring that the 
master not send out the freed slave empty-handed (reqam), but that the master would 
provide liberally (ha<''lneq ta 'anlq) from his bounty27 The master must adorn the slave 
with hands full of the necessities for starting a new life, with provisions from flock, field 
and vineyard. In this regard, the master recognizes the contribution made to his house-
hold by the slave during six years of service.28 
In addition to its appearance in the socio-moral laws, the humanistic vein of 
Deuteronomy emerges in its cui tic ordinances. The law of cult centralization in 
Deuteronomy 12 is punctuated with exhortations regarding the Levite, the slave, and the 
maidservant (v 12, 18, 19)29 The legislation on the first fruit offering in Deuteronomy 
26: I-II expands the requirement from Exodus 23: 19 in two ways. Deuteronomy 26: I-
I I includes a historical liturgy or Credo (vv 5-10) and appends a prescription to include 
the Levites and aliens in sharing the feast of God's bounty (v II). The law of the tithe, 
which follows the first fruit legislation in Deuteronomy 26: 12-15, specifies that the 
Levites, aliens, orphans and widows should be the beneficiaries of the giving of the tithe. 
Such concern for persons on the fringes of society is presented as a fitting link between 
the proper worship of God and the everyday life of God's people.30 
Regardless of the precise o'rigin of this incipient humanism, it is clear that 
Deuteronomy reflects an advance over earlier legislation in the area of ethical develop-
ment. Deuteronomy, despite some passages exhibiting a programmatic zeal, moves 
beyond its predecessors in promoting an expansive ethic to complement its restrictive the-
ology. Since all persons are under the one God, so all persons are to be the recipients of 
covenant care. This kind of inclusive concern provides a model for the Loyal Opposition 
in the Church. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have considered the contribution of Deuteronomy to an understand-
ing of Christian ethics as Loyal Opposition. Since the writers of Deuteronomy adapted a 
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political document, one which demanded an exclusive allegiance on the part of a vassal 
to a king, to express a vision of loyal service to Yahweh, we suggested that Deuteronomy 
is formative for the Loyal Opposition. The use of political terminology, such as Covenant, 
Love and Opposition, suggests points of contact between the views of Deuteronomy and 
those of modem believers. 
Additionally, the authors of Deuteronomy modified the treaty format in decisive ways 
to present the book as a mosaic of sermons that speak to both ancient and modem hear-
ers. Major sections and smaller segments of the book contain calls for obedience to 
Torah. This demand corresponds to the point of a good sermon, namely, to lead to a life 
changing response on the part of the hearer.' I Deuteronomy seeks to motivate the hearer 
to remain loyal to Yahweh and to portray such a commitment within the community. 
These are themes fitting for believers of any age. 
We noted two themes of Deuteronomy, love for God and love for others, and sug-
gested that these two ideas are the heart of Christian ethics. To be sure, the first matter, 
loyalty to God, is the consuming passion of Deuteronomy. Faithful people are called to 
affirm an unswerving loyalty to the God who has graciously entered into a covenant rela-
tionship with them. 
The second matter, loyalty within the community, forms a secondary theme within 
Deuteronomy. The Deuteronomic additions to previous laws, for instance, attest to an 
emerging humanism. To be sure, the viewpoint of Deuteronomy leaves room for further 
development. In this regard, the sermonic reapplication of texts reveals not only the views 
of the writers of Deuteronomy, but also provides a model of what faithful communities 
must do, reinterpret the message of God's grace for each new generation. 
For the Loyal Opposition, one notes that a past authoritative word may not prove to 
provide the final word for a later generation. Contemporary issues require the reappropri-
ation of earlier ideas. The function of the Opposition may be to challenge the Church to 
evaluate its theology and praxis in order to determine their appropriateness for current 
issues. By means of its persuasive, not coercive, power, the Loyal Opposition calls the 
Church to loyalty to God and commitment to persons. 
NOTES 
I. It is a privilege to write this article to honor Bob Lyon. Since our first meeting at Asbury 
Theological Seminary, Bob has challenged me to grow as a student and as a servant. I shall always 
be grateful for the surprises of grace that have come as a result of following Bob's model of strong 
commitment to God and to people. 
2. For instance, the phrase hayy6m occurs in Deuteronomy I: I 0, 39; 2: 18, 25; 4:4, 8, 26, 
39,40;5:1,3;6:6;7:1 1;8:1, II , 19;9:1,3; 10:13; 11:2,8, 13,26,27,28,32; 12:8; 13:19; ISS, 
15; 19:9; 20:3; 263, 17, 18; 27:1, 4, 10; 28:1,13,14,15; 29:9, II , 12, 142, 17; 30:2, 8, I 1, 15, 
16, 18, 19; 31 :2, 2 I, 27; 32:46. Variations of this phrase, such as hayy6m hazzeh, 'ad hayy6m 
hazzeh, and kayy6m hazzeh could also be noted. The term we(atta, occurring, for example, in 2: 13; 
4: I; 5:25; 10: 12, 22; 12:9; 26: I 0; 31: 19; 32:39, complements the contemporary focus of the doc-
ument by imagining the reader as hearing the words of Moses. 
3. Author's translation. Other biblical quotes, unless indicated, are from the NRSV. 
4. Patrick D. Miller Jr., Deuteronomy. Interpretation. A Bible Commentary for Teaching and 
Preaching (Louisville, KY: John Knox, 1990), p. 67. 
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5. For extended discussions about these matters, see Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I- II, 
Anchor Bible, 5 (New York, NY: Doubleday, 199 J) and Moshe Weinfeld, Deuteronomy and the 
Deuteronomic School (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992). 
6. Besides calling people to a deep devotion to Yahweh, Deuteronomy may also indicate 
some deeper levels of contrast with Israelite society in general. For instance, the development of 
Israelite monotheism stands in stark contrast to the general polytheistic or monolatrous concepts 
that held sway for a time in Israel. Israel's emerging monotheism challenged the prevailing religious 
structures of its day and formed a new center from which to encourage ethical decision-making. 
Ultimately, this viewpoint left its stamp on the Hebrew Bible in general and the Torah in particular 
as the dominant perspective, but this precedence was gained over time. 
7. As a significant point of comparison, the order of the curses in VTE parallels the order of 
the curses in Deuteronomy 28:23-35. It is clear that the pattern in Deuteronomy is derivative, hav-
ing been borrowed from a list such as the one in VTE, which organizes the curses, by the hierarchy 
of the gods. See Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I- II , p. 7. 
8. Ibid., p. 8. 
9. 'The transition from Torah as a specific instruction to the sacred "book of the Torah" of 
the josianic period marked a turning point in Israel's spiritual life. The ritual instructions, which had 
been kept in priestly esoteric circles, were now written by scribes and wise men (cf. jer 8:8) and 
became part of the national lore." Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I- I I, p. 18. 
10. Religious leaders in sympathy with the views expressed by Deuteronomy guided young 
King josiah in his reign. Since these advisors trained up josiah in the ways he should go, it should 
not appear as a surprise that josiah would support their overwhelming reform movement when he 
became an adult. From a conversation with Dr. j. Edward Wright. 
II. Regarding this issue, see Weinfeld's section entitled, "Deuteronomy As Turning Point in 
Israelite Religion" (Weinfeld, Deuteronomy I-II, pp. 37-44). 
12. Miller, Deuteronomy, p. 98. 
13. Miller points out the repetition of this theme in Deuteronomy 6: 12-15; 7:8-10; 16b, 19b; 
8 :11,15,19; 9:1 ; 10:12-13; 11:1 , 13, 16, 18-22, 28b; 13:2-5, 6, 10,13; 18:9; 26:16-17; 29:26; 
30:2b, 6, 8, 10, 16-17 (Miller, Deuteronomy, p. 98). 
14. Miller, Deuteronomy, pp. 15-16. 
I 5 . Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1- I I, p. 35 I . 
16. "As indicated above, love with all the heart means sole recognition of the beloved to the 
exclusion of any rival. Indeed, "love" in the ancient Near East connotes loyalty. Thus, when the 
suzerain demands loyalty from his vassal, he adjures him that he shall love (ra'cemu) the king as he 
loves himself (VTE, lines 266-68)." Weinfeld, Deuteronomy 1- 11, p. 351. 
17. Ibid., p. 351. 
18. It does not appear necessary for our purpose here to determine whether the phrase 
"these words" (haddebarim hii'elleh) refers to the preceding proclamation of Yahweh's uniqueness, 
to the Ten Commandments, or to the general parenetic discourse of Deuteronomy. 
19. Deuteronomy 6: 16 warns against testing God as at Massah. This reference provides an 
interesting contrast to the inducements of wealth, though the basic concern is the same. At Massah, 
the Israelites tested Yahweh by wondering whether Yahweh could supply their needs. In Canaan, 
the Israelites are warned against testing God when God has provided more than needed. In either 
situation, want or excess, the main matter is obedience to the divine commands. 
20. Evidence, such as that from Kunti llet Ajrud, may indicate the identification of Yahweh 
with a variety of sites and of Yahweh with Asherah. This would indicate non-centralized worship 
and, perhaps, the worship of deities other than Yahweh in ancient Israel. For an inscriptional exam-
ple, note brkt 'tkm Iyhwh fJmm wlfJrth (Zeev Meshel, KuntJ11et 'Ajrud. A Religious Centre From The Time 
Of The judaean Monarchy On The Border Of Sinai. Cat. No. 175. The Israel Museum, jerusalem. 
16 Hunt 
Spertus Hall. Spring 1978. no pagel. For discussion and extensive bibliography regarding Yahweh 
and other deities, see Mark S. Smith, The Early History of Cod. Yahweh and Other Deities in Ancient 
Israel (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1990>. 
21. Dennis ). Wiseman, "The Vassal Treaties of Esarhaddon.' Iraq 20 (1 958H 268; see also 
Weinfeld, Deuteronomic School, p. 81. 
22. Weinfeld quotes the vassal treaty of Esarhaddon concluded during Assurbanipa J' s 
enthronement ceremony. Much has to do with homage to the king, but the text includes instructive 
clauses commanding the people actively to oppose all acts of rebell ion and assassination attempts 
and to preserve the dynasty (ibid., p. 891. 
23. In this regard, see, for example, Weinfeld, Deuteronomic School, p. 282. He also notes the 
example of the slave law in Deuteronomy 15:12-18 I I Exodus 21:2-11 which we will review 
below. 
24. The texts indicate that the care for the well being of the stranger should include such 
items as material provision, inclusion in the community and insuring justice. Provision is mentioned 
in the giving of meat not to be consumed by the covenant community (14 :2 1), the sharing of the 
tithe every third year (14:29) and in the requirement to leave a portion of the harvest (24 : 19)' The 
communi ty should include the disenfranchised in some of its festivals (16: I I, 14), The person on 
the fringe of society should receive faimess in legal matters (24: I 71. 
25. For the laws of loans, see Deuteronomy 15: I- II. 
26. Exodus 2 I I I I takes up the matter of a female slave. However, the Covenant Code leg-
islation does not treat the woman in an equal way to the later Deuteronomic law. Exodus 2 1:7 
states explicitly that the female slave is not to be released as the males are, but is treated like the 
concubine of the master. In this case, one notices that Deuteronomy 15: 17b contradicts Exodus 
21:7 by explicitly including the female slave in the possibility of manumission. 
27. According to Deuteronomy 16: 16, the Israelite males must appear before Yahweh at the 
specified spot three times annually. They must, however, not appear empty-handed (reqa m), but 
bring gifts according to the bounty God has provided. It seems that just as it would have been inap-
propriate for the faithful to make a pilgrimage without a gift, it is inappropriate to release a slave 
without some grant. 
28. See Deuteronomy 15 : 18. 
29. Weinfeld, Deuteronomic School, p. 290. 
30. Weinfeld also notes that Deuteronomy displays a new concern for women in society. He 
writes, "The book of Deuteronomy shows a particularly humanistic attitude towards women. We 
have already noted the lack of distinction in its law between male and female slaves and its 
approach to the law of the seduced maiden. There are also a number of laws pertaining to conjugal 
life which have no counterpart in any other of the Pentateuchal books. They deal with such matters 
as the inheritance rights of an unloved woman's son (21: 15- 17); the protection of a wife's honor 
and reputation as articulated in the law of conjugal slander (22: 13-19); consideratio n for a woman's 
intimate feelings (24:5: 'he shall gladden his wife whom he has taken'); and the law of the female 
captive (2 1: 10- 14). Though the laws themselves may be quite ancient, the fact that the author of 
Deuteronomy chose to incorporate them in his code attests to his humanistic orientation. ' see ibid., 
p. 291. 
3 I . On the matter of Deuteronomy as "proper preaching:' see Miller, Deuteronomy, p. 12. 
IN BUT NOT OF THE WORLD: THE 
CONFLUENCE OF WISDOM AND TORAH 
IN THE SOLOMON STORY (1 KINGS 1-11) 
FRANK ANTHONY SPINA 
1. INTRODUCTION 
I Kings I- I I portrays King Solomon in the most lavish of terms. ' Israel was awed 
when their monarch adjudicated a seemingly insoluable dispute between two prosti-
tutes (I Kgs 3: 16-28). The number of his official entourage far exceeded that of other 
kings (I Kgs 4:1-19; 9:23; see also I Sam 14:47-51; 2 Sam 8:15-18; 20:23-26).2 In 
his time, Israel's population was beyond counting (I Kgs 3:8), the country was content 
and secure (4:20, 25), the realm extended from the Euphrates to Egypt (5: I, 4 [RSV 
4:21 , 24]), and success in foreign policy was illustrated by the immense tribute 
received (5: I [RSV 4:211; 10: I 0, 25) as well as by relationships with Hiram King of 
Tyre and the Queen of Sheba (5:15-25 [RSV 5:1-111;9:10-14; 10:1 -10). This king 
built a palace and a temple (I Kings 6-8), had a fleet (9:26) and a harem of one thou-
sand women (I I :3). Given all this, it is virtually predictable that Solomon's wisdom (I 
Kgs 5:9-14 [RSV 4:29-341; 10:1 -10, 23-24; 11:41), wealth (3:13; 5:2-8 [RSV 4:22-
281; 9:26-28; 10: 14-22), and fame (10:24) would be judged to be incomparable. 
While Solomon's incredible accomplishments and resultant reputation are not 
presented solely as a function of his vaunted wisdom, it is arguably the most decisive 
factor. God offered Solomon wealth and honor only after he requested wisdom (I 
Kgs 3: I 0-1 3). Thus, it is no accident that just as Moses is conventionally associated 
with Torah, and David with the Psalms, so Solomon is with wisdom. In addition to 
the emphasis in I Kings I- II (see 2 Chr 1:7-13; 9: 1-9, 22-23), Solomon is also 
associated with Proverbs, Qoheleth and the Song of Songs, which is sometimes 
regarded as a wisdom genre (Prov I: I; Qoh 1: I; Cant I: I). Regardless of the vari-
ety of wisdom in view, the canonical tradition relates Solomon to it in one way or 
another.3 In I Kings I- I I it is hardly a stretch to say that virtually all of Solomon's 
successes are connected directly or indirectly to his God-given wisdom. 
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In turn, Solomon's wisdom makes him Israel's "worldliest" king. That is, I Kings I- II 
portrays Solomon as the Israelite king most recognized and admired by the surrounding 
nations and their leaders. As David is the ideal or messianic king (I Sam I: I 0; 16: 1-2 
Sam 24 [the "ideal David" is in view in 2 Samuel 21-24]) and Josiah is the reformer king 
par excellence (2 Kgs 22: 1-23 :30; see 23 :25), Solomon is Israel's wisest, wealthiest, 
grandest and most famous king4 Not surprisingly, scholars have inferred from I Kings I-
I I that Israel in the Solomonic era was unprecedentedly urbane and sophisticated. This 
was nothing short of Israel's 'golden age' or" enlightenment."1 Even if one does not take 
the account at face historical value, Israel under Solomon seems to have been at its acme 
in terms of economic strength, political power, and international involvement.6 Solomon's 
wisdom carried Israel to the pinnacle of the world's social and political scene. 
However, regardless of the king's impressive wisdom and the heights to which he was 
able to bring Israel as a result of it, a prior question needs to be asked: How should 
Solomon's wisdom be understood when I Kings I- I I is taken seriously as Scripture? In other 
words, what are the theological implications of the way the Solo monic regnum has been 
rendered? More specifically, what happens when this passage is regarded not primarily as a 
source for reconstructing the history of Israel, but as a witness to Cod's involvement in the 
life of Israel as the people of Cod?7ln my view, it makes a great deal of difference how one 
approaches this material. Instead of taking a position outside" the text to make ostensive 
objective judgments about this ruler's successes and failures, I want to attend to the way 
Solomon is presented as one whose role is to be evaluated by criteria rooted in the canon's 
witness to Cod's will for the king and the people for whom he was responsible8 
Some scholars whose goal is historical reconstruction contend that I Kings I- I I func-
tioned to legitimate a king who had introduced a centralized, hierarchical political struc-
ture that was both foreign and inimical to what the community had formerly experienced 
and affirmed as quintessentially Israelite9 Put more sharply, Israel's pre-monarchic social 
structures reflected its genuine beliefs and values, while the monarchy was an aberration. 
Even if there is a modicum of truth to this assessment-kingship is scarcely an unmixed 
blessing in the biblical witness (see 1 Samuel S)- it still does not take seriously enough the 
theological complexity and nuances of the canonical testimony. 
For instance, under the rubric of this Festschrift, for many biblical scholars the "loyal 
opposition' would most readily be identified with those stalwarts of truth and justice who 
denounce the king, denigrate the royal establishment, with its oppressive, bloated, self-
serving bureaucracy, and all the power, wealth and status that are derivative of such social 
arrangements. The Solomonic kingship becomes then a symbol of any political, social, or 
ecclesiastical establishment that has lost sight of its mission, operated out of cynical self-
interest and against the legitimate claims of common or disenfranchised folk, prostituted 
social ideals for personal or corporate aggrandizement, and cavalierly used religion to justi-
fy itself at the expense of a prophetic, revolutionary, and egali tarian moral agenda. 
But seen from a canonical perspective, any "loyal opposition' should be rooted in the 
Bible's witness to the totality of Cod's involvements with the community of faith. The bib-
lical testimony brings a corrective word to bear on all human causes and agendas, no mat-
ter how noble. Unless the whole witness is taken seriously, the biblical material will 
inevitably be read ideologically, neutralizing and domesticating the Word of Cod. We 
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who treasure the Old Testament as Holy Scripture are not obligated to find in the text 
analogues to contemporary situations with which we can self-righteously identify or alter-
nately which we can berate from an assumed superior moral vantage point. We must first 
and foremost hear the text as Cod's word to Cod's people, trying under the Holy Spirit to 
appropriate all the elements of a message which has been designed to provide a theologi-
cally and ethically decisive word in our present condition of being simultaneously disen-
gaged from and hopelessly entangled in the world. 
In this light, it is instructive to approach I Kings I- I I as a witness to how Solomon and 
Israel were supposed to be in but not of the world. While we can only touch on the high 
points of the theological implications of this rendering of the Solomon story in the brief 
scope of this essay, it is to be hoped that the text's potential for further theological and 
ethical reflection will be evident. 
2. SOLOMON'S "EARLY WISDOM" (1 KINGS 1-2) 
I Kings 1-2 recounts the last days of David leading up to Solomon's accession. The 
palpable tension in the story is a function of two factors. From an internal perspective, 
characters side with either Adonijah or Solomon as they maneuver to take the place of 
their father, who has become literally and metaphorically impotent (I Kgs I: 1-6), From 
an external perspective, the reader puzzles over which of the king's sons YHWH wanted 
to be king. All we know about Solomon up to this point is that the Lord loved him and 
on the occasion of his birth delivered a message concerning him via Nathan the prophet 
(2 Sam 12:24-25), But Adonijah was David's oldest living son and presumably under nor-
mal circumstances the heir apparent (2 Sam 3:2-5; I Kgs 1:6; 2:22). 
The problem is that there is no explicit confirmation that Solomon was YHWH s choice. 
David's recalling that he had promised the throne to Solomon appears to have been 
prompted by the manipulative strategy of Nathan and Bath-Sheba (J Kgs I: 11-37). The 
episode is further complicated by YHWH's absence, which contrasts greatly to the intimate 
divine role in the selections of Saul and David (I Sam 9: 15-17; 10: I; 16: 1-13). Curiously, 
Adonijah was the first one who mentioned that his failure to retain the kingship was Cod's 
doing (I Kgs 2: 15), but it is not certain that this is the narrator's viewpoint. 
Perhaps the divine word to David in 2 Sam 7: 12-13 is key in that it states that the son 
who follows David will in fact be the one whom YHWH has raised up. Such a promise is 
not vitiated merely because Solomon's takeover involved conventional or dubious means. 
YHWH's will could be brought about even by questionable practices. This would be akin 
to YHWH's word to Rebekah that her younger son would be pre-eminent over the elder, 
even though no instructions were forthcoming as to how this should come about (Cen 
25:23), We discover later that it was a result of Jacob's and Rebekah's exploitation and 
deception (Cen 25:29-34; 27: 1-40). Similarly, Cod's protection of Jacob's family and 
future was made possible by the evil of brothers selling a brother into slavery and by the 
courageous though highly suspect actions of a Canaanite woman named Tamar (Cen 
37: \-36; 38; 45:5; 50:20). Likewise, Solomon fulfilled God's will by assuming the king-
ship in David's stead though neither he nor those who supported him necessarily knew 
or were concerned to follow Cod's will, or used ethical means when they inadvertently 
accomplished it.'o 
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Solomon is largely passive in the events leading up to his enthronement (I Kgs I: I 1-
48l. Afterwards, his initial actions focus on his defeated rival Adonijah and men who had 
been David's antagonists. The way this is recounted is important. Once he proscribes 
Adonijah's movements (I Kgs I :49-53), Solomon receives deathbed instructions from his 
father. David first invoked the Mosaic Torah (I Kgs 2:1 -4), making his words consonant 
with those found throughout Deuteronomy and Former Prophets which are grounded in 
God's promises to and requirements for Israel. Thus, Solomon is enjoined to keep Torah, 
something for which the ideal David was known (2 Sam 22:21 -25; I Kgs 3: 14; 9:4; 
11:4, 33-34, 38l. In David's echoing Torah, and therefore speaking as it were in the 
name of YHWH or Moses, he stresses (along with the narrator?) that Solomon's kingship 
also is to be governed by Torah (see Deut 17: 14-20l. The "unconditional" covenant with 
David's dynastic house (2 Sam 7: I- I 7) is also subject to the Torah under which Israel was 
to live (see Josh I :7-8l. 
However, after emphasizing Torah, David does an abrupt turn-about when broaching 
the matter of his enemies (I Kqs 2:5-9). The use of wisdom vocabulary in this context is 
striking. When David urges Solomon to assassinate Joab, he counsels his son to "act accord-
ing to your wisdom' (v6; wEi<;lsTta kehokmatekal . As for Shimei, David reminds Solomon 
that 'you are a wise man and will know what to do to him' (v 9; ki lis )attah 
weyada(ta let \3ser ta\'iseh-16). Yet, in spite of this appeal to wisdom, David specifies each 
course of action. Evidently, Solomon was to use his wisdom to decide the best way to 
carry out the instructions rather than to decide whether to carry them out. Analogous uses 
of wisdom are found elsewhere (2 Sam 14: 1-21; 16:20-17:23; 20: 14-22). 
David's appeal to wisdom in this setting contrasts sharply with the role of wisdom in 2 
Samuel 21 -24. Sheppard calls attention to the fact that this section separates the previous 
account, which focuses on the succession to David's throne, from its continuation in I 
Kings 1-2. Instead of succession, this material centers on David, describing the ideal attrib-
utes of Israel's ruler in terms of righteousness and the fear of God, which is a wisdom 
motif (see Prov 1:7; 16: 12; 29:4,14). The use of wisdom language in 2 Samuel 22 and 
23: 1-7 enables these texts to exercise a hermeneutical function in interpreting the previ-
ous material. Wisdom provides a theological evaluation of Israel's religious and moral real-
ity, it is not merely an anthropological phenomenon. The ideals of wisdom and the ideals 
of li fe under Torah are combined. I I Wisdom and Torah belong together (see Deut 4: 1-8, 
especially v 6). 
In light of the combination of wisdom and Torah in 2 Samuel 21 -24, David's apparent 
appeal to wisdom independently of Torah in I Kgs 2:5-9 is put into bold relief. The point is 
not that David's enemies should not have been punished. It is rather that there is no 
effort made to mete out that punishment according to Torah, let alone any attempt to 
consult the Lord directly or through prophetic or priestly mediators (compare Joshua 7l. 
Regardless of David's previous admonition about the importance of Torah for Solomon, 
wisdom that is unqualified by Torah has become decisive when dealing with adversaries. 
That this use of wisdom is sandwiched between 2 Samuel 21 -24, where wisdom and 
Torah are inextricably related, and I Kgs 3 :3-9, where wisdom is a gift of God and like-
wise connected with Torah (as we shall see), should caution us from disguising the role of 
"Torah-less" wisdom here with translations like "'clever'" or ·'crafty".1 2 Nor should we too 
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hastily conclude that the wisdom being referred to by David is neutral just because he first 
called attention to Torah. Is it only a coincidence that Solomon's use of wisdom as 
encouraged by his father led to death and possibly a liturgical violation (murder at the 
altar), whereas the king's use of divinely given wisdom led to life and appropriate ritual 
acts (I Kgs 2:28, 34, 46; 3: 15, 27)?13 This material has been shaped to show that Torah 
and Wisdom are to be combined; serious problems arise when that is not the case. 
3. DIVINELY GIVEN WISDOM (I KINGS 3) 
Scholars have tended to divide I Kings 3 into three components: (I) editorial remarks 
in vv 1-2; (2) material related on form critical grounds to certain ancient Near Eastern 
royal texts, or perhaps a dream form which has been reworked (w 3-15); (3) a folklore 
element featuring a dispute between prostitutes (w 16-28) .1 4 However these genetic 
issues are resolved, I want to attend to the present canonical shaping to ascertain how to 
evaluate this phase of Solomon's kingship. To that end, the role of chap. 3 in I Kings I-
I I will also have to be considered. 
In light of the introductory statements, it is difficult not to be somewhat ambivalent 
from the outset about Solomon's kingship. There is a negative cast in the note that 
Solomon entered into a marriage alliance with the Pharaoh and brought the latter's 
daughter into the royal city (I Kgs 3: I). Israelites were expressly forbidden to marry for-
eign women because of the prospect of idolatry. In two key texts where Moses and 
Joshua respectively warn Israel about the temptation to idolatry (Deut 7:3; Josh 23: 12), 
the very same term as that found here is present: Further, if the king was 
not to return to Egypt to acquire horses-as stipulated by the "law of the king' (Deut 
17: I 6)-doing so to acquire a foreign wife was surely a more serious offense. 
Unfortunately, this first marriage of Solomon after his kingship was ., established" (I Kgs 
2 :46) adumbrates his later numerous marriages which are given as the main reason for 
his precipitous collapse (I Kgs I I : 1-8l-
It is less clear how one is to assess the information about the cultic activities (I Kgs 3:2-
3), which were being carried out at "high places." These may refer to pagan worship cen-
ters.15 Perhaps the fact that the temple had not yet been built meant that such practices 
were at least temporarily licit. Still, it should not escape our notice that the statement, 
"Now Solomon loved YHWH, walking in the statutes of David his father," is bracketed by 
two qualifying sentences beginning with "only' (raq). First we are told that the people 
were sacrificing (zbh) at the high places, then that Solomon sacrificed and burned incense 
(qtr) there. When we discover later that Solomon's many wives were sacrificing (zbq) and 
burning incense as well, the repetition of vocabulary recalls this text (1 Kgs I I :8). Of 
course, Solomon's harem was being patently pagan. Was Solomon early on also acting 
Implicitly as a pagan? 
It is as though the main ingredients of Solomon's kingship, the good and the bad, are 
already present in I Kgs 3: 1_3.16 Solomon loved YHWH and followed the divine com-
mandments. But that did not prevent his ill-advised marriage and the possibly illicit cultic 
practices in which he and his people were engaged. Two Solomons, as it were, are put 
forward in the introduction to I Kings 3. The question is: Which one will finally triumph? 
The initial answer to that query is encouraging. Solomon went to Cibeon, the "great 
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high place, to offer a thousand burnt offerings, on which occasion YHWH appeared to 
him in a dream (I Kgs 3:4). When invited to ask what Cod should give him, the king's 
response could not have been more praiseworthy. Having acknowledged YHWH's loyalty 
to David, his father's exemplary obedience, and the divine role in his own succession (I 
Kgs 3:6-7a), Solomon confessed his sense of inadequacy for the job he faced. He was 
only a little child" (na'ar who did not know how to "go out or come in," that is, 
he was young and inexperienced (v 7) . His task was formidable since Israel was too great 
to be numbered (v 8). What the king wanted, therefore, was a "listening heart/mind" Oeb 
somea') and the ability to discern good from evil (v 9).' 7 Cod's granting this would enable 
him to administer justice (Iispotl. YHWH gave Solomon the opportunity to ask for any-
thing imaginable and he opted for "wisdom." That was indeed laudable. 
Cod was pleased. Since Solomon did not ask for long life, riches, or the life of his ene-
mies, but instead requested discernment for hearing justice (habfn lismoa' Cod 
gave the king a "wise and discerning heart/mind" Oeb Dakam wenabon [vv. I 1- 12]). 
What Cod granted Solomon would be unsurpassed (v 12e). In addition, Cod would 
include riches and honor precisely because the king had not sought these things (v 13l. 
Most importantly, Cod had provided Solomon with the gift most needed to rule "this 
weighty people" (v 9) justly, prudently, and wisely. 
That Solomon had without question been endowed with wisdom from Cod was 
amply demonstrated in his arbitration of the dispute brought before him by two prosti-
tutes (vv 16-27). 18 With remarkable insight into maternal instincts, the king intuited that 
the woman who was unwilling to see the living child cut in two had to be the true moth-
er (vv 26-27).19 Predictably, Israel was overwhelmed when it saw that "the wisdom of 
Cod was in him to execute justice' (kf -hokmat 'el6hfm beqirbo la 'asot [v 28]). 
With such a w ise king on the throne, Israel's prospects were exceedingly enviable. 
But there is more to Solomon's wisdom than the fact that Cod gave it and the king 
applied it. What is the connection between Solomon's divinely proffered wisdom and the 
way I Kings 3 begins? We need to remember the introductory information about the for-
eign marriage, the sacrifices and incense at high places, as well as the king's loving YHWH 
and walking in the statutes of David (vv 1-3). We also must keep in mind that Solomon 
arrived at C ibeon-the "great high place"-to make a thousand offerings (v 4l. 
Two references in the context of Solomon's receipt of wisdom are crucial in this con-
nection. One occurs during the dream, when Cod makes the lengthening of Solomon's 
days depend on the king's walking in "my ways, keeping my statutes and commandments 
as David your father did" (v 14). "Walking" (hlk), "statutes" and the example of 
David reca ll I Kgs 3:3 . In other words, Torah and David's exemplary keeping of Torah 
precede the story wherein Solomon receives divine wisdom. Wisdom cannot be thought 
of in this instance apart from Torah, and vice versa. Both wisdom and Torah derive from 
Cod. Both are to be used by the king as he rules over Israel.2o Indeed, using wisdom with-
out Torah has already been illustrated in 1 Kings 2, where destruction is the outcome. 
The second reference occurs after Solomon awakes, Before the dream the king offered 
a thousand sacrifices at Cibeon (v 4l. This was consistent with the practices of the people 
and Solomon already mentioned (vv 2-3 ). But after receiving wisdom from Cod, Solomon 
returned to Jerusalem, stood before the ark of the covenant, offered up burnt offerings and 
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peace offerings, and celebrated a meal with all his servants (v 15).21 This is most interesting 
in view of our having been informed that the people's previous cultic activities were a func-
tion of the temple's not yet having been built (v 2). Is Solomon now offering sacrifices in 
Jerusalem proleptically? Does the narration at this point signal that the combination of 
Torah and divinely given wisdom eventuates in appropriate cultic practices? Does the meal 
with his servants serve to ratify and confirm what has just happened? However such ques-
tions are answered, it seems clear that I Kings 3 depicts Solomon as a king whose behav-
ior is equally informed by the concerns of Torah and wisdom. 
According to the present canonical form, Torah cannot be thought of as "special reve-
lation' and wisdom as "general revelation."2z In I Kings 3, Torah and wisdom are tandem 
resources provided the king by God. As further evidence of this, Kenik has shown how 
much terminology in the dream sequence evokes traditional language and ideas about 
Israel's model kingn This peri cope about God's bestowal of wisdom on Solomon is 
replete with the language and concepts of Torah. 
The close association between wisdom and Torah is also confirmed by the way I 
Kings 9, a second divine appearance account, is explicitly tied to I Kings 3. After the king 
finished all his building projects, "YHWH appeared to Solomon a second time, as he had 
appeared to him at Cibeon" (v 2: wayyercP YHWH >el-selamah senft ka>aser nir>ah >elaw 
begib'6n). In this appearance, God responded to Solomon's temple dedicatory prayer 
(8: 12-61) by emphasizing Torah and the necessity of the king's adhering to it (9:4-9).24 If 
Torah is violated, Solomon's kingship will indubitably end in disaster25 Wisdom without 
Torah cannot guarantee Solomon's success. 
In the end, Solomon's kingship has to be judged according to the way that he incorpo-
rates the contents of two divine appearances, one in which wisdom is given in the "ambi-
ence of Mosaic law' (see note 23) and the other in which Torah remains the crucial ele-
ment in Solomon's carrying out the mandate he has been given. Properly understood, the 
wisdom which God gives was designed to help Solomon orient his kingship toward 
Torah, not rely on some administrative competence that is allegedly neutral with respect 
to God's will as expressed in Torah. 
4. THE SCOPE OF SOLOMON'S WISDOM (t Kcs 5:9-14 [RSV 4:29-34]) 
As impressive as Solomon's adjudication of the dispute between the prostitutes was, 
the king's wisdom went far beyond the courtroom, not only in application but in reputa-
tion. The sapiential gift which God gave to Solomon consisted of "wisdom' (hokah), 
"extraordinary discernment" (tebunah harbeh mead) and a "broad mind" (ral:lab leb), 
either the latter quality or all three qualities were "like the sand on the seashore" (5:9 
[RSY 4:2911- the amount of wisdom was equal to the number of Israelites over whom it 
was to be exercised (3:9; 4:20)' The result was that the monarch's wisdom was greater 
than that of any other sage, no matter how famous. He was wiser than the eastern and 
Egyptian wisemen26 Even worthies whose possession of wisdom was a matter of general 
knowledge (Ethan the Ezrahite; Heman, Calcol, Darda, the sons of MahoD could not 
match Solomon; thus, his fame was widespread in the surrounding nations (5: 10-11 [R5V 
4:30-31]). This wisest of sages was responsible for three thousand proverbs (mesalim) 
and one thousand and five songs (slnm); he was able to expatiate on any variety of tree, 
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beasts, birds, reptiles or fish (5: 12-13 [RSV 4:32-33]). Naturally, such sagacity eventuated 
in both royalty and ordinary folk seeking out Solomon to observe this amazing display of 
wisdom for themselves (5: 14 [RSV 4:34]). 
How should this summary of Solomon's magnificent sapiential prowess be understood 
in the overall presentation 7 At first glance, it seems without question to be an unqualified 
positive valuation. But a closer look reveals otherwise. To be sure, it continues to be 
stressed that Solomon's wisdom derived from God (5:9, 26 [RSV 4:29; 5: 12]). But the 
context has to be taken into account, for it shifts the emphasis. For one thing, the summa-
ry follows chap. 4 (RSV 4: 1-20), which, according to Stanley Walters, is an "office-note."27 
There are four of these in Samuel and one in Kings (I Sam 7:15-17; 14:47-51; 2 Sam 
8: 15-18; 20:23-26; I Kgs 4: 1-19). They are designed to differentiate the period of the 
judges and the post-Solomonic kings from the time of Israel's first three kings (Saul, David, 
Solomon) and the prophet who anointed the first two (Samuel). The various judges and 
post-Solomonic kings are separated by a rise-and-fall pattern, which is to be contrasted 
with the divisions that obtain in the Samuel, Saul, David, and Solomon stories. In addition, 
the office-notes serve a hermeneutical function in which an editorial viewpoint is con-
veyed by signaling a new, theologically significant, beginning in the narrative. 
If Walters's thesis is valid, we should be on the lookout for clues indicating a shift in 
direction in Solomon's kingship after I Kgs 4: 1-19. One may already be evident in 4:20, 
which at first appears innocuous enough; indeed, it seems to be a straightforward positive 
assertion. The population was as numerous as the sand by the sea-doubtless an allusion 
to Cod's promise to the ancestors having been fulfilled. Also, the people ate, drank and 
were happy. It seems impossible to improve on the situation. At the same time, there is a 
potentially ominous note. Solomon's rule over "all Israel" (kol yisra'el [4: I]) is the first 
datum revealed in the office-note. But this very first verse afterwards-and the last verse of 
the chapter in the Masoretic versification-refers to a divided Israel: "Judah and Israel." That 
is, in spite of the numbers, in spite of the celebration, there is already a hint of the schism 
that is soon to be triggered by Solomon's policies (I Kings I 1-12). 
Furthermore, notwithstanding the impressive achievements of Solomon which are 
rehearsed- the boundaries of the kingdom/B the tribute taken, the amount required for 
one day at court, the vast holdings in horses and, of course, Solomon's incomparable wis-
dom (5: 1-14 [RSV 4:21 -34])- there appear to be cracks in the wall. There is another dis-
quieting mention of "Judah and Israel," though it is once again found in the context of 
peace and contentment (5:4-5 [RSV 4:24-25l. Also, even the impressive foreign policy 
achievements as manifested in the arrangements made with Hiram of Tyre (5: 15-25 
[RSV 5: 1-12]) seem to be qualified by the fact that after arrangements to acquire T yrian 
materials and workers for the building of the temple, Solomon raised a levy of forced 
labor out of all Israel (5:27 [RSV 5:13]). Ironically, this notation follows immediately a 
verse that underscores Cod's gift of wisdom to Solomon (5:26 [RSV 5: 13]) . 
Perhaps we should not be surprised, since already in the office-note Adoniram's job as 
head of the forced labor contingent indicates that this was hardly a temporary policy on 
Solomon's part (4:6). Even if it is the case that the kind of labor to which Israelites were 
subjected is to be distinguished from that to which non-Israelites were subjected (see 
9: 15-22, especially v 22), that does not absolve Solomon entirely. Samuel had warned 
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early on that Israel's king would introduce a range of oppressive exactments, including 
making the people "his slaves" (I Sam 8: 11 -18, especially v 17), Besides, had Solomon's 
policy regarding Israelite laborers been as benign as some commentators maintain, it 
would be hard to explain the later reaction of Rehoboam, the king's successor (I Kgs 
12:4)29 For all his wisdom, not everything in Solomon's life portended a glorious future. 3D 
5. SOLOMON AND THE QUEEN OF SHEBA (1 Kcs 10: 1-13) 
We already know from I Kgs 5: 14 (RSV 4:34) that Solomon's wisdom gave him an 
international reputation, Thus, a state visit by the Queen of Sheba is merely illustrative of 
one particular foreign response to the Israelite king's enviable fame. She came expressly to 
test Solomon with hard questions, a test he passed with flying colors (10: 1-3), 
Consequently, she is overwhelmed by the king's abilities and surroundings, and thus effu-
sive in her praise of him (10:4-9), Once more Solomon's wisdom appears to be cast in a 
shadowless light. 
But that judgment may also be premature. Paying close attention to the Queen's 
speech where she gushes over Solomon is instructive. Having affirmed that Solomon was 
indeed greater than she had been told and that those who stood before him experiencing 
the benefits of his wisdom were most fortunate, she avers that Cod's love for Israel led 
Him to establish the king on the throne to "execute justice and righteousness" ([vv 7-9]; 
mispat This was surely among the most important duties of an Israelite king 
(see 2 Sam 8: 15), so in this instance the Queen of Sheba is echoing a decidedly Israelite 
sentiment.) I However, while she claimed that executing justice and righteousness were 
among the virtues that most caught her attention, the narrator's report about what 
impressed her most placed the accent elsewhere: the house that he had built, the food of 
his table, the seating of his officials, the attendance of his servants, their clothing, his cup-
bearers, and the burnt offerings which he made (vv 4-5). There has been a subtle shift 
from the administration of justice (3 :28) to wealth, consumption, exotic goods, ritual and 
entertainment Parker points out that none of these accumulations are said to have bene-
fitted Israel in any way- Solomon's wisdom is edging closer to the service of his own self-
aggrandizement. )2 
The texts preceding the Queen of Sheba account indicate in other ways that neither 
Solomon's reliance on wisdom nor his adherence to Torah were what they should have 
been, For example, in the account that details the building of the temple (I Kings 6), the 
construction is, as it were, "interrupted" by the insertion of a text in which YHWH point-
edly reminds Solomon to walk in '" my statutes and obey my ordinances and keep all 
my commandments and walk in them",," (v 12), The sudden appearance of YHWH dis-
abuses one of the notion that the building of the temple in and of itself could be consid-
ered an act of complete obedience without remainder. Indeed, the Lord's willingness to 
dwell among Israel was more a function of obedience than the erection of a sanctuary, 
even though the deity had commanded that it be built (v 13), 
As the narrative unfolds, we realize that the Lord's abrupt admonition in 6: 11 -13 was 
hardly superfluous, It is somewhat disconcerting that Solomon spent thirteen years on his 
palace and only seven years on the temple (6:38; 7: I), If that fact is not damning, then 
certainly the reminder that Solomon made a special dwelling for his Egyptian wife is 
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(7:8); this reference and that in 3: I do not let us forget for a moment that the king's for-
eign wife/ wives is/are going to be a problem. 
It must even be asked whether Solomon's retaining of Hiram, a craftsman from T yre, 
raises questions about the king's changing outlook and conduct, Hiram's father was a 
T yrian, his mother an Israelite from Naphtali; his "wisdom, understanding, and skill" were 
in metallurgy 0: 13-14l. Hiram contributed a great deal to Solomon's building projects (vv 
15-46)- no single person was said to have done more. Are Hiram's Tyrian connections a 
negative? Should a semi-foreigner have been so involved in the building of YHWH's 
House? Was his wisdom nothing more than technical skill and artistic aptitude?ll 
Answering these questions would be all but impossible if we possessed only the text in 
I Kings. But it is difficult to avoid thinking about a similar use of craftsmen when the 
wilderness tabemacle was under construction (Exod 31: I- II ; 35:30-36:2; see also 36:3-
38:23l. In the Exodus setting, YHWH named Bezalel and endowed him with the neces-
sary gifts, including the "Spirit of Cod," for a specialized task having to do with the tabema-
cle (31: 1-5). Oholiab and others who were to assist Bezalel were also specifically selected 
by the Lord (v 6). These craftsmen worked according to explicit divine instructions (v I Il. 
After the beginning of the desert project had been interrupted by the golden calf inci-
dent (Exodus 32-34), Moses prepared the people once more by summoning them for an 
offering (35: 1-29). Then the role of the divinely selected craftsmen was reintroduced 
(35:30-36: I). It turns out that all the artisans involved in the project received their ability 
and got their orders directly from the Lord (36: I). Cod's involvement in this could hardly 
have been more intimate. 
This contingent of divinely elected workers seems to stand in sharpest contrast to the 
man that Solomon employed. While the T yrian was possessed at one level of sufficient 
skill- skill that was indeed rooted in wisdom- there were negative factors at work. He was 
not fully an Israelite, he was not uniquely called by YHWH, he was not assisted by crafts-
men similarly endowed, and he was not said to possess the "Spirit of Cod." In spite of the 
fact that Solomon was building the temple at David's and YHWH's behest (2 Sam 7 : 13-
14; I Kgs 8 : 18-19), his use of Hiram appears to throw something of a shadow over the 
project. l4 Hiram's involvement undercuts the supposition that Solomon's building project 
was a full-orbed fulfillment of Cod's will. 
These hints of something less than Solomon's complete obedience coupled with the 
more materialistic emphasis surrounding the Queen of Sheba's visit perhaps call for 
another appraisal of the king's great temple dedicatory prayer, something which on the 
surface seems to be unassailable (8: 15-53). Throughout the prayer, Solomon entreats the 
Lord to forgive or heal Israel for any number of transgressions and their concomitant pun-
ishments. But in one instance Solomon implores the Lord to reverse the effects of exile 
(vv 46-53)1 This is an ultimate punishment for Israel. Should exile be even a remote con-
sideration for a people whose king was leading according to the twin precepts of wisdom 
and Torah? The point is not that in the event of exile YHWH would refuse to forgive and 
restore Israel. Rather, the issue turns on the fact that there might be an exile in the first 
place, since this was the punishment that Israel was to avoid at all costs. Exile could only 
mean that Israel had committed sins of such gravity and with such persistence that an 
unthinkable punishment had become a grim reality. Unfortunately, there has been a series 
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of clues leading up to the Queen of Sheba's visit which make us realize that Solomon's 
mentioning of exile in his prayer was more than hypothetical. We are doubtless supposed 
to regard Solomon's prayer as sincere, but at the same time it is one of those instances 
where the supplicant revealed more than he realized. Solomon was in effect simultane-
ously praying for the reversal of the effects of exile and prophesying that it would almost 
certainly happen. 
6. CONCLUSION 
Solomon's reign ended in unmitigated disaster-Israel was split into two and never uni-
fied again. This foolish king took many of his wives from the surrounding nations and 
erected shrines to their gods and goddesses (II: 1-8). Such egregious behavior prompted 
the Lord to denounce Solomon and raise up a series of adversaries against the kingdom 
( II: I 1-13, 14-40).35 One of these, Jeroboam ben Nebat, became king of the northern 
kingdom Israel after leading a revolt against Solomon's son Rehoboam, who was the first 
king of Judah (I 1:26-40; 12: 1-20). Though Solomon's own death was peaceful (II :4 1-
43), the death of the United Kingdom over which he had ruled and to whose end he had 
contributed could hardly have been more tragic. 
The issue brought to the forefront by this sad story is not which of several possible 
social systems are to be preferred. To judge the monarchy deficient on the basis of mod-
ern political standards is a thorough anachronism. Likewise, attributing the biblical presen-
tation of the monarchy to those who had a stake in suppressing democratic or egalitarian 
institutions is no less an ideological reading than arguing for the legitimacy of the divine 
right of kings on the basis of the text. Rather, this account is geared to raise issues having 
to do with the importance of combining Torah and Wisdom, both given by God, in the 
person of the king who was responsible for leading God's people. In I Kings I-I I , Torah 
is not to be seen as a "religious" requirement and Wisdom as a "secular" one. They 
together derive from God and are to be seen as instrumental for guiding those who are 
elected to carry out God's mandate in Israel's life. Solomon's problem was not that he 
was a king, but that he was a king who increasingly allowed to slip from his grasp the 
combination of Torah and Wisdom without which even his best efforts would be 
doomed to failure. The "wisest" thing Solomon could have done was adhere to T orah36 
The "loyal opposition" in I Kings I- I I ought not, then, to be construed as those who 
considered themselves oppressed by Solomon and then later rebelled against that oppres-
sion. From a canonical point of view, we dare not lose sight of the fact that the rebellion 
in the story was a function of YHWH's bringing judgment on Solomon's disobedience, 
not some romantic notion of the noble aspirations of the downtrodden. Indeed, the one 
who successfully led the revolt against Rehoboam- fully sanctioned by a prophet speaking 
in God's name (II :29-39)-was himself admonished to pay close attention to Torah (v 
39), Because he failed as miserably as Solomon at that task (J 2:25-33), his name became 
synonymous with inducing Israel to sin (e.g., 15:34). 
Rather, Solomon faced the task of presiding over an institution that in many significant 
ways compared to similar "worldly" institutions of the surrounding nations. At times, Israel 
wanted just such an institution (I Sam 8:5). Though problematic and potentially destruc-
tive from God's point of view (8 :7- 18), such an institution could be "sanctified" for Israel's 
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purposes. In Solomon's case, this meant combining Torah and Wisdom in the execution 
of his office. Torah and Wisdom would enable Solomon and Israel to be in but not of the 
world. Their monarchical institutions paralleled those of the pagan world in a thousand 
details. The difference-if a difference was to be maintained- would be the combination 
of Torah and Wisdom. The more Solomon moved away from these divine gifts, the more 
he became a king like all the other nations had. Apart from Torah and Wisdom, Solomon 
became increasingly of the world over against which he had been selected- and Israel had 
been elected-to be an alternative. With Torah and Wisdom, Solomon-and Israel- could 
have walked that fine line between being in but not of the world. Without them, the 
results were as disastrous as they were predictable. It soon became all but impossible to 
distinguish between Israel and any other nation. Institutional structures per se were not 
the issue. The will of God as expressed in Torah and Wisdom was. 
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LOYAL OPPOSITION AND THE LAw IN 
THE TEACHING OF JESUS: 




No study of two sayings from the synoptic tradition can completely account 
for the position that Jesus took on the Law, but for a number of reasons Mark 
10:9 and 2:27 can provide the basis for a possible way forward. Although 
occasionally disputed, both sayings have strong claims to authenticity.! Each 
impinges on a different part of the Law. Both sayings contain a prescription, as 
well as the justification for the demand made, thereby reducing the amount of 
speculation necessary in reconstructing the logic of Jesus' demand 2 And 
together they illustrate one of the central difficulties in accounting for Jesus' 
attitude toward the Law. 
Nonetheless, existing paradigms for explaining the approach taken to the Law 
by Jesus have failed to account for these sayings and those like them in the syn-
optic tradition. For example, it has been argued that Jesus describes the real 
meaning of the Sabbath in Mark 2:27.3 But that cannot be said of Jesus' treat-
ment of the so-called divorce provision in Mark 10:9. There Jesus appears to set 
the Law aside, rather than define its real meaning. 
Alternatively, one might argue, as does Marcus Borg, that Jesus' approach is 
dictated by a hermeneutics of mercy4 However, in so doing Borg is forced to 
argue that Jesus' comment on divorce was initiated by his contemporaries and, as 
a result, he relies heavily upon the secondary features of the account. 
Furthermore, he makes no attempt to explain how it is that Jesus' view of the 
divorce question can be understood in terms of a concern for mercy. 
Yet another alternative has been to combine the two models and to argue 
that Jesus at times "abrogates" the Law and, at other times, insists upon observing 
its "true meaning."s But this, like the argument that Jesus exercises his sovereignty 
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over the Law, only begs the larger questions: Was jesus inconsistent in his approach to 
the Law," or is the consistency he practices foreign to our own, cu lturally conditioned 
notions of what constitutes consistency?, If he was inconsistent by our standards and 
his, can patterns be isolated which account for at least parts of his approach? If not, on 
what basis did jesus take first one approach to the Law and then another? 
Together, then, these passages illustrate the difficulties in using some of the existing 
paradigms for understanding the problem of jesus' attitude toward the Law. For the 
same reasons, however, they also provide possible windows to the unifying "logic" 
behind part of his demands. 
II. TORAH: A PARADIGM OF ITS USE 
Accordingly we will offer an alternative paradigm; suggest other points of contact 
with the synoptic tradition; and assess the significance of the paradigm, using the 
insights of comparative religious ethics. Then we will consider where the approach 
taken by jesus might be located in a schema for charting jewish approaches to the 
Law. In closing we will identify two important implications of the results described 
here. 
A The Law, Emptied of Continued Relevance 
As described in Mark 10:9, jesus must have been aware of the fact that his 
demand impinges upon the provision for divorce in Deut 24: I. Nonetheless, he 
makes no direct reference to it. He does not refer to it in order to endorse its continu-
ing validity or to assess its meaning and appropriate application. Nor does he directly 
forbid his hearers to avail themselves of the provision.8 Instead, the logion takes the 
form of a single-stranded mashal with a nuance which is far more difficult to define.9 
As it appears in the Creek of Mark's gospel, the saying derives much of its prescrip-
tive force from the use of me with the subjunctive mood verb, XffiptS£-tffi. There are 
other features too that contribute to this impression: It is terse. The subjects and verbs 
of both clauses are arranged in antithesis to one another: 0£o<; -
- Xffiptsbffi. And the relative clause is placed in an advanced position in 
the sentence. In this way, the act of man ·'putting asunder is placed in sharp contrast 
with the act of Cod "joining together." 
There are few who would disagree about the interpretation of the second clause. It 
is a simple, unconditional prohibition of divorce. ' 0 However, by referring to that which 
Cod has "joined together," the first clause elicits assent to the notion that marriage is 
divinely instituted and, by implication, calls for a pattern of behavior which accords 
with that understanding. 
In other words, the logion does not simply call for the hearer to refrain from invok-
ing the provision for divorce. It calls for a pattern of response which takes seriously 
the character of marriage as divinely instituted." As a result the provision for divorce 
is not directly rescinded. Instead, it is emptied of any continued relevance .'2 
B. The Law, A Summons to Free Fulfillment 
Significant features of the demand in Mark 2:27 closely approximate basic features of 
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the logion in Mark 10:9. As in Mark 10:9, Jesus must have been aware that his own 
demand impinged upon the demand made by Torah. In spite of this he does not 
appeal for an approach to Sabbath observance on the basis of the Law itself. Nor does 
he explicitly summon those who hear him to abandon observing the Law. Instead, he 
simply advances his own demand. As in Mark 10:9, the demand also begins with a 
reference to the creative intent of God and, again, takes the form of an antithesis. 
In Mark 2:27, however, the contrast is sharper and has a different significance. This 
is due in part to the fact that, unlike Mark 10:9, both clauses are of equal grammatical 
value. The main clause to; DUX 'tov u'v8po)1!oV i:Yfvf1:0 is juxtaposed with 
the nominal clause OUX 6 u'V8pCOTCOV DtU 'tov The Sabbath is also the 
subject of both clauses, and this strengthens the contrast. Whereas in Mark 10:9 mar-
riage is the subject of the first clause and divorce the subject of the second. 
These are differences of considerable significance. For while both divorce and 
Sabbath observance are thereby set against the background of God's will as creator, 
the effect is not the same. The provision for divorce, as we have seen, is emptied of 
continued relevance. Framed as his demand is in Mark 2:27, Jesus summons his hearers 
to a "free fulfillment" of the Sabbath. 13 
Accordingly, Jesus provides no clue to the specific nature of the response expected. 
Instead, he confines himself to characterizing the Sabbath as God's gift to Israel and, 
only as the Sabbath is observed as gift, is the end for which it was intended realized. 
As Robert Tannehill notes: 
The lack of concern with qualifications and with the practical problem of estab-
lishing rules of behavior is quite apparent as soon as one considers the implica-
tions of such a saying within the context of Jewish piety. The saying does not 
spell out a rule which will directly solve questions of how to behave on the sab-
bath. Starting from this aphorism various practical conclusions could be reached, 
from an almost total disregard of the sabbath law because of human need to 
observance of the sabbath law except in unusual cases, since the sabbath is good 
for man. The aphorism does not predetermine the conclusion but requires the 
hearer to think about these things in a radical way. 14 
C. Other Points of Contact in the Synoptic Tradition 
Together, these two patterns provide a paradigm which can be applied to authentic 
traditions elsewhere in the gospels. The first, second, and fourth of the so-called 
antitheses found in Matt 5:21-48 provide an example. I \ 
1. The Antitheses 
Here Jesus is described as juxtaposing his own demand with that of Torah. He 
introduces his demands in language which is without substantive parallel; and he does 
so without customary recourse to other parts of the Law. Yet, as Reinhart Hummel 
observes, the antitheses "are less antithetical in content than in form. "16 
The fourth antithesis might appear to set aside the Law, but the remaining antithe-
ses do not clearly dispense with the Decalogue. Conversely, the first and second 
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antitheses might suggest a heightening of the Law's demand. Yet the fourth antithesis 
does not heighten the Law's demand, but appears instead to supplant it. 
The relationship of Torah to the prescriptive content of Jesus' demand is then of 
greater complexity than the words "radicalization; "abrogation; or "exposition" can 
account for. The patterns of prescription are, however, very much like those which we 
have identified above in Mark I 0:9 and 2:27 
On the one hand, antitheses one (on murder) and two (on adultery) can be com-
pared with Mark 2:27. Both demands point to a wider range of attitudes and actions 
than that required by the commandments by juxtaposing an additional demand with 
Torah. So the prohibition of murder is juxtaposed with the further warning: 
nus 6 0PYLS0J.l£VOs 1:0 aO£A,cp0 aino'll 
£voxo" £<J1:aL 1:11 KP'L<J£L 
And the prohibition of adultery is juxtaposed with the words : 
n&; 6 pAfnf.OV Yl.lvalxa npos 1:0 fTCt81.lJ.l1l<JaL 
li011 fJ.l0LX£l.l<J£V atmlv 
Neither antithesis begins to spell out all of the possible actions or attitudes which are 
prohibited. To the contrary, it is impossible to specify the claims which they make. In 
this way the auditor is summoned to its free fulfillment. 
On the other hand, the fourth antithesis compares favorably with Mark 10:9. Jesus 
juxtaposes the demand for trustworthy oaths with his own prohibition of oath-taking. 
The demand for trustworthy oaths is, as a result, no longer relevant: E<J1:f.O OE 6 
A6yos UJ.lWV vat val ou ou. 
2. Mark 7:15 
One or the other part of our paradigm may also apply to still other synoptic tradi-
tions. For example, in its present setting and form, Mark 7: 15 cannot be authentic.'7 
However, it may have originally had a different form, or it may have been uttered 
under circumstances which would put the logion in a very different light. Were it pos-
sible to recover the form or reconstruct the setting, we believe that the demand would 
compare well with at least part of the paradigm described above. 
So, for example, Charles Carlston argues that the earliest and authentic form of the 
saying may have been: what truly defiles a man comes from within, not from with-
OUt."' 8 If he is right, then the Law is not set aside; instead, its free fulfillment is 
demanded. And the logion, like other parts of the synoptic tradition, conforms to a 
part of the paradigm which we have identified. 
Be that as it may, by examining those prescriptive traditions with strong claims to 
authenticity, we have identified two patterns which help to define the relationship of 
Torah to the prescriptive content of Jesus' ethic. In the space remaining, it needs to be 
asked, What ties these two parts of the paradigm together? Why does Jesus take one 
position on the Torah in Mark 10:9 and another in Mark 2:27, at times emptying the 
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law of continued relevance and at other times summoning his followers to a free ful-
fillment of God's will? Is he inconsistent, or is the consistency he practices foreign to 
our own, culturally conditioned notions of what constitutes consistency? 
III. PRACTICAL JUSTIFICATION IN THE ETHICS OF JESUS 
The answer could be provided by arguing, as so many have, on the basis of coher-
ence. But this approach has bedeviled studies of the historical Jesus. Of necessity, argu-
ments from coherence begin with a given picture of the whole and then argue that 
one part or another of the tradition coheres with the larger picture that the writer has 
in mind. This approach has its advantages. However, such arguments often disregard 
the potentially diverse character of Jesus' thought and the variety of influences which 
may have shaped his thinking. Furthermore, such an approach is ultimately no more 
convincing than the extent to which one is prepared to accept a given scholar's larger 
assumptions. 
This tendency can be seen, for example, in the case which some have recently made 
for a Jesus who is a "teacher of subversive wisdom. Insisting that eschatology cannot 
account for the whole of Jesus' teaching, some have argued that the model ought to 
be completely abandoned. '9 The work of more cautious scholars suggests, however, 
that such absolute distinctions ought not to be made too quickly, or too firmly. 20 
Accordingly, the methods of comparative religious ethics are used here, believing that 
this model will allow us to analyze the use of ethical language without prejudging the 
outcome. The use of such a model also has the advantage of allowing us to study the 
use of ethical language from selected passages, without insisting on a picture of the 
whole in advance. Interpretation of the evidence will, of course, always remain a mat-
ter of debate, but in theory the use of such a method requires greater accountability 
to the evidence because it focuses upon the logic of individual demands. 
Others may question the wisdom of using a method like the one described here, 
particularly since the language of the method is patently foreign to the setting in 
which Jesus lived. Yet, like the application of other social sciences to the biblical text, 
the purpose of comparative religious ethics is not to reproduce the subject's thought-
world or thought-forms. Indeed, by using a method of this kind, we acknowledge the 
distance which exists between us and the object of study. Use of the method is also 
based upon the realization that the questions to which we seek answers may not 
have been the questions to which Jesus or his contemporaries may have addressed 
themselves. 
Nonetheless, such methods should not be allowed to force the original subject matter 
to "'say' things that are alien to its original purpose. For this reason, students of com-
parative religious ethics require that the definitions they use conform with the sub-
ject's intuitive understanding of the term and be cross-culturally applicable. A thor-
ough defense of such an approach cannot be undertaken here, but the authors of the 
method have made every effort to conform to these criteria. It has been applied to 
more than one culture, some of which are from the past. And more than one student 
of religious ethics has confirmed the model's usefulness. 21 
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A. The Logic of Religious Ethics 
The concept from comparative religious ethics which is the most helpful here is 
that of "practical justification.' In a given situation anyone making a demand must 
describe how s/ he expects an action to be performed: "What is to be done, to whom, 
in what way, under what circumstances."22 In addition, s/he may be called upon to 
give reasons for the action (or behavior) s/ he demands. 
The process of providing those reasons is called "practical justifica tion.' Although 
often unexpressed, the reasons given may, in fact, lie on one of three levels, which 




I. Principles / Rules 
t 
Situational Application 
If, for example, the speaker was called upon to justify the prescription, "do not 
strike your parents," s/he might begin with an appeal to a moral principle, such as 
"Honor your father and mother." In so doing s/he would be appealing to level one. 
Challenged, s/he may then argue that the person to whom s/he is speaking ought 
to honor her/ his parents because it is a direct commandment of the community's god. 
S/ he might also elaborate by arguing that, having accepted the premise that whoever 
has the power to create humankind has the right to be obeyed, the person to whom 
s/he is speaking is, therefore, bound by that creator's command. These appeals belong 
to level two, validation. 
Only if these last reasons were challenged as arbitrary or unreasonable would the 
speaker then be required to move to level three and to vindicate her/ his demand. The 
speaker would then need to argue by some means that it is reasonable to obey the 
creator or that there is a creator2 4 
In a religious ethic a number of statements may prove to be significant, but none is 
more important on level two (i .e., validation) than the appeal made to divine authori-
ty. Logically prior to all other demands, even the harshest or most inviting of sanctions 
are of logically secondary significance to such an appeal. Without having identified the 
divine authority making the demand, any other justification given for a course of 
action lacks meaning. Without being convinced that a certain divinity can and will 
exercise authority, the demands made lack force. 25 
B. jesus and Practical justification 
Where tradition provides us evidence that Jesus defended his demands in this way, 
he is described as having appealed to the will of the Creator. 
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1. In Mark 10:9 
The prescription in Mark 10:9 relies for justification upon an explicit appeal: 0 ... 0 
9£0C; The reference to Cod immediately suggests that we are no longer 
on the same level of the appellate ladder of practical justification as we were in dis-
cussing the appeal to moral principles. We are, instead, dealing with a higher order of 
justification: an appeal to divine authority. 
This particular appeal rests upon two basic premises. One is a prior and general 
premise (here, that the intention or design of a creator is obligatory). The other is a 
positive belief about Cod (here, that he is creator of the marital relationship). An 
instance of what students of comparative religious ethics call "proprietary 
entitlement,"26 the logic of the appeal combines these premises and, if given full 
expression, would run as follows: 
Premise I: The intention or design of a creator is right or obligatory. 
Premise 2: Cod is the creator of not only men and women, but of the relation-
ship established between them (i.e., marriage). 
Premise 3: Cod intends that man and woman live in unbroken relationship to 
one another. 
Conclusion: Therefore, maintenance of that relationship is right or obligatory. 
Appealing as Jesus does to the authority of Cod as Creator, certain understandings of 
the logion are seen to be misleading. One such interpretation is that of the appeal as one 
made to 'Scripture against Scripture,' or Schnft gegen Schrift, as some writers refer to it.27 As 
we have noted, in our judgment the references to Cen I :27 and 2:27 are both secondary. 
And even if the references were authentic, Jesus does not appear to place any weight on 
the argument that these texts (as opposed to Deut 24: I) provide an earlier, superior view 
of marriage28 or a view which must be harmonized with that of Deut 24 : 129 
Completely absent too is any indication that Jesus relied upon his own authority in 
justifying his demandJO The only evidence that might be adduced for the suggestion 
that he does is the bold character of the assertion itself. Nonetheless, it is upon Cod's 
authority that the weight of the demand rests. 
2. In Mark 2:27 
A similar justification is given by Jesus for his demand in Mark 2:27. There is only 
one difference. Rather than refer to Cod explicitly, Jesus uses a reverential circumlocu-
tion: 'Co Ota 'Cov 6: v9po:l1tov £YEV£'CO J1 Again, then, the logic of the 
appeal is that of proprietary entitlement: 
Premise I: The intention or design of a creator is right or obligatory. 
Premise 2: Cod is the Creator of the Sabbath.32 
Premise 3: Cod, in creating the Sabbath, intended that it be observed in such a 
way that man's (i.e., Israel's)l3 weI/-being would be enhanced. 
Conclusion: Therefore, that the Sabbath should be observed with a view to 
man's well-being is right or obligatory. 
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The logic of the appeal excludes alternative interpretations of the appeal from consid-
eration for the same reasons adduced in connection with Mk 10:9.34 
C The Significance of Mark 2.-27 and' 0.·9 
As brief as are the authorizing reasons offered here, their importance cannot be 
underestimated. 
1. For the Logic of Jesus' Ethic 
Together, these two passages preserve a record of Jesus validating his demands, 
using the highest order of appeal possible on that level. The only higher appeal that he 
might have made would have been to vindicate (rather than validate) his demand. That 
is, he might have attempted to defend belief in the divine authority back of his 
demand.3s This we have no record of him doing and, given the setting in which he 
taught and lived, he may not have found it necessary. 
In both prescriptions, then, we are in contact with that which is, logically speaking, 
most basic to the justification which Jesus gave for obedience to his demands: the per-
sonal authority of God, who is also creator. It is a finding which is all the more impor-
tant because it is drawn from sayings material in which both demand and the valida-
tion for the demand appear in single sayings. Separate traditions are not employed. 
The connection does not need to be reconstructed. 
To date, where scholars have argued that the Endzeit = Urzeit equation shaped the 
content of Jesus' demand, they have been forced to rely upon an argument from 
coherenceJ6 Here the connection is explicit and, using the insights of comparative reli-
gious ethics, we have been able to characterize the connection in more specific terms. 
2. For the Place of Torah in Jesus' Ethic 
The pattern of validation used by Jesus also explains why he does not begin in 
making his demands with the word of Torah itself. For him Torah is not identical in 
an absolute sense with the will of God. At times the two intersect, even though the 
demands of God's will may be impossible to specify using the Law. At other times the 
Law is emptied of continued relevance. In either case the issue is always the will of 
the Creator, which is the ultimate justification for the demands Jesus makes. Such an 
understanding of the place of divine authority in his demands and the resulting ambi-
guity in his attitude toward the Law should come as no surprise. 
IV. JESUS, JUDAISM AND THE LAW 
Judaism before, during, and after the life of Jesus manifests considerable variety of 
opinion on the place of the Law in the context of Jewish eschatological expectation. 
The schema used here for describing that variety has been developed by Gershom 
ScholemJ7 Scholem's interest is primarily in the development of the Messianic idea as 
reflected in rabbinic literature and, clearly, our interest lies elsewhere. Nonetheless, his 
schema is of considerable heuristic value: (I) Describing such expectations in terms of 
tendencies, Scholem recognizes eschatological beliefs ([ike many others) are often a 
matter of emphasis. Accordingly, his approach avoids the pitfalls of attempting to 
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assign particular approaches to one "party' or another. (2) Although his work is not of 
immediate relevance, it does establish that these emphases exist elsewhere, and there 
is no evidence to suggest that (at least in this case) there is any reason to make a spe-
cial exception for the material discussed here. (3) Scholem's schema is also at home 
with the notion that there was more than one Judaism in the ancient world. 
Specifically, he describes conservative, restorative and utopian tendencies in Jewish 
messianic thought. In what follows, we review those categories, focusing on the way 
in which Torah figures in these three visions of the future. The discussion is, necessari-
ly, illustrative in nature and is not meant to be exhaustive. 
A. Conservative, Restorative and Utopian Tendencies in Jewish Eschatology 
At times the literature can be conservative in its vision of the future. Seeking to pre-
serve that which already is, it sees even the eschatological future in these terms and, 
so, expects the Law and, in some instances, even the halakhah to be a part of that 
future. 38 So, for example, T. B. Sanhedrin 51 b reads as follows: 
R. Nahman said in the name of Rabbah b. Abbuha in the name of Rab: The 
Halachah is in accordance with the message sent by Rabin in the name of R. Jose 
b. Hanina. R. Joseph queried: (Do we need) to fix a halachah for the days of the 
Messiah? - Abaye answered: If so, we should not study the laws of sacrifices, as 
they are also only for the Messianic era. But we say, Study and receive reward. i. 
e. Learning has its own merit quite apart from any practical utility that may be 
derived therefrom 39 
Current circumstances may preclude the offering of sacrifices, but the halakhah gov-
erning sacrifice will govern eschatological practice40 It remains important even in the 
present and even now it is worthy of study. 
At other times the literature can be restorative in its outlook. Anticipating a return 
to or recreation of a past, ideal condition, the literature draws upon golden eras of the 
past, when obedience was a hallmark of man's relationship with Cod. It looks for a 
day when the demand of Torah or the will of Cod was at once lighter and heavier, 
because it is perfectly understood.41 
One portion of the Testament of Levi (apparently free at this point of later 
Christian interpolation42) envisions the future in just such terms: 
And he [i. e., the eschatological priest] shall open the gates of paradise; he shall 
remove the sword that has threatened since Adam, and he will grant to the 
saints to eat of the tree of life. The spirit of holiness shall be upon them43 
At still other times the literature can be utopian in its outlook, anticipating a state of 
affairs which never existed before. Abandoning models provided by either the past or 
the future, it can be "anarchic" in character, foreseeing a day when recourse to the 
familiar means of quantifying obedience will be unnecessary44 
Although a problematic passage, susceptible of a variety of interpretations, Jer 
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3 I :3 1-34 is clearly utopian in its outlook: 
Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant 
with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant which I 
made with their fathers when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the 
land of Egypt, my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband, says 
the Lord. But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel 
after those days, says the Lord : I will put my law within them, and I will write it 
upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no 
longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, "Know 
the Lord," for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says 
the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more. 
These three tendencies rarely, if ever, find pure expression in Jewish literature. 
Combi nations are more frequently the rule, and no one group is always the pre-
dictable advocate of a particular vision of the future 4S For example, it is not at all clear 
that Jeremiah (or the later editor of his prophecies) foresees a future entirely without 
Torah in any external sense46 His vision, therefore might be characterized as one 
shaped by both utopian and conservative impulses. Nonetheless, the influence of dif-
fering visions of the future does exist. 
B. Restorative and Utopian Tendencies in the Eschatology of Jesus 
Against this background, Jesus need not be seen as a "conservative" in order to 
locate him within Judaism; nor do we need to characterize his approach as a singular 
exception to an otherwise uniformly "conservative' world. The apparent ambiguity of 
his approach to the Law and the justification which he gives for obedience to his 
demands suggest that his ethic had restorative inspiration and that he drew at length 
for such inspiration upon the creative role of God. Endzeit may not have been Urzeit 
for Jesus in that he draws at length upon the Genesis account, but the will of the 
Creator certainly appears to have been the will of the one who brings the end. 
However, the tendencies in his thought do not appear to have been limited to the 
restorative impulse. He foresees obedience of a kind for which the creation narratives 
may provide inspiration, but they do not completely delimit his demands. As such, he 
re-envisions the return of the Creator, embracing not only a restorative, but utopian 
vision of things to come. It is, nonetheless, a Jewish vision of the future and of the 
Law's place in it, shaped by hopes that had and would continue to shape those visions. 
V. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
Of course, just how far these categories dominated Jesus' thought and even his 
approach to the Law remains to be seen. As was noted above, the results of this study 
are necessarily provisional. We have dealt with only a few of the sayings which might 
be discussed and with only prescriptive sayings. 
Nonetheless, the passages have strong claims to authenticity and provide an opportu-
nity to study not only the kind of demands which Jesus made, but the justifying rea-
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sons which he provided for those demands as well. Avoiding reconstruction across 
sayings and prescinding from an appeal to larger assumptions about the nature of the 
teaching of Jesus, this approach located at least one dimension of his approach to the 
Law squarely within the Judaisms of his day. 
The evidence described indicates that it is premature to argue that an eschatological 
understanding of Jesus should be replaced by a sapiential one:? Such a position not 
only fails to account for the kind of evidence described here, but overlooks the possi-
bility that Jesus could have been influenced by both realms of thought. 48 Any long-last-
ing contribution to the discussion of what the whole of Jesus' teaching may have 
looked like will need to avoid the simplistic and misleading "either/or" that has charac-
terized much of the past debate. 
The logic of the demands made by Jesus also presents a challenge to the ··either/or'· 
approach which has characterized the discussion of parts of Jesus' teaching - specifi-
cally, the relationship between ethics and eschatology in his thought. The insights of 
comparative religious ethics suggest that both divine authority and eschatological 
understandings of God are too closely intertwined in the demands which Jesus made 
to justify arguing that either "theo-Iogy' or oIeschato-logy" is more basic to the teaching 
of Jesus. The former might be argued to be logically prior, but the latter proves to be a 
part of the most basic appeals which Jesus makes when justifying his demands:o 
As such the ethic of Jesus is at odds with conservative understandings of God's will 
and breaks in upon attempts to capture the will of God in those terms. However, the 
"loyal opposition'· Jesus practices is not opposition for opposition's sake. In the 
Kingdom one confronts again and again the will of the God who was, who is and 
who will be. 
NOTES 
I. On both the form and authenticity of Mark 10:9, see: P. Winter, On the Trial of Jesus (SJ 
I; Berlin: de Gruyter, 1961), p. 112 n. 4; E. Trocme:, The Formation of the Gospel according to 
Mark (London: SPCK, 1963), p. I IOn. I; T.W. Manson, The Teaching of Jesus. Studies of Its Form 
and Content (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1967), pp. 29 1-92; On Mark 2:27, see e.g., E. 
Kasemann, The Problem of the Historical Jesus (SBT 40; London: SCM, 1964), pp. 38-39; E. 
Lohse, "Jesu Worte uber den Sabbat," Judentum, Urchristentum, Kirchen, Festschrift fiir Joachim 
Jeremias (SZNW 26; 2nd ed.; Berlin: T6pelmann, 1964), p. 85; H. Braun, Spiitjudisch-hal retischer 
und fruhchristlicher Radikalismus, Jesus lion Nazareth und die essenische Qumransekte (sHT 24 / 2; 
Tubingen: Mohr, 1957), p. 70 n. I; E. Schweizer, The Good News According to Mark (London: 
SPCK, 1971), p. 72; and H. Hubner, Das Gesetz in der synoptischen Tradition. Studien zur These 
einer progressilien Qumranisierung und Judaisierung innerhalb der synoptischen Tradition (Witten: 
Luther, 1973), pp. 120-21. 
2. On the performative and, therefore, prescriptive force of the language used here, see 
D.o. Evans, The Logic of Selflnliolliement, A Philosophical Study of Everyday Language with Special 
Reference to the Christian Use of Language about God as Creator (London: SCM, 1963), pp. 27-78. 
3. I. Abrahams, Studies in Pharisaism and the Gospels (2 vols.; Cambridge: Cambridge 
University, 1917), I: 134 and DE Nineham, The Gospel of St. Mark (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 
1963), pp. 105-106. 
4. M.J. Borg, Conflict, Holiness & Politics in the Teachings of Jesus (Studies in the Bible and Early 
Christianity 5); (New York, NY: Mellen, 1984), p. 161. 
42 Schmidt 
5 E. P. Sanders, jesus and judaism (London: SCM, 1985), p. 267. 
6. Both because he was a Galilean and because he taught in the period before the devel-
opments of the second century, such inconsistency is hardly unthinkable. See G. Vermes, "jesus 
the jew: Christian and jewish Reactions," Toronto journal of Theology 4 (1988): I 16. Also: B. j. 
Lee, The Galilean jewishness of jesus, Retrieving the jewish Origins of Christianity (New York, NY: 
Paulist, 1988), 1:127-3 1. 
7. 0 ., for example, the apparently "chaotic" character of Rabbinic thought which is, in 
fact, governed by an "organismic process of integration' foreign to our own approach . See M. 
Kadushin, The Rabbinic Mind Ord ed.; New York, NY: Bloch, 1972), pp. 14-34. 
8. Cf. the first half only of Banks' observation (jesus and the Law in the Synoptic Tradition 
[SNTSMS 28; Cambridge: Cambridge University, 19751, p. 242): ".jesus neither moves out 
from the Law in making his own demands nor relates these requirements back to it." For a just 
criticism of the second half of Banks' statement see Sanders, jesus, p. 247. 
9. R. Bultmann, The History of the Synoptic Tradition 2nd ed. (Oxford : Blackwell, 1972), p. 
8 1. Perhaps more accurate is R. Tannehill's description of it as an "antithetical aphorism" (The 
Sword of His Mouth SBLLS I; (Missoula, MT: Scholars, 19751, p. 95) 
10. E.g., C.E.B. Cranfield, The Gospel according to Saint Mark (Cambridge: Ca mbridge 
University, 1959), p. 32 1; E. Haenchen, Der Weg jesu, Eine Erkliirung des Markus-Evangeliums und 
der kanonischen Parallelen (Berlin: T6pelmann, 1960), pp. 339-3 40; and D.R. Catchpole, 'The 
Synoptic Divorce Material as a Traditio-Historical Problem:' Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 
57(1974)1 18. 
I I. Cf. Tanneh ill (Sword, pp. 95-96): "The possibility of separation is brought up against 
God's act of joining man and woman. There is no longer an option which man may exercise 
without offense to God. The whole marriage relation is understood in light of the active pres-
ence of God realizing his wi ll in the union of man and woman. There is no possibility of the 
destruction of this re latio n with impunity." 
12. Banks (jesus, pp. 149-50) w rites: '".the Deuteronomic provision is thus neither abrogat-
ed nor expounded but set in a context in which it no longer applies." Although similar to the 
view which I take here, we differ at two crucial points: (I) Unlike Banks, I be lieve that jesus 
advances his demand, fully aware of the fact that he thereby relativizes the authority of the Law 
and (2) that he does so not on the basis of his own authority, but on the basis of God's (see 
below). 
13. I have borrowed the expression, "free fulfillm e nt," from G. Scholem ("Toward an 
Understanding of the Messianic Idea in judaism," in The Messianic Idea in Judaism, and Other 
Essays in Jewish Spirituality [London: Allen & Unwin, 197 11, pp. 20-2 1), who uses it in another 
connection. 
14. Tannehill, Sword, p. 94. 
I 5. The re lative consensus on the authenticity and earliest form of these antitheses is 
acknowledged even by its opponents: e.g., M.j. Suggs, 'The Antitheses as Redactional Products; 
jesus Christus in Historie und Theologie, Neutestamentliche Festschrift fUr Hans Conzelmann zum 60. 
Geburtstag (ed. G. Strecker; Tubingen: Mohr, 1975), pp. 433, 435. The most recent defense of 
th e consensus is that provided by G. Strecker, The Sermon on the Mount, An Exegetical 
Commentary (Nashville, TN: Abingdon, 1988), pp. 62-64. 
16. R. Hummel, Die Auseinandersetzung zwischen Kirche und judentum im Matthausevangelium 
(BET 33; Munchen: Kaiser, 1963), p. 72. 
17. See H. Ra',sanen, "Jesus and the Food Laws: Reflections on Mark 7: 15," journal for the 
Study of the New Testament 16 (1982): 89 and now, Sanders, jesus, pp. 266-67. 
18. C. Carlston, 'The Things That Defile (Mark vii.14) and the Law in Matthew and Mark, 
New Testament Testament Studies 15 (1968-69): 95. 
The Ethics of a Restorative and Utopian Eschatology 43 
19. M.J. Borg, "A Renaissance in Jesus Studies," Theology Today (1988): 28S-88. 
20. J.G. Williams, "Neither Here Nor There, Between Wisdom and Apocalyptic in Jesus' 
Kingdom Sayings," Forum (1989): 7-30. 
21. D. Little and S.B. Twiss, Comparative Religious Ethics (San Francisco, CA: Harper & Row, 
1978) and J. Ladd, The Structure of a Moral Code, A Philosophical Analysis of Ethical Discourse 
Applied to the Ethics of the Navaho Indians (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1957). 
22. Little and Twiss, op. cit., pp. 99-100. 
23. The diagram and the illustration which follows is adapted from the work of Little and 
Twiss, op. cit., p. 99. 
24. For further on this subject and the subject of practical justification in general, see Little 
and Twiss, op. cit., pp. 96-122 and Ladd, Moral Code, pp. 146-91. 
25. 0. Little and Twiss, op. cit., pp. 59-6 I . 
26. Ibid , p. 183. 
27. E.g., Catchpole, "Divorce Material," p. 121. 
28. O. H.J. Schoeps, "Restitutio Principii as the Basis of the Nova Lex Jesu," Journal of Biblical 
Literature 66 (1947): 453, 456. 
29. Ibid. , pp. 454-55. 
30. Banks, Jesus, pp. 150-5 I. 
3 I. See: U.B. Muller, "Vision und Botschaft. Erwagunge n zur prophetischen Struktur der 
Verkundigung Jesu," Zeitschrift furTheologie und Kirche 74 (1977): 437. 
32. In implying that the Sabbath is part of God's primordial creation, Jesus' thought approxi-
mates that of the writer of Jub 2, esp. vv 23, 30 and 31. See M. Testuz, Les idees religieuses du 
Livre Jubites (Geneva: Droz, 1960>, pp. 140-43. In Jubilees, however, the Sabbath is preserved to 
be given to Israel, presumably with Torah (v 20>, and appropriate behavior on the Sabbath is 
specified (vv 26-33>' 
33. See: E. Lohmeyer, Das Evangelium des Markus (Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar uber 
das Neue Testament 2; 10th ed.; Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1956), p. 66. 
34. Those who believe that the reference to I Samuel is original regard Jesus' defense of his 
demand as appeal to scripture against scripture (e.g., Cranfield, Mark, p. I IS). Others detect an 
appeal to christology: e.g., Banks, Jesus, p. I 50-51. 
35. On the subject of vindication, see: Little and Twiss, Ethics, pp. II 1-16. 
36. The best of recent descriptions is probably that given by B.F. Meyer, The Aims of Jesus 
(London: SCM, 1979), pp. 137-53. However, in our opinion Meyer exaggerates the distance 
between Jesus and his contemporaries. Having argued that Jesus is heir to what we describe 
below as the restorative impulse in Jewish theology, he then describes Jesus in terms which are 
seemingly foreign to the rest of Judaism. 
37. Scholem, "Messianic Idea," esp. pp. 3-4. 
38. Ibid., p. 3. 
39. As quoted in W.o. Davies, Torah in the Messianic Age and/or the Age to Come (JBLMS 7; 
Philadelphia, PA: Society of Biblical Literature, 1952), p. 64. 
40. On the meaning of this passage, see : Davies, ibid., pp. 63-64. 
41. Cf. Scholem, "Messianic Idea," pp. 3, 20. On the broader impact of the restorative 
impulse in Jewish eschatology, see: H. Gunkel, Schopfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit. Eine 
Religionsgeschichtliche Untersuchung iiber Cen 1 und Ap Joh 12 (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und 
Ruprecht, 1895) and J. Je remias, "rcapaoncro"," Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 
(1967) 5 :765-68. 
42. The composition and provenance of the Testaments is often difficult to determine. 
Here, however, the prominence of the Testament's eschatological priest suggests a Maccabean 
o rigin for the passage cited here. See: ].] . Collins, "Testaments," Jewish Writings of the Second 
44 Schmidt 
Temple Period (ed. Michael E. Stone; Compendia Rerum ludaicarum ad Novum Testamentum 
2.2; Assen: Van Gorcum, 1984), p. 343. 
43. H.C. Kee, trans. , "Testaments of the Twelve Patriarc hs, " The Old Testament 
Pseudepigrapha, vol. I of Apocalyptic Literature and Testaments, ed., John H. Charlesworth 
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1983), 
44. Cf Scholem, "Messianic Idea," p. 21. 
45. Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
46. Davies, Torah , pp. 16-26. 
47. Contra (among others) Borg jesus, pp. 10- 14, pp. 97- 124 and now, John Dominic 
Crossan, The Historical jesus, The Life of a Mediterranean Jewish Peasant (San Francisco, CA: Harper, 
1991), 
48. Cf Williams, "Neither Here Nor There: pp. 7-30. 
49. It is precisely this either/or choice which two of the most recent contributors attempt to 
impose upon the debate. Heinz Schurmann argues, for example, that "theo-Iogy" is more basic. 
See his: "Das hermeneutische Hauptproblem der Verkundigung lesu, Eschto-Iogie und Theo-
logie im gegenseitigen Verhaltnis," Gott im Welt, Festgabe fur Karl Rahner (ed., lB. Metz, et al.; 
Freiburg: Herder, 1964), pp. S81-82, pp. 600-601 J. By contrast, Helmut Merklein argues that 
the theo-Iogy of Jes us is an implication of his eschato-Iogy. See his Die Gottesherrschaft als 
Handlungsprinzip, Untersuchung zur Ethik jesu (fB 34; Wurzburg: Echter, 1978), pp. 212-13. 
IMAGES OF THE CHURCH IN 1 
CORINTHIANS AND 1 TIMOTHY 
AN EXERCISE IN CANONICAL 
HERMENEUTICS 
EUGENE E. LEMCIO 
I. INTRODUCTION 
It is my great pleasure to offer this essay in tribute to Professor Robert W. Lyon, 
my first teacher of New Testament exegesis and criticism at Asbury Theological 
Seminary. Although he set rigorous academic standards, our honoree always 
stressed the need for scholarly endeavor to serve the people of God within whose 
faith and life the documents originated. Therefore, churchman that he is, it is fitting 
that my subject should deal with some aspect of the Church's life and thought 
which are to be found in the NT. But Bob is a certain kind of churchman, believing 
that the people of God need to know how to hear and accommodate the loyal 
(might we say "loving"?) opposition within it. At its best, a conversation among mul-
tiple and diverse voices on the grand theme(s) of Scripture can move us closer to 
the ideal of the Church as semper reformanda. It is in this spirit that I offer this two-
part thesis in commemoration of his retirement: (I) By approaching I Corinthians 
and I Timothy via their dominating images of the Church as body and house(hold), 
one is thereby able to integrate (and not merely treat in no particular order or con-
figuration) their primary themes or motifs, respectively. (2) These two distinct 
images (and the internally-integrated themes which they "control") are in "opposi-
tion" to each other in the sense that they resist the objectifying and absolutizing of 
one over the other: i.e., they protest the confusing of these or any other image with 
the single reality to which they join us. 
On the way to developing these points further, a word needs to be said about 
definitions and rationales which should be kept in mind throughout. 
I. [ concur with those who see in I Corinthians and I Timothy two very differ-
ent views of the Church and church life. Others might minimize the diversity. Since 
both, after all, do appear in the same Canon, they cannot be that far apart. 
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Obviously, enough of a similarity exists between them that permitted each to be included. 
In response, one may point to significant diversity among other NT writers. There is the 
multiple gospel corpus. The Synoptics differ among themselves according to the manner 
by which each evangelist adopts, adapts, and arranges his traditions. And there are the 
well-known contrasts between the Synoptics and John. Acts reports tensions in the early 
Church between non-hellenistic and hellenistic Jewish Christians (6 : 1-6) and between 
these and the Pauline Gentile mission (15: 1-5). The Apostle in Galatians vividly recounts 
his "heart-to-heart" with Peter at Antioch (2 : 11 -14). Furthermore, the Canon itself pre-
serves the literary contributions of these disputants in the two epistolary corpora: Pauline 
and "general" or "catholic."1 
2. We have here at least a toleration, if not delight, in plurality and diversity. It is legiti-
mated. The Bible itself tells us so. Consequently, whatever hermeneutical method is used 
to interpret the NT, it shall have to avoid harmonization, reduction to a common denomi-
nator, and preferential treatment of one document over another, and one theme above 
another. So it is, as Paul Minear observes, with images: "No writer makes any single image 
serve in a passage of any length as the only or sufficient analogy for the community of 
faith. There is, however, an equally significant corollary. If no figure dominates the stage, 
all figures gain in import by sharing that stage.2 However, there are boundaries. Only this 
much variety is sanctioned. If there is deviation, it is "standard deviation."l 
3. But why approach this study via "images" rather than through examining themes or 
Leitmotivs? The reason lies in part with my discontent with the way in which the latter 
kind of investigation usually emerges as "singular" and "horizontal" in character. Images, 
however, tend to organize several categories at first regarded as separate into a cluster or 
gestalt. My thinking first started moving in this direction as I began reading bumperstickers 
more carefully. There was a certain cohesiveness or integrity to the presence of these 
signs anticipating the 1984 presidential election: "Reagan-Bush, "Free Trade, "Nuclear 
Power," "Pro-Life," "Support the Right to Bear Arms." Likewise, the following constellation 
of stickers had its own integrity: "Mondale-Ferraro," "Fair Trade,' "Solar Power," "Pro-
Choice," "Support the Right to Arm Bears. 
What is the 'glue' which binds these slogans together? My claim is that controlling 
images (including verbal ones) help to envision or picture such a gestalt. This is clear 
when we observe how much of a community's modus operandi is determined by the sym-
bols and metaphors that organize its complex of persons and policies.4 In the fairly recent 
past, small colleges and universities occasionally employed family language to describe the 
character of campus life. However, one may now find the president referred to as the 
CEO of a "management team" in a corporation having to pay attention to the "bottom 
line" and the products' which one "delivers" to various "markets" This view of education 
as a business enterprise has profound and not-so-subtle effects on the concept of mission, 
curriculum development, faculty hiring and promotion, and student recruitment. So far as 
I Corinthians and I Timothy are concerned, I shall endeavor to show how the body lan-
guage of the former and the house(hold) language of the latter account for and integrate 
several categories: Christology, faith, Pneumatology, church organization, leadership, class, 
women, and eschatology. In other words, I shall not be so much concerned with deter-
mining a singular meaning for "body' and "house(hold)" as I will with showing how they 
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work to give coherent shape to these internal "themes." 
4. Furthermore, I shall attempt to suggest how the diversity between these two images 
and the subjects which they "control" may function in an equally authoritative way to 
determine the "whole counsel of God." The Canon itself, when viewed with sufficient 
comprehensiveness, can provide the clues. It conveys not only standard subject matter 
but also standard means of making it "work." Four phenomena are crucial. (a) The Bible 
legitimizes multiple visions and expressions of the same reality. For example, the 
Abrahamic and Davidic Covenants appear in both unconditional and conditional forms 
(Genesis 12 and 22, 2 Sam 7: 14-16 (See Psalm 89) and I Kings 9, respectively). The role 
of human, ethical response in justification is conveyed variously in Galatians and James. 
(b) Scripture contains both a conservative and libertarian attitude towards tradition, seen 
most clearly in the gospel tradition. One is concerned to preserve and conserve. The 
other is to adapt and apply. (c) With multiple visions and a dual attitude to tradition, the 
authors themselves inform, confirm, and correct their readers, depending on the need. In 
other words, having argued for or assumed a foundation of thought and experience, writ-
ers either provide weal or pronounce woe, either console or condemn. (Or, more often, 
they do both, to one degree or another). (d) Documents possessing the qualities in (aHC) 
seem to have been selected for their capacity to transcend the original Sitze im Leben so as 
to "speak" to future generations in other times and places. Can we understand the role of 
the two letters in this light? My suggestion is that one of the canonical functions of 
Corinthians is to confirm the genius of all corinthian-like church situations and to criticize 
excesses or shortcomings of those of the timothean kind-and vice versa. In other words, 
readers in every age were intended to gaze into these full-length, I 80-degree mirrors, 
reflecting the whole truth about themselves, "warts and aiL" It remains for us to see which 
of the two images tends to govern and support a particular tradition in our own day and 
how each will convey bane or offer blessing (or both)S 
5. In the process, it will be apparent that certain kinds of historical questions are out of 
place in such canonical (biblical theological) study.6 Whether or not Paul wrote I Timothy 
is not a criterion for making a value judgment for or against the views of the letter. Is it 
the historical authors of the NT who are authoritative, or is it the corpus of literature rec-
ognized as such by the Church? We do not have the option of preferring I Corinthians 
above I Timothy (or vice versa) . So, the focus of attention is on exegeting the final form 
of the canonical text rather than on the historical reconstruction of each church's beliefs 
based on information mined from the NT. Here we have a microcosm of the classical 
debate on the nature of biblical theology. 
6. Ultimately, interpreters will have to consider more self-consciously the nature and 
role of image-symbol-metaphors in exegesis and hermeneutics. With apologies to Ogden 
Nash, one has to ask, "What's a meta for?" As their etymology suggests, symbols act pri-
marily as bridges, connectors «j'\)v+ = "throw together") which "carry [us] 
across" (/.-Lf't<X + <pfPftV) from one understanding or experience to another (and back?). 
They are not the reality about which they speak. Rather, they enable us to move from 
our present conception or experience of it to another. Such a shift can be a disturbing 
experience. Quoting Amos Wilder,' Paul Minear writes that the symbols touch, ''' that 
level of experience ... where man is made and unmade, where the world is shaped and 
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reshaped, whe re the bondage of necessity or social and psychological patterns is dis-
solved."'8 Of their particular usefulness, Minear writes, "In every generation the use and re-
use of the Biblical images has been one path by which the church has tried to learn what 
the church truly is, so that it could become what it is not. For evoking this kind of self-
knowledge, images may be more effective than formal dogmatic assertions. This may well 
be why the New Testament did not legislate any particular definition of the Church and 
why Christian theology has never agreed upon any such definition."9 
7. Furthermore, we have to ask how much of the metaphor is essential and how 
much of it is penumbral? It used to be (until the end of the nineteenth century) that each 
detail of a parable was thought to correspond to a point whose message was equally 
meaningful and authoritative. Then Adolf luelicher convinced several generations of 
scholars that there was only one central point to be made and sought. iO Thus, in the 
Parable of the Unjust Judge (Luke 18: 1-8), one is not to deduce that God is corrupt but 
that, on analogy, he will hear the case (the "prayer") of the persistent petitioner. In recent 
years, several scholars have rightly dared to challenge an overly-mechanical application of 
Juelicher's fundamental insight. " Yet, the main point still stands. So it is with more com-
plex analogies such as metaphors. We may have to distinguish the primary vision which 
the core of the image promotes from penumbral, optical distortions which adhere. In 
other words, the idea of household does not stand or fall with the presence or absence of 
servitude from slaves. Nor does such an image of the Church require that women be 
excluded from leadership roles. In this way, one can avoid the "battle of the proof-texts' 
approach, whereby an opponent's scriptural backing / bashing can be countered by 
another, equally as authoritative (and damaging). 
8. Imagistic language is flexible in other ways. The same metaphor can have positive and 
negative applications. For example, government can function under God (Romans 13) or 
under the Devil and his henchpersons (Revelation 13). The Temple can realize its purpose 
as a house of prayer for all the nations, or it may degenerate into a den of thieves (Mark 
I I). Families may be either healthy or "dysfunctional" (a word whose usefulness (functionali-
ty) is nearing extinction). Because Jesus' own relatives regarded him mad and requiring isola-
tion (Mark 3:2 1), he redefined his family along other lines: those who do the will of God 
(vv 31-35). However, by this appeal to the flexibility of language, I am not suggesting that 
exegesis of the specifics is no longer important for hermeneutics. Nor am I proposing that 
the Prologue to 5t. John's Gospel should read, "In the beginning was the metaphor." Rather, 
I am calling for an exegesis (and hermeneutic) of the reigning metaphors or images. What is 
their role in the communicative and interpretive task? in doctrine? 
So far as organization is concerned, I shall move in two stages: Part II wi ll explore the 
dominating image of the Church in each letter, demonstrating how each vision controls 
or governs several categories. In Part III, I shall attempt to show how each NT paradigm 
and its constituent parts might function as mirrors of contemporary church life, at least on 
the American scene. 
II. IMAGES OF THE CHURCH 
In I Corinthians, body imagery prevails, especially in chap. I 2 where Paul attempts to 
prevent both uniformity and disunity resulting from a misunderstanding and misappropri-
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ation of spiritual gifts. This problem is but a variant, perhaps the most serious one (requir-
ing three chapters of attention), of the difficulty announced as early as I : I O. So the 
Apostle appeals for the charismata to bring about unity from diversity. However, my main 
concem is not to repeat that common observation but to concentrate on the character of 
the body language. Of the I 14 instances of swma in the NT, 46 occur in I Corinthians in 
various senses. None ever appears in the Pastorals. The usages salient for my purpose are 
these: "just as the body is one and has many parts ... , thus also Christ. For we all were also 
baptized into one body by one Spirit... (vv 12-13). Rather than join the debate over 
every contested point here, I shall concentrate on the character of the image.12 This lan-
guage suggests inter-relation with Christ (however defined) and with others so joined with 
him, such that what affects a part, affects the whole (3: 17; 5:5, 6, 9-13; esp. 12:26). The 
picture of the Church which emerges is that of a collective, intimate, organic, integrative, 
dynamic entity. 
In I Tim 3: 15, the Pastor regards the Church as "the house (hold) of God, the bulwark 
and pillar of the truth ."ll No such sense occurs in I Corinthians. I. This determinative ref-
erence is reinforced in vv 4, 5, and 12, where leaders, unable to "rule" at home, will hard-
ly be successful in this role in the Church. To appreciate the full impact of "house(hold)," 
we must not think of a modem, single-family dwelling inhabited by two parents and one 
and three quarter children (mistakenly called "traditional" by careless politicians and 
churchpeoplel. Wayne Meeks observes that "the household was much broader than the 
family in modern Western societies, including not only immediate relatives but also slaves, 
freedmen, hired workers, and sometimes tenants and partners in trade or craft."15 All of 
this needed to be organized and administered as a veritable institution requiring structure, 
order, and efficiency. A premium would be put on preserving and protecting life and 
property. "The strucuture of the oihos was hierarchical, and contemporary political and 
moral thought regarded the structure of superior and inferior roles as basic to the well-
being of the whole society."1 6 
"Pillar and bulwark of the truth" extends the image in the direction of the cultus: the 
"house of God," i.e. the Temple (or a pagan shrine). Here, too, the religious image sug-
gests something more than a place where God and people meet: orders of priests, rota-
tions of service, supply of sacrificial offerings, furniture, paraphenalia, and the oversight 
required to make everything work. Stability and propriety, conserving of tradition, and the 
passing on of sound teaching belong quite naturally to such an environment. More can be 
said under this heading, but I shall reserve pressing the point further for the categories that 
follow. It is enough to observe that we have before us the differences which exist 
between an organism and an organization. l? 
Christology 
The prevailing image of the Church in Corinthians has its roots in a particular 
Christology, which branches out in several directions. This appears most specifically at 
15:20-22, especially in the "in Adam" - "in Christ" contrast, where each is viewed as a cor-
porate or at least representative figure. The fundamental issue is that Paul uses the language 
of organic, 'personal' connection between Christ and both individual Christians and their life 
together as a body. Clowney points out that "The key to Paul's use of the metaphor 'body 
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of Christ' lies in this representative principle as it is applied to the literal body of Christ. 
He ... refers to Christ's physical body when he says .. .'Whoever partakes of the sacrament 
unworthily is 'guilty of the body and blood of the Lord' (I Cor I I :27l. Here the crucified 
body is in view." IB Subsequently, the Apostle takes the imagery further: "For you [emphatic] 
are [thel body of Christ and individually members [of itl" (v 27. See 10: 16-17). Earlier, he 
had argued that the reason that Christians may not unite physically with prostitutes is that 
their bodies (here, individually) are members of Christ (6: 15l. Sexual ethics are grounded, 
not in an idea about Christ, but in one's union with Him, however that might actually occur. 
Once again, there is a sense of intimate relationship and "organic" connection. 
In I Timothy, the relation between Christ and believer is more formal and remote. 
The creed or hymn of 3: I 6 emphasizes several revelatory moments of salvation history-
all "public' and none of them directly touching the Church's experience of him. Earlier, 
Christ Jesus is portrayed (2:5-6) as the man who mediates between God and humankind. 
He spans the gap. But mediation, while suggesting a certain kind of resultant proximity 
(he mediates as a human for humans),19 does not necessarily mean intimacy.2o The soteri-
ology of ransom for many suggests substitution or exchange rather than incorporation. In 
chap. 6, the author lays a different Christological groundwork for ethics. The foundation is 
not the current, mystical union with the risen Christ. Rather, Timothy is to fight the good 
fight and run the race by looking back to the good confession which Jesus made before 
Pontius Pilate (v 13) and by looking forward to the "appearance of our Lord Jesus Christ" 
(v 14). Instead of proximity, there is remoteness. (Once again, I must remind the reader 
that I am not making a value judgment here,) 
(The) Faith and Truth 
Likewise, the language of faith matches the ecclesial and Christological images just 
reviewed. So, the accent in I Corinthians falls on faith's subjective dimension. In general, 
Christian faith is not to be defined in terms of human wisdom but according to the Spirit 
and power of God (2:5l. That same Spirit grants a special exercise of faith (12:9l. But 
faith capable of moving mountains means nothing without love (13 :2), which is superior 
to all (v 13l. Yet, there are objective grounds for this subjective response. Empty is the 
Corinthians' faith (and so is the apostolic preaching) if Jesus did not rise from the dead 
(15: 14, 17). Of course, such an emphasis is not lacking in I Timothy (e.g., I: 5, 14, 19; 
2:7, 15). However, dominating this letter is the articular "the" faith, a reference to a body 
of doctrine, of teaching (3 :9; 4: I, 6; 5:8; 6: 10,12, 211. In fact, the two expressions ('trIO' 
1ttO''tHOO' Kat 'tljO' KaAljO' OtOaO'KaAtaO') appear together at 4:6 (See v I). The preser-
vation and transmission of teaching (also specified in some cases as "sound" or "healthy") 
dominates the letter (1 :10; 4:1, 6,13; 5:17; 6:1, 3). Furthermore, the role of teaching 
looms large here, too. Thus, besides calling himself a preacher and apostle, Paul early on 
(2:7) claims to be a "teacher [OtOaO'KaAoO'l of the Gentiles in faith and truth" (or,'a 
faithful and true teacher"?). Although women are not permitted this role (v II), teaching 
(OtOaO'KEw) is incumbent upon the young Pastor (4: I I, 6:2) and a qualification for the 
bishop who must be OtOaK'ttKoO' (3 :2). 
Of course, these activities are to be found in I Corinthians; but they bear a different 
nuance, a sense governed by the dominant vision. LuoaK'ttKoO' is not so much a qualifi-
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cation as it is a spiritual endowment (2: 13, twice). The Spirit grants to the body the 
charism of teachers (12:28, third in the listl, though not all teach (the Greek grammar 
requires a negative response to Paul's questions in v 29), In a more general sense, Paul 
(and even nature itself) teaches (4: 17, II: 14, 14:6). And the Corinthians themselves may 
introduce into Christian worship a psalm, a teaching, revelation, tongue, and interpreta-
tion (14 :26), Finally, in the pastoral letter, faith and teaching are grounded in the truth 
(2:7, 4:3. See 2:4, 6:5). All of this corresponds naturally to an understanding of the 
Church in 3: 15 as both the "house" of God and the ·'support and pillar of the truth. '· (Not 
surprisingly, what follows in v I 6 bears the marks of a creed or confession about the 
··mystery of godliness' or ·'piety".) The point is not that such formality is lacking entirely in 
I Corinthians (See 5:8 and 13:6). Paul can be very conscious about the reception and 
transmission of traditions (I 1:2, 23; I 5:3), However, the communication of revelation 
both through him (as a bearer of a "word from the Lord" in chap. 7) and through the 
Spirit is much more direct and ad hoc and in keeping with the body language of this letter. 
The Spirit 
Next to Christology, perhaps the closest link with the image of the Church as body is 
with Paul's claims about the Spirit's role. It is He who enables one to confess jesus' lord-
ship (12 :3), in whose body believers are discrete members (v 27), Each of the Spirit's indi-
vidual and varied gifts is designed to function for the common good (v 7 and much of 
chap. 14's argument about the relative value of the gifts of prophecy and tongues speak-
ing). Throughout the discussion, there is constant oscillation between the diversity of the 
charismata and the unity of the Spirit, who apportions them as he wills (vv 8-11. See vv 
4-6 for the ·'proto-Trinitarian' origins (the same Spirit, Lord, and God) for the varieties of 
gifts, service, and working). In the middle of Paul's development of the body imagery, the 
link with Spirit is most clear at v 13: "by the one Spirit, we were all baptized into the one 
body and were made to drink of the one Spirit." 
In I Timothy, the differences in conception and operation are not simply numerical. 
The nineteen instances in I Corinthians do quantitatively overshadow the two references 
here. However, most notable is the distinct focus which complements the categories 
examined thus far in this letter. The creed of 3: I 6 opens with the declaration that God 
(ewcr) or "he" (ocr) was manifested (fq>avfpw8YJ) in (the) flesh. He was justified in or by 
(the) Spirit (fOtKatw8YJ fV 1tVfU).Lan). This statement, reminiscent of another document 
connected with Ephesus, seems to say that the Spirit argued that jesus was in the right, 
was vindicated (See also john 16:8, I 0). Here, too, the connection between Christology 
and Pneumatology is clear; but it proceeds along other lines. Furthermore, the teaching is 
encoded or at least formalized in a poeticlhymnic pattern. It belongs to a confession of 
commonly-held truth. The only other mention of the Spirit's role follows immediately and 
reflects a similar motif (4: I): "And the Spirit says specifically (PYJ'twcr) that in subsequent 
times some will desert from the faith [understood as a body of doctrine which the 
Church as pillar of the truth is to preserve) and give their minds to misleading spirits and 
demonic teachings." This is followed by a brief but condensed summary of their content 
(vv 2-51. Then the Pastor exhorts his younger colleague how to combat their influence 
(vv 6-16). Thus, the Spirit functions as the revealer of truth about future (and perhaps 
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imminent) threats to the integrity of the Church, via onslaughts against its doctrines. 
Again, the nature of the Spirit's role corresponds to the image of the Church as the pillar 
of the truth. Pneumatology and ecclesiology walk hand in hand. 
Leadership 
It should come as no surprise, given the controlling images and the observations about 
(the) faith, teaching, and Spirit, that concepts of leadership should follow suit. Cod-appoint-
ed (or placed, E8£'w) Spirit-gifted apostles, prophets, teachers, and governors should lead 
the body of Christ (12 :28, 3 Il. But these appear to be leaders of the Church universal. 
There do not seem to be "officers' of the community at Corinth per se. Chloe's circle 
reports dissension to Paul (I : I 0-1 I); but it is not certain that they themselves are members 
of the Corinthian church.21 None of the principals (Apollos, Cephas, and Paul himself), 
around whom "cults of personality' have grown are in town at the time (v 12). Who 
orders the prayers and prophesying by men and women (I I : I- IS)? No one seems to pre-
side over the chaotic eucharist (I I: 16-34l. Is anyone heading up the worship encouraged 
in 14:26-347 Through whom does the church write its inquiries to the Apostle7 Whatever 
leadership there is seems entirely ad hoc and remains completely in the background." 
However, there does seem to be a steady stream of emissaries from Paul, including 
Timothy (4: 17; 16: I 0, 12, 15-18l. The body at Corinth does not have a head. An egalitari-
an spirit prevails, even though some kind of hierarchy cannot be ruled out. 
It seems quite natural, then, that "the household of God, the bulwark and pillar of the 
truth" (see above) should require specifically-qualified leaders rather than "gifted" persons. 
Aspiration to fill the office of a bishop (mLCiK01CTjCi) is noble. Among other things (3 : 1-7), 
one must be a good teacher (v 2) and manage (1CpOLCi'tTjVat) his own children and 
household. Otherwise, he will not be able to care for (mL/-lEA,OUCi8at) God's Church (vv 
4-5l. A similar set of standards is to be applied to deacons (vv 8-13), who must likewise 
be grounded in the truth (v 9) and able to manage their children and households as expe-
rience for an analogous role in the Church (vv 12-13). This phenomenon is not so much 
a matter of later development as it is a function of sociology and theology, as the commu-
nity at Qumran should ever remind us. Timothy himself, urged to be a good minister 
(bLaKovoCi) of Jesus Christ, must maintain certain standards of character and perfor-
mance (4:6, I 1-16), of which teaching has a prominent place (vv 6, I I, 13, 16). He has 
been granted a gift (xapLCi/-la) through prophecy (words more prominent in I 
Corinthians) when the council of elders laid hands on him (v 15). Paul's 
further instructions regarding Timothy's disposition towards other elders reinforces what 
was said earlier about their role as teachers (5: 17l. 
Class 
Lacking qualified leaders at Corinth may in part, at least, be a function of class. Not many 
in that body were wise as defmed by "fleshly' standards, not many were powerful or nobly-
bom (EUYEVEtCi) . In their case, God had chosen the foolish ('ta /-lropa), weak, low-bom, and 
rejected elements of the world in order to confound their opposites (I :26-28)23 Did any 
own slaves? Although householders may have done so, it is only a possibility24 That there 
were slaves among Christians at Corinth is clear from 7:21 -22; but there is no way of telling 
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here how many, if any, belonged to Christian households. More clear is 12: 13: in stressing 
that the many have become one through the Spirit, Paul supplies "whether Jews or Greeks, 
slaves or free." Fee notes, "As in 7: 17-24, these terms express the two basic distinctions that 
separated people in that culture-race/ religion and social statuS."25 What is clear is that there 
does not seem to be enough of a problem between Christian master and slave to call much 
attention to the nature of their social and spiritual relationships. 
How different is the situation in I Timothy. Determining the socio-economic condi-
tions does not require detective-like assembling of circumstantial evidence. Women were 
rich enough to afford elaborate gold-leaf hair pieces (2:9). Before becoming widowed, 
some were financially able to provide relief to the afflicted (5: 1 0). The church at Ephesus 
was economically sound enough to support widows, although their number had begun to 
drain resources, such that "real" widows needed to be distinguished from those young 
enough to remarry (5:3-16), Masters were numerous enough to require advice for their 
treatment of slaves. And both needed instruction about their attitudes towards one anoth-
er (6: 1-2). Affluent members existed in sufficient numbers and influence to need exhorta-
tion twice regarding both the evils of money and its potential for good (6:7-10, 17-19). 
Eschatology & Relation to the World 
Will members of an organism relate differently to the world and its future than those 
belonging to an organization? An answer can only be inferred. The slogan, ''you can't take it 
with you," has its biblical roots at I Tim 6:7: "we brought nothing into the world and [it is 
certain thatJ we cannot take anything out of the world." The point here is that the Pastor 
does not appeal to the imminent end of all things as the rationale, It is the end of one's phys-
ical life, not the end of the age which should cause one to be free of wealth, This is in keep-
ing with prayer for the general population and for political authorities (kings and all who are 
in power) so that 'we may lead a quiet and peaceable life" (2:2), In other words, there is a 
sense of legitimate accommodation in a world whose imminent end is not in sight. Indeed, 
the author refers in 4: 1 to the Spirit's clear warning about apostasy in later times (UO"'tcPOLO" 
[not cO"Xa'tOLO"] KatpOLO"). But not much more is made of this, either here or elsewhere in 
the letter. How different the scene in Corinth, Apparently there are some (though not 
many) in this body who are able to buy goods (ayopaI;;HY) and deal (xpao'\)0"8at) with the 
world (7:3 1-32). Yet, they are to live free of acquisitions and connections in view of the pre-
sent circumstance, variously described as the impending distress, the shortening of the 
appointed time, and passing away of this world's form (vv 26, 29, 31), 
Women (and Men) 
Might it be that images of the Church at Corinth and Ephesus have an effect on the 
status and role of women in these churches? Could an analogous, interlocking influence 
be at work here, too? The Corinthian context is public worship and the exercise by both 
sexes of prayer and prophecy (I I :5), which heads the list of spiritual gifts (14: I). Of all 
the charismata, prophecy has the special value of building up the Church (vv 3-5, 12), 
two chapters before being imaged as a body (See esp, 12:23-24, 27-31). What is often 
overlooked in the intricate discussion about the need for women to be covered during 
the prophetic act is that, although it signals inferiority, the covering is an egalitarian device. 
54 Lemcio 
In other words, the · veil" confers authority read the best texts at v I Q) upon 
women to participate equally with men in speaking a word from Cod to the congrega-
tion. And, although Paul begins his argument with a hierarchical, and hence vertical, 
"chain of command" model of authority (Cod-[head of!] Christ-man-woman) and the 
chronological priority of the male in creation (vv 3, 8), he switches to a more lateral and 
organic one. "Nevertheless woman is not apart from man, nor is man apart from woman 
in the Lord" (v I I). Furthermore, the procreative process reverses the original created 
order: "For just as the woman came from the man, so also man comes through woman; 
and all th ings come from Cod" (v 12}26 
Of course, the Pastor in I Timothy 2 : 11 -15 does not make room for such a reversal 
in the order of creation which gives Adam priority over Eve. Nor does Paul in I 
Corinthians link any subordinationist language with her being the first to transgress. It 
appears to be a different world, a different mindset not to be explained away by recourse 
to different authors or to an earlier (allegedly better> and later (allegedly worse) develop-
ment (known by the grossly-simplistic category, "early catholicism"). The canonical 
approach rules out preferential treatment, whether the criterion for doing so is historical, 
authorial, or doctrinal. 
Instead, one must proceed along two contextual lines, one more narrow and the other 
more broad. More narrowly speaking, it is necessary to be as precise as possible about 
what Paul is or is not saying in the immediate context. One has only to examine the ren-
derings among modern translations of <XU8EV'tEtv in v 12 no domineer"? "have authori-
ty"?} or of crcosEtv ("save"?, "kept safe"?, restore"?) and of EV 1:11 1:EKVOYOVt<x ("in (the 
act of) childbearing"?, "in the birth of the Child"?} and various permutations of these to 
see that the sense here is not as straightforward as it seems at first reading27 
So far as the broader issue is concerned, one must ever keep in mind that the author's 
attitude towards women belongs to the controlling image of the letter which we have 
seen to be a more organizational, institutional, formal, and hence traditional one. The 
accent is upon regularity, preservation, conservation, and established authorities. Political 
and social stability is reinforced by prayer for leaders and by the maintenance of slavery, 
albeit on a different plain. The real threat is ideological. This increases the tendency to 
guard, protect, and transmit the truth to the next generation. So, not surprisingly, political, 
social, ecclesiastical, and familial hierarchy are firmly in place at the church in Ephesus. 
III CANONICAL CONVERSATION 
Unfortunately, the canon does not itself explicitly suggest the canons which should be 
applied in the interpretation of these macroscopic images and their component parts. 
However, one could at least posit (given the confirmatory and critical functions of 
Scripture elsewhere) that each model and its components were intended both to support 
its own view of the Church and to help prevent extreme and exclusive appropriation of 
the other.28 
Were one to search for "dynamic equivalents" in our American ecclesiastical context, 
one might tentatively suggest that the Corinthian paradigm has supported the Church's 
life as manifested in the Pentecostal and "holiness' traditions. Using very broad strokes for 
the sake of argument, I suggest that these have exhibited a more intimate Christo logy, 
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subjective faith, and charistmatic Pneumatology. Personal experience and right living have 
been deemed more important than right doctrine. The congregation's "body life" has 
been such as to welcome the marginalized of society and to be supported by the "blue 
collar" worker. Its leadership has tended to be authorized by "giftedness" rather than by 
formal qualification. Few had advanced education. Fewer still enjoyed the luxury of full-
time, salaried positions. Women often found opportunities for leadership, even "ordina-
tion." Until recently, its eschatology has been more imminental (pre-millennial among 
Pentecostal, primarily post-millennial among Wesleyan groupsl. A corresponding attitude 
to the world has generally emphasized withdrawal from political involvement and social 
reform by governmental programs. Of course, the rescue of souls from societal evils, such 
as prostitution, drink and gambling, was deemed appropriate from the start. The Church 
as a vital, living organism (a body) bursting with energy and vitality has been characteristic 
of worship in congregations arising out of this tradition. 
A more "Ephesian" model has tended to undergird the mainline Reformed and sacra-
mentarian traditions. Doctrinal purity, confessional assent, and liturgical integrity have 
been dominant concerns. An educated, qualified (and often specialized) clergy has not 
only maintained vigilance to defend against outside threats, it has also passed on the tradi-
tion to subsequent generations through a formal catechetical process which led to confir-
mation and extended into adulthood. Until very recently, the Church's operations have 
been supervised by men rather than by women. The Spirit has been seen as operative in 
and through the collective rather than through individual inspiration. Congregations have 
served middle and upper classes whose success in the world of politics and business indi-
cated a coming to terms with the institutions of modern life. In fact, the church itself has 
functioned as an organization-albeit of a different sort. Although "this world was not their 
home" in the absolute sense, churches have thrived on the stability, regularity, and tacit 
support of the society in which they found themselves. 
However, these pure types (or their approximations) tend not to exist as such any-
more. Each has leavened the other. Charismatic renewal bearing certain "Corinthian' fea-
tures (including more participation of women in leadership roles) has manifested itself in 
mainstream Protestant denominations and in the Roman Catholic Church, although no 
significant inroads have occurred in Eastern Orthodoxy, to my knowledge. Worship that 
has been regarded as formal at best and moribund at worst has come alive. Mainline 
churches have taken up (and sometimes taken over) the causes of the excluded and 
oppressed. "Born again" language can be heard across the traditions. Likewise, a 
'Timothean' influence has appeared among Pentecostal and Assemblies groups where 
economic success has enabled and demanded a more formally-educated clergy and has 
encouraged at least an openness to liturgical renewal. There has come a recognition that 
structure need not squelch vitality, that what often appeared to be "free" worship con-
tained its own, sometimes rigid, strictures. 
Such cross-fertilization has helped and continues helping to keep the "down-side" of 
each model from gaining ascendency. Not all growth is healthy. Uncontrolled and with-
out direction, it can produce cancer. Change is good until moorings with the past are cut 
in search of a rather fuzzy future whose realization lacks both maps and methods. The 
desire for stability can cloak an underlying rigidity which refuses to consider a reasoned 
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and documented strategy for change. Although unintended, quenching the Spirit some-
times results. These sensibilities emerge when an interpreter treats the texts as both pre-
serving something at once extremely vital and profoundly vulnerable to abuse. So, by 
reading each in this fashion, faith could be kept from being both mindless, on the one 
hand and frozen into dogma on the other. Reading both texts thus might prevent intima-
cy with Christ from becoming familiarity, at one extreme, loftiness from turning to 
remoteness at the other. I Timothy would keep women's liberty from dissolv-
ing into demagoguery (aUeEV'tEtV), while I Corinthians could be appealed to when 
orderliness is in danger of being a means of oppression.29 
Whichever the direction of the application, the interpreter must become an astute 
observer of all of the dynamics of the situation. Besides becoming as fully informed as 
possible, s/he must avoid settling into an unyielding, disloyal, unloving opposition which 
can easily become diabolical in its divisiveness "throw through, so as to 
separatel. Dialectic is the key. As the etymology suggests, it requires constant conversation 
between the parties, neither of whom is dispensable. What cannot be done without is 
thorough knowledge of the disputant's point of view. Although my loyalty is to the Other 
Place, I must re late the report by Professor Billy Abraham of a tradition at Oxford (which 
I dearly love) that one has to be able to defend the position of one's opponents more 
ably than they themselves could before being allowed to criticize them. 
What may we conclude from this exercize? First, individual themes in these very differ-
ent documents can be integrated around a dominant image of the Church. It remains to 
be seen whether or not analogous instances can be found elsewhere. It may well be that 
particular views of God or Christ (or some other category) will be the unifying elements. 
Second, I have attempted to provide a sample of how two different ("opposing") voices 
within Scripture might function in a more fully-blown capacity to address the entire peo-
ple of God with "the whole counsel of God" in very different circumstances. If these ten-
tative proposals even so much as point in the right direction (being themselves treasure in 
breakable clay pots, 2 Cor 4: 17), then we may be going a step farther along the road of 
practicing the claim that "all scripture is God-breathed and useful for teaching, rebuking, 
correcting, and training in righteousness, so that God's person may be perfect [i.e. 'com-
plete'l, thoroughly equipped for every good work" (2 Tim 3: 16). 
NOTES 
I have focused my attention mainly upon secondary literature which helps to develop what 
I believe to be a novel two-part thesis. 
I. The most comprehensive treatment in English of variety in the Early Church's thought and 
life is still ). D. G. Dunn's Unity and Diversity in the New Testament (philadelphia, PA: Westminste r, 
1977). Despite the promise of the title, there is little demonstration of fundamental unity. See n. 3, 
below. 
2. Paul Minear, Images of the Church in the New Testament (philadelphia, PA: Westminster, 
I 960l, p. 22. 
3. I have attempted to demonstrate that, alongside the diversity, there lies a unifying, keryg-
matic center. See my 'The Unifying Kerygma of the New Testament," Journal for the Study of the 
New Testament 33 (1988): 3- 17 and 38 (1990l: 3-1 I. Both articles were combined in an appendix 
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of the same title in my book, The Past ofjesus in the Gospels (SNTSMS 68; Cambridge: the University 
Press, 1991). 
4. Minear, Images, p. 24, declares about any primary community, "Its self-understanding, its 
inner cohesion, its esprit de corps, derive from a dominant image of itself, even though that image 
remains inarticulately imbedded in subconscious strata." 
5. Other attempts to do the same with various paradigms appear in Robert W. Wall and 
Eugene E. Lemcio, The New Testament as Canon. A Reader in Canonical Criticism (jSNTSS 76; 
Sheffield: Academic Press, 1992). 
6. Furthermore, the history which is sometimes reconstructed is poorly done. Simplistic linear 
models of development cannot be supported by the data. For example, it is a commonplace to 
assert that earliest Christianity was of the apocalyptic, other-wordly variety whose egalitarian and 
informal character later became doctrinnaire, hierarchical, and accommodating to the world. Yet, 
except for j. A. T. Robinson, mainstream experts, both "conservative" and "liberal," regularly date 
Revelation in the 90s of our era. However, here is a late apocalyptic work neither presupposing nor 
advocating any specific kind of organization or leadership. On the other hand, the Qumran sectari-
ans manifest an even earlier apocalyptic outlook whose exponents lived in a highly structured soci-
ety headed by a stratified leadership. Often, it is overlooked that judaism, the matrix out of which 
Christianity emerged, was itself simultaneously capable of embracing Sadducees, Pharisees, and 
Essenes, each with its own social and political characteristics. Both judaism and Christianity did 
develop. But they did not do so at a single rate or in a straight line. The image of a great watershed, 
with many tributaries and tidal influences, describes the situation better than that of a single river. 
For fuller arguments and secondary literature see my study, "Ephesus and the New Testament 
Canon," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 69 (1986): 210-234 and reprinted as chap. 14 in Wall 
and Lemcio, The New Testament as Canon, n. 5 above. 
7. Amos Wilder, New Testament Faith for Today (New York, NY: Harper, 1955), p. 93. 
8. Minear, Images, pp. 24-25. 
9. Ibid., p. 24. 
10. Adolf juelicher, Die Gleichnisreden Jesu 2 vols (2nd ed.; T uebingen: Mohr, 1899, 191 m. 
II. R. E. Brown, "Parable and Allegory Reconsidered," Novum Testamentum 5 (1962): 36-45 
and C. F. D. Moule, "Mark 4: 1-20 Yet Once More:' Neotestamentica et Semitica: Studies in Honour of 
Matthew Black ted. E. E. Ellis and M. Wilcox; Edinburgh: T. &. T. Clark, 1969), pp. 95-96. 
Minear, Images, pp. 222-223, observes that "through all the analogies the New Testament 
writers were speaking of a single reality, a single realm of activity, a single magnitude. The purpose 
of every comparison is to point beyond itself. The greater the number of comparisons, the greater 
number of pointers. When so many pointers impel our eyes to look in one direction, our compre-
hension of the magnitude of w hat lies in that direction is enhanced. This is why in the New 
Testament we observe no sentimental fascination for the images themselves, such as a preacher or a 
poet feels for a symbol of his own devising. The overarching interest is that reality toward which all 
point." There is much to agree with here. I would only add that symbols not only point to the reali-
ty, they also connect us with it. Otherwise, why does one get so involved (whichever way it goes) 
with the desecration of images (such as the flag and the cross)? Furthermore, biblical images do not 
only point towards the Reality; they also "compete" with one another in a "monotheizing" way by 
relativizing cine another. 
12. Given the limited scope of this essay, it is not necessary to join the debate over the nature 
of the particular relation to Christ: whether Christians are the only body that Christ has, as j. A. T. 
Robinson maintained in The Body. A Study in Pauline Theology (S8T 1/5; London: SCM, 1952), p. 
5 1 or whether it is another kind of body of which they are part: "an ecclesiastical Body, consisting 
of believers, in which he dwells on earth through his Spirit", as R. H. Gundry argues in SOMA in 
Biblical Theology with Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology (SNTSMS 29; Cambridge: University Press, 
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1976), p. 228. 
13. George W Knight III notes that "even though building terminology is utilized [cr1:UAOcr and 
EbpatW!.w1, since the conduct in view relates to the interaction of the members of God's family, 
modern translations have opted for 'household' {RSV, NASB, NEB, NlV)." See his Commentary on 
the Pastoral Epistles (NIGTC; Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1992), p. 180. 
14. All six references to OLKOcr or OLKLU are confined to individuals' homes or households 
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REASONING WITH UNBELIEVERS AND 
THE PLACE OF THE SCRIPTURES IN 
TERTULLIAN'S APOLOGy1 
PAUL LIVERMORE 
We are frequently told that deep faith causes intolerance. Fundamentalists perse-
cute; those who look at religious questions dispassionately do not. Though the view 
might have some truth, a survey of history casts doubt on it as simplistic. 
Early Christians were persecuted by broad-minded Romans who insisted that 
they must participate in civi l religion. Since sophisticated Romans did not themselves 
believe in the gods, or at least did not believe in anything like we normally think of 
when we use that word, we assume they did not care what Christians privately 
thought. Further, until Celsus and Porphyry pagans never bothered to study the 
faith. While the masses projected crude views on Christians, as they had on the 
Jews, and accused them of violent crimes; the learned dismissed them as supersti-
tious.2 In his letter to Trajan, Pliny the Younger wrote3 
I do not doubt that whatever kind of crime it may be to which they have 
confessed, their pertinency and inflexible obstinacy should certainly be 
punished ... . I thought it more necessary, therefore, to find out what truth 
there was in this [their beliefs and mode of worship] by applying torture to 
two maidservants, who were called deaconess. But I found nothing but a 
depraved and extravagant superstition, and I therefore postponed my 
examination and had recourse to you for consultation. 
Pliny, famous as an urbane Roman, would have rejected the claim that he pre-
judged their case, but he did not hope for Trajan to explain Christian beliefs. He 
wanted advice on how to suppress the movement without making Rome appear 
cruel. In other words: What was the politically most expedient way to make 
Christians conform? 
Less than a century after Pliny, Christians in North Africa were suffering under 
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persecution. After becoming a Christian, T ertullian took up their case: His personality is 
legendary. He thrived on debate, arguing with heretics and the official church after 
becoming a Montanist, as well as with civil officers. 
This article looks at Tertullian's debate with the officials in Carthage found in The 
Apology. We will study the method he used in his defense of Christians. We are not ask-
ing so much what specific arguments he marshaled as what kind of arguments. Or, look-
ing at the same issue from the other side of the equation, what kind of arguments would 
Roman officials have found persuasive? 
We attach to this inquiry a second. We intend to explore how the Scriptures figured in 
The Apology's argument. 
I. TERTUILLIAN'S TASK: ARGUING WITH THOSE WHO DID NOT ACCEPT 
CHRISTIAN PREMISES 
T ertullian wrote The Apology to refute charges against Christians upon which the offi-
cials based their persecution. In chapter 2 he named four, two civil and public (sacrilege 
and treason) and two private and supposedly part of eucharistic celebrations (incest with 
mothers and sisters and the killing and eating of infantsl. 
The latter two, incest and cannibalism, were scurrilous and propagated by rumor. That 
did not make them less serious, since they grew from fear and hatred of the unknown. 
We cannot tell just how many people actually thought the rumors true but evidence sug-
gests a good number did until the middle of the third century. 
Tertullian's defense against these two charges was to deny them. He noted that the 
authorities could not present one person who had actually witnessed the acts. He also 
pointed out how the acts were totally inconsistent with Christian faith and practice-much 
more so than with pagan faith and practice. We will look at one case of this defense to 
show how T ertullian argued in this regard. 
The civil charges of treason and sacrilege were really more serious, since they arose 
from an indisputable feature of Christian discipline, the restriction of worship to the living 
God. Faithful Christians could not yield in the way Rome demanded they yield, to partici-
pate in civil religious ceremonies and offer supreme allegiance to the emperor, without 
denying the faith. According to Roman law, Christians were guilty. 
There are a number of ways T ertullian might have made his case to vindicate the 
beleaguered faithful. First, he could have argued, as Western democracies now do, that 
religion is a private matter, and the state has no right to impose its will so long as its sover-
eignty is not undermined. But Rome did think the church undermined its sovereignty, 
and nothing in The Apology disputes that T ertullian thought religion a legitimate concern 
of the state. 
Second, T ertullian could have reasoned that since the state was ruled by evil people, 
Christians should defy their laws. But this approach would have earned nothing but con-
tempt as well as condemnation. Further, The Apology's tone suggests something different 
from defiance. It suggest an appeal to people who can reach a sound judgment.s This is 
an genuine apology. 
Finally, T ertullian might have argued that Christians should not be persecuted because 
they were really not guilty of criminal acts. This is, in fact, the tactic he took. And it was 
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for this reason that his pre-Christian work as a lawyer proved invaluable. He not only 
knew the rules of legal debate but also practiced them with considerable skill. 
But Tertullian's task was still not easily accomplished. True, the church now had the 
advantage of an advocate skilled in legal debate, and he could marshal compelling argu-
ments against the charges of infanticide and incest, but those of treason and sacrilege 
were more difficult. As noted Christians, according to Roman law, were guilty; the public 
character of Christian action in these two cases made the charges inescapable.6 
If T ertullian' s goal was to argue that Christians were not guilty of criminal acts and yet 
acknowledge that in the cases of treason and sacrilege they systematically broke Roman 
law, the only recourse left was to prove that the laws were flawed. He had somehow to 
show that these laws, either as written or as commonly understood, were bad laws. 
We will also inquire whether Tertullian could have used the Scriptures to any real gain. 
Several options lay before him. First, he might have explicitly cited or alluded to them as 
proof for his argument. But he could have done so and accomplished his ultimate goal only 
if the officials would have accepted the Scriptures as authoritative, which they hardly did. 
Two other possibilities lay before him. Following one of them, T ertullian might first 
have given an apologetic for the Scriptures and then based his further argument on their 
authority. In fact, he does offer in chapters 18-20 a kind of apologetic. But, as we shall 
later see, he does not go on to make the Scriptures the basis for his remaining argument. 
Or, T ertullian might have used scriptural themes but offered reasons why they should 
be accepted as true other than that the Scriptures prove them to be true. In doing so, he 
could have mentioned that these themes were scriptural and even that Christians adopt-
ed them because of the Scriptures. At the same time, however, he would have argued 
that Roman officials should accept them because of other evidence. This last is the 
method he follows in The Apology. 
Before we go on several issues concerning Tertullian's implicit use of the Scriptures in 
The Apology merit note. First, his method in The Apology differs sharply from that in his 
works on heresy. For example, in the Ante-Nicene Fathers the translator, Holmes, identi-
fies 326 citations or allusions to the Bible in Against Praxeas. In The Apology, a document 
a quarter longer, Thelwall identifies only five. I have found more in The Apology, but cer-
tainly not enough to alter the impression the numbers give. 
The short explanation for the difference between his method in The Apology and that 
in the anti-heretical works is that the latter were written to those who accepted the 
authority of the Scriptures, though the heretics did argue that they were the only ones 
who properly understood the Scriptures. But since Roman officials did not accept the 
Scriptures, an argument from them in The Apology would have been fruitless. 
Having reached the preliminary view that T ertullian does not base his argument on 
scriptural authority, we have to inquire whether we can reconcile this method with his 
well-known rejection of human reason. The Prescription against Heretics (chapter 7) con-
tains his famous remark contrasting human philosophy and God's revealed word and his 
assertion that Christians have no need of any source of knowledge beyond their faith. 
Granted, no one so prolific and creative as T ertullian can be held to rigid consistency, we 
still query how the same person could say the one thing and then do the other. The con-
trasting methods seem to be main points in both documents. 
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We mention this apparent contrast at the outset to indicate an issue that needs to be 
taken up again at the end of our study. The issue can be put into the form of a question: 
In order to be thoroughly scriptural and argue for a Christian view on this or that topic, 
do we have to prove beforehand that the Scriptures offer the sole or even the primary 
means of support? Or, to pose the question of the work we are presently studying, is 
T ertullian thoroughly scriptural in The Apology 7 
Our preliminary observations, therefore, indicate that in The Apology T ertullian pri-
marily uses the Scriptures implicitly, that is, scriptural themes appear without any note to 
the effect that they have their origins in the Bible. And even when he uses them more 
explicitly by directly citing them or, as generally happens, by paraphrasing or alluding to 
them, his primary point is not to use scriptural origin as the reason why pagans ought to 
believe that an idea is true but simply to show this as the source from which Christian 
faith and practice have sprung. 
We now inquire into Roman legal practice which provided for a review of a law's legit-
imacy. Tertullian's effort to exonerate Christians required both that it be possible to 
review a law and also that he follow the rules of legal review. Such a procedure did exist.7 
Before we can make sense of his argument, then, we must get critical aspects of the pro-
cedure in mind. 
Roman law had originally grown from two sources, from the customs of early Romans 
and the will of patricians and then in the imperial era from the rulers. Both kinds of law, 
those from custom and those from the powerful, could very well be nothing more than 
inherited, self-serving traditions. Those in power had a good deal to gain by making cer-
tain that such laws were not amenable to correction from a higher standard. 
But a procedure for legal review did evolve within the Roman system. During the peri-
od of the republic, the principle of natural law was introduced into Roman jurisprudence. 
The concept had already pervaded the Mediterranean world, Stoicism first coining its sys-
tematic, philosophical form. Settling the question whether Roman jurists adopted the con-
cept directly from the Stoics or merely from their cultural milieu is unnecessary to our 
purposes. During the time when Rome's hegemony was extended far beyond the Italian 
peninsula, the idea of natural law had nearly universal acceptance and was profoundly 
influencing Roman jurisprudence. 
We should make a few remarks about natural law and its relation to jurisprudence. 
First, natural law governs both that part of the universe which lack self-consciousness and, 
especially in the case of human beings, that which possesses it. For humans, the good life 
is achieved when people voluntarily govern their lives according to this law. Thus, 
through clear thought we can discover natural law and through a positive will we can fol-
low it. Second, Stoic ethics pivoted on the four principles of wisdom, justice, temperance, 
and courage. Law was particularly concerned with the issue of justice. Third, in natural 
law theory ethical questions precede legal questions. The validity of a law depends up the 
degree to which it furthers justice. Fourth, since natural law is a universal principle, the 
customs of people everywhere should reflect its influence. This does not mean that all 
national laws are considered just, but that when they are compared, the pervasive charac-
ter of natural law will appear. Thus, as the power of Rome extended farther and farther, 
the jus gentium was regarded less as a mere reflection of various ethnic customs and 
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more as ius naturale. 
Now we consider briefly aspects of the procedure in Roman legal review. In a fine arti-
cle on Tertullian's exegesis of Scripture j. H. Waszink8 offers from Cicero (De inventione 
2.40.1 16) four criteria for the examination of legal documents. Waszink makes the point 
that the African father transferred techniques he learned in working with legal documents 
to his study of the Scriptures. Putting aside the issue of method in interpreting the Bible, 
we return to his task as an advocate before a Roman court. The citation mentioned above 
is illuminating. Cicero writes that controversy over a law "arises from ambiguity, from the 
letter and intent [ex scripto et sententiaIJ, from conflicting laws [ex contrariis legibusl, from 
reasoning by analogy, from definition." Thus, Cicero offers four ways in which the mean-
ing of a law can be examined to determine whether it is an appropriate law or has been 
understood appropriately. The four ways are: (I) discovery of original intent, (2) compari-
son of contradictory laws, (3) discovery of meaning by analogy, and (4) giving precise def-
inition to the law. The principle of natural law is seen most clearly in criterion three, but 
obviously provides the background for the other three criteria as well. 
Before we conclude this section on the practice of Roman legal review, we make sev-
eral observations which seem to contradict what we have just observed. First, Roman 
jurisprudence did not begin with the broad theory of natural law and extrapolate from it 
statutes for particular situations. That is, it did not work from the general to the specific. 
Rather, its tendency was to review current laws in the light of the general principles and 
how successfully they achieved equity. It worked from the specific to the general and 
then back to the specific. 
The application of this to Christians is obvious. Roman courts would naturally have 
seen the laws which required compliance with civil religion as appropriate. The mere 
assertion that natural law confirmed the Christian case and refuted the law's legitimacy 
would have struck them as odd. Only through a detailed argument could the conformity 
of the Christian case with the principle of natural law have been made compelling. 
Second, the fine achievements of Roman law in adapting natural law did not result in 
its disinterested application to all cases. Those involving Roman citizens and their property 
garnered the most impressive displays of such legal review. Rank injustice to non-citizens 
and common people were never reviewed and do not appear to have caused much soul-
searching among the government. C. E. M. de Ste. Croix9 has pointed out that experts in 
Roman law have long noted a contradiction between high standard and narrow applica-
tion. In particular, magistrates were given a free hand in cases of criminal law to interpret 
and apply statutes. Their arbitrary cruelty, extra ordinem procedures were sanctioned by 
the state. They did not act illegally. 
Thus, in the time of T ertullian, Roman legal practice offered a method of judicial 
review by which a statute or a custom could be examined. The general principle behind 
this procedure was that of natural law. Accordingly, a legal statute was appropriate to the 
degree it reflected natural law. Roman jurists were charged not only with the task of pros-
ecuting or defending on the basis of enacted laws, but also with examining the appropri-
ateness of laws. However, it would not have been a foregone conclusion that the princi-
ple of natural law in the case of Christians would have led to their exoneration. In the 
mind of a typical Roman jurist, Christian belief was superstitious, hardly something sup-
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ported by natural reason. Further, they not only found Christian belief illegal, they also 
considered it dangerous for the welfare of the state and thus treasonous. 
II. TERTUWAN'S REASONING IN THE ApOLOGY 
We query now whether T ertullian in fact appealed to the right of legal review in The 
Apology. In chapter 4 he indicates how he intends to proceed and he explicitly men-
tions the legal principle he will use in arguing his case. (J have edited the translation myself 
to divide the paragraphs into shorter and more logical units.) 
Well, if I have found what your law prohibits to be good, as one who has 
arrived at such a previous opinion, has it not lost its power to debar me from it, 
though that very thing, if it were evil, it would justly forbid me? If your law has 
gone wrong, it is of human origin, I think; it has not fallen from heaven. Is it 
wonderful that man should err in making a law, or come to his senses in reject-
ing it? Did not the Lacedaemonians amend the laws of Lycurgus himself, there-
by inflicting such pain on their author that he shut himself up, and doomed him-
self to death by starvation? Are you not yourselves every day, in your efforts to 
illumine the darkness of antiquity, cutting and hewing with the new axes of 
imperial rescripts and edicts, that whole ancient and rugged forest of your laws? 
Has not Severus, that most resolute of rulers, but yesterday repealed the ridicu-
lous laws which compelled people to have child ren before the Julian laws allow 
matrimony to be contracted, and that though they have the authority of age 
upon their side? There were laws, too, in old times, that parties against whom a 
decision had been given might be cut in pieces by their creditors; however, by 
common consent that cruelty was afterwards erased from the statutes, and the 
capital penalty turned into a brand of shame. By adopting the plan of confiscat-
ing a debtor's goods, it was sought rather to pour the blood in blushes over his 
face than to pour it out. How many laws li e hidden out of sight which still 
require to be reformed' For it is neither the number of their years nor the digni-
ty of their maker that commends them, but simply that they are just; and there-
fore, when their injustice is recognized, they are deservedly condemned, even 
though they condemn. 
We could hardly find a clearer statement that natural law stands above civil enact-
ments than that in the first sentence above. Civil laws which prohibit good as defined by 
natural law have no legitimate force; natural laws against an evil, though lacking statutory 
support, are sti ll binding. 
This principle forces an obvious insight into civil laws. They are no more than enact-
ments of human beings and must be treated as such. When human error has been dis-
covered, the law must be rescinded. 
The last paragraph is crucial to T ertullian' s argument. He does not bitterly accuse his 
readers of evil or stubbornness. He gently explains that they may have followed bad laws 
out of ignorance. But the laws should now be reviewed. Only one criterion can justify 
keeping a law: the justice of the law. 
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We turn to Tertullian's explicit discussion of the Scriptures in chapters 18-20. The stan-
dard edition of The Apology has 50 chapters, the section on the Scriptures appearing 
about one third of the way in the work. If T ertullian based his argument on the authority 
of the Scriptures, he would have developed the first third of the book as an apology for 
them and in the last two thirds argued from them. But he does not, as we have noted. 
We can show how this is the case by comparing the arguments of chapters I 7 and I S. 
Chapter I 7 describes how humans have a kind of natural knowledge of Cod. 
The eye cannot see Him, though He is (spiritually) visible. He is incomprehensi-
ble, though in grace He is manifested. He is beyond our utmost thought, though 
our human faculties conceive Him. He is therefore equally real and great. But 
that which, in the ordinary sense, can be seen and handled and conceived, is 
inferior to the eyes by which it is taken in, and the hands by which it is tainted, 
and the faculties by which it is discovered; but that which is infinite is known 
only to itself. This it is which gives some notion of Cod, while yet beyond all our 
conceptions- our very incapacity of fully grasping Him affords us the idea of 
what He really is. He is presented to our minds in His transcendent greatness, as 
at once known and unknown. And this is the crowning guilt of men, that they 
will not recognize One, of whom they cannot possibly be ignorant. Would you 
have proof from the works of His hands, so numerous and so great, which both 
contain you and sustain you, which minister at once to your enjoyment and 
strike you with awe; or would you rather have it from the testimony of the soul 
itself? Though under the oppressive bondage of the body, though led astray by 
depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and passions, though in slavery to 
false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep, 
or a sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it speaks of Cod; 
using no other word, because this is the peculiar name of the true Cod. "Cod is 
great and good," which may Cod give," are the words on every lip. It bears wit-
ness, too, that Cod is judge, exclaiming, "Cod sees, and, "I commend myself to 
Cod," and, "Cod will repay me.'· 0 noble testimony of the soul by nature 
Christian! Then, too, in using such words as these, it looks not to the Capitol, 
but to the heavens. It knows that there is the throne of the living Cod, as from 
Him and from thence itself came down. 
This passage mirrors themes of Romans I: ISff. and Acts 17:24ff., though differences 
also appear. The ideas about the testimony of material nature to Cod have been trans-
muted from the Scriptures, if we must find sources, through such predecessors as the 
African Munucius Felix (The Octavius, chapters 17- IS). Tertullian's reflections upon his 
predecessor's work may have shaped how he read the Scriptures. 
T ertullian values the testimony of the soul. While he argues that reflection on the 
material universe leads to recognition of the living and transcendent Cod, he also says 
that the inner soul of the human involuntarily testifies to truth about Cod. Then he makes 
the astounding observation that the soul is naturally Christian (ani mae naturaliter 
Christianael. Bray 'O claims that Tertullian hardly ignores the fallen condition of the 
human, since he had just catalogued shackles that inhibit a clear knowledge of Cod. This 
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claim is true, yet the whole point of the words which follow the recognition of this condi-
tion is that the soul persistently reflects an apprehension of Cod. 
Now we turn to chapter 18 which specifically mentions the Scriptures. 
But, that we might attain an ampler and more authoritative knowledge at once 
of Himself, and of His counsels and will, Cod has added a written revelation for 
the behoof of every one whose heart is set on seeking Him, that seeking he may 
find, and finding believe, and believing obey. For from the first He sent messen-
gers into the world-men whose stainless righteousness made them worthy to 
know the Most High, and to reveal Him- men abundantly endowed with the 
Holy Spirit, that they might proclaim that there is one Cod only who made all 
things, who formed man from the dust of the ground (for He is the true 
Prometheus) who gave order to the world by arranging the seasons and their 
course. These have further set before us the proofs He has given of His majesty 
in His judgments by floods and fires, the rules appoint by Him for securing His 
favour, as well as the retribution in store of the ignoring, forsaking and keeping 
them, as being about the end of all to adjudge His worshippers to everlasting 
life, and the wicked to the doom of fire at once without ending and without 
break, raising up again all the dead from the beginning, reforming and renewing 
them with the object of awarding either recompense. Once these things were 
with us, too, the theme of ridicule. We are of your stock and nature: men are 
made, not born, Christians. The preachers of whom we have spoken are called 
prophets, from the office which belongs to them of predicting the future. Their 
words, as well as the miracles which they performed, that men might have faith 
in their divine authority, we have sti ll in the literary treasures they have left, and 
which are open to all. 
T ertullian does not mince his words. Knowledge given through revelation is superior 
to that given through any other form, not just parallel to it. Echoes of the Scriptures are 
numerous, as are more muted echoes of the rule of faith. Likening his former attitude to 
that of his auditors, as a mocker of Christian ideas, Tertullian reinforces the view that calm 
reflection can result in great change. 
The balance of chapters 18-20 gives an apology for the Scriptures in three strokes. Its 
divine authority is shown by: (I) the remarkable translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into 
Creek (chapter 18); (2) the antiquity of the Hebrew Scriptures which predate the Creeks, 
Egyptians, or other ancients renown for their wisdom (chapter 19); and (3) the amazing 
fulfillment of scriptural prophecies (chapter 20l. 
Thus, chapters 18-20 offer an apology for the Hebrew Scriptures. But once Tertullian 
finished these comments, he returned to his previous argument and employed it through-
out the balance of the book. Noting that Christianity was born in the time of Tiberius, 
and thus is not so ancient as the religion of Israel, he connects the two eras by observing 
that the prophets of Israel predicted the coming of Jesus. But we hear no citation of the 
New Testament Scriptures, only echoes them. 
T ertullian's next move (in chapter 21) is stunning. He compares teaching about Christ 
with themes found in pagan thought. 
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Accordingly, He appeared among us, whose coming to renovate and illuminate 
man's nature was pre-announced by God- I mean Christ, that Son of God. And 
so the supreme Head and Master of this grace and discipline, the Enlightener 
and Trainer of the human race, God's own Son, was announced among us, 
born- but not so born as to make Him ashamed of the name of Son or of His 
paternal origin. It was not His lot to have as His father, by incest with a sister, or 
by violation of a daughter or another's wife, a god in the shape of serpent, or ox, 
or bird, or lover, for his vile ends transmuting himself into the gold of Oanus. 
They are your divinities upon whom these base deeds of Jupiter were done. But 
the Son of God has no mother in any sense which involves impurity; she whom 
men suppose to be His mother in the ordinary way, had never entered into the 
marriage bond. But, first, I shall discuss His essential nature, and so the nature of 
His birth will be understood. We have already asserted that God made the 
world, and all which contains, by His Word, and Reason, and Power. It is abun-
dantly plain that your philosophers, too, regard the Logos- that is, the Word and 
Reason- as the Creator of the universe. For Zeno lays it down that he is the cre-
ator, having made all things according to a determinate plan; that his name is 
Father and God, and the soul of Jupiter, and the necessity of all things. C1eanthe 
ascribes all this to the spirit, which he maintains pervades the universe. And we, 
in like manner, hold that the Word, and Reason, and Power, by which we have 
said God made all, have spirit as their proper essential substratum, in which the 
Word has inbeing to give forth utterances, and reason abides to dispose and 
arrange, and power is over all to execute. We have been taught that He pro-
ceeds forth from God, and in that procession He is generated; so that He is the 
Son of Cod, and is called Cod from unity of substance with God. 
T ertullian boldly compares Christian and pagan ideas. Pagan ideas, he implies, can be 
drawn from two kinds of sources, myths and philosophy. The two do not have equal 
value. Though myths may resemble Christian teaching in that both refer to a divine son, 
they differ in that Christ's birth is unlike anything their vile stories report. Some philoso-
phy, on the other hand, more closely resembles Christian teaching, since both speak of 
the Creator as God's Word, Reason, and Power. Tertullian hardly suggests that philoso-
phers who spoke in this fashion had a clear idea of the truth, but he believes they were 
approaching truth, and this is far from the case with the myths. 
Christians, according to T ertullian, read the Scriptures for two reasons. First, as 
implied in what we have noted, they provide clear knowledge of the truth; second, they 
give clear directives for living. For the second, I include the one instance, and the only 
instance I have discovered, in which Tertullian explicitly cites from the Bible in The 
Apology and indicates he is doing so (chapter 31). 
But we merely, you say, flatter the emperor, and feign these prayers of ours to 
escape persecution. Thank you for your mistake, for you give us the opportunity 
of proving our allegations. Do you, then, who think we care nothing for the wel-
fare of Caesar look into God's revelations, examine our sacred books, which we 
do not keep in hiding, and which many accidents put into the hands of those 
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who are not of us. Learn from them that a large benevolence is enjoined upon 
us, even so far as to supplicate Cod for our enemies, and to beseech blessings 
on our persecutors [Matthew 5 :44l. Who, then, are greater enemies and perse-
cutors of Christians, than the very parties with treason against whom we are 
charged? Nay, even in terms, and most clearly, the Scripture say, "Pray for kings, 
and rules, and powers, that all may be peace with you' [I Timothy 2:2 Il. For 
when there is disturbance in the empire, if the commotion is felt by its other 
members, surely we too, though we are not to be given to disorder, are to be 
found in some place or other which the calamity affects. 
The Scriptures explain Christian behavior. Christians do the The Apology (hence the 
quotation) what the Scriptures instruct them to do. Such use of the Scriptures has a 
restricted purpose. T ertullian is not asking that his readers agree with them; he merely 
asks that they note how seriously Christians read them. For Christians the Scriptures pro-
vide the rule of life. 
Chapter 39 offers a fascinating description of Christian worship. In agreement with 
what we have seen before, he here describes how the Scriptures shape Christian belief 
and conduct. The new element in this passage is that through this window into early 
Christian worship we envision the actual process. 
I shall at once go on, then, to exhibit the peculiarities of the Christian society, 
that, as I have refuted the evil charged against it, I may point out its positive 
good. We are a body knit together as such by a common religious profession, by 
unity of discipline, and by the bond of a common hope. We meet together as an 
assembly and congregation, that, offering up prayer to Cod as with united force, 
we may wrestle with Him in our supplications. This violence Cod delights in. 
We pray, too, for the emperors, for their ministers and for all in authority, for 
the welfare of the world, for the prevalence of peace, for the delay of the final 
consummation. We assemble to read our sacred writings, if any peculiarity of 
the time makes either forewarnings or reminiscence needful. However it be in 
that respect, with the sacred words we nourish our faith, we animate our hope, 
we make our confidence more steadfast; and no less by inculcations of Cod's 
precepts we confirm good habits. In the same place also exhortations are made, 
rebukes and sacred censures are administered. For with a great gravity is the 
work of judging carried on among us, as befits those who feel assured that they 
are in the sight of Cod; and you have the most notable example of judgment to 
come when anyone has sinned so grievously as to require his severance from 
us in prayer, in the congregation and in all sacred intercourse. 
In chapter 9, T ertullian takes up the charges against Christians of criminal acts. He 
begins by noting that pagans are guilty of infanticide. Citizens of his own country had for-
merly sacrificed infants to Saturn, and some continued the practice in secret. Tiberius, in 
an unsuccessful effort to eradicate the evil, had actually ordered the priests involved to be 
crucified. Why, T ertullian ironically asks, should Roman officials want Christians to wor-
ship the very deity unable to save his own children? 
He next takes up the issue of cultic murder beyond that of children and mentions 
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cases where it was still practiced. He notes one instance in which the pagans, because 
they sacrificed a beast-fighter so his was not innocent blood, did not think it a crime. He 
queries: "Is it less, because of that, the blood of a man?" 
Then, returning to the issue of infanticide, he asks whether sacrifice is the only way 
such a vile act could be carried out. Pagans have found rnany ways to dispose of unwant-
ed children and suffer no punishment: drowning, exposure, and abortion. The last, he rea-
sons, is impossible for Christians. 
In our case, murder being once for all forbidden, we may not destroy even the 
foetus in the womb, while as yet the human being derives blood from other 
parts of the body for its sustenance. To hinder a birth is merely a speedier man-
killing; nor does it matter whether you take away a life that is born, or destroy 
one that is coming to birth. That is a man which is going to be one [homo est et 
qui est futurusl; you have the fruit already in its seed. 
T ertullian next considers blood-eating. Human blood had been consumed for several 
reasons: to seal a covenant between friends, to initiate one into the cult of the goddess 
Bellona, to cure epilepsy by consuming the blood of gladiators. Then, having mentioned 
the games, T ertullian goes on to speak of those who devour bears which have in their vis-
cera undigested human flesh . He asks: Is this really less than cannibalism? We note in this 
passage how he alludes to the Apostolic Decree (Acts 15:29). 
Blush for your vile ways before the Christians, who have not even the blood of 
animals at their meals of simple and natural food; who abstain from things stran-
gled and that die a natural death, or no other reason than that they may not 
contract pollution, so much as from blood secreted in the viscera . To clench the 
matter with a single example, you tempt Christians with sausages of blood, just 
because you are perfectly aware that the thing by which you thus try to get 
them to transgress they hold unlawful. 
After naming more cases of murder or cannibalism, justified by the pagans, T ertullian 
turns to the issue of incest. We hear again the same litany of contradictions between 
pagan rage at what Christians supposedly do and what is known of them. The practice of 
incest was enjoined by Jupiter, reported of Persians, and glorified by Greeks in the story of 
Oedipus. Exposure of infants makes a pagan vulnerable to unintentional incest. Here is a 
infant left to the elements, picked up by a sympathetic stranger, and raised to maturity. 
Years later, not knowing the biological origins, the pagan giving way to uninhibited lust 
may have intercourse with this relative. 
In contrast, Christian sexual ethics provide absolute protection from incest. The disci-
pline of the church is clearly visible. 
A persevering and steadfast chastity has protected us from anything like this: 
keeping as we do from adulteries and all post-marital unfaithfulness, we are not 
exposed to incestuous mishaps. some of us, making matters still more secure, 
got away from them entirely the power of sensual sin, by a virgin continence, 
still boys in this respect when they are old. 
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III. THE SCRIPTURES IN THE ApOLOGY'S ARGUMENT 
We return to the issue raised earlier, whether Tertullian contradicts himself when he 
says one thing in The Prescription Against Heretics and does another in The Apology. 
Actually, the contradiction might be more profound than at first recognized. In this case 
T ertullian would have explicitly argued for one method of discovering truth and excluded 
another in The Prescription and then would have systematically used the excluded 
method in The Apology. 
Within The Apology T ertullian follows the techniques of Roman legal debate. He 
depends upon the principles of natural law and its corollary, general revelation, to an 
astonishing degree. He applies the principles in various ways to show how they confirm 
Christian thought. His argument from the beginning to the end proceeds on the assump-
tion that this mode of argumentation is valid and will succeed. He nowhere breaks from 
it. He nowhere leaves us with the impression that he is merely playing the pagan's game 
but does not believe their rules are valid. Observations made now and then about the 
Scriptures introduce no new pattern of argument. 
All of this leads us to an important conclusion. T ertullian really believes natural law 
and the Scriptures converge in some ways. We do not ignore that he acknowledges the 
serious problems with natural reason, as was discussed in the passage from chapter 17. 
But he suggests that in all people the soul innately knows something better about Cod 
than pagan thought reflects. 
Does all of this make the Scriptures irrelevant? Or, to put the question a different way: 
Are there two equally reliable paths to the truth about Cod and his wi ll, Scripture and natur-
al reason and law? We observe several points in this regard, both drawn from The Apology. 
What the pagan world offers is a mass of confusion within which there are only shreds 
of truth. These shreds are so mixed with error that pagans never follow them up. 
Therefore, he does not appeal to natural law so that pagans will follow it by itself but that 
they wi ll note how their better thoughts parallel themes in Christian teaching. 
The Scriptures, on the other hand, offer clear direction, and they are the source of 
Christian faith and practice. Nowhere in The Apology does T ertullian sugges t that 
Christians have come to the truth about Cod (that he is spiritual and one) or do correct 
things (such as not kill or be chaste) because natural reason or natural law has enlightened 
them. The Scriptures awaken within the latent but darkened shreds of truth that natural 
reason and law reflect. They give clear instruction on the truth . 
If this is all true, then, a second issue must be considered, the relation of the Scriptures 
to the 'rule of faith. ' As is well known, Tertullian and Irenaeus (Against Heresies 3:4:1 -2; 
4:26:2-3) first articulated the concept of the rule, the former stating it in boldest form (The 
Prescription Against Heretics chapter 19, see chapters 12ffJ A few comments must suffice. 
First, T ertullian did not see a necessary tension between the rule and the Scriptures as 
Protestants might. For him the two agreed perfectly, and any fear that an unresolvable 
conflict might arise is anachronistic. 
Second, Tertullian appealed to the rule's authority in debates with gnostics. He did so 
for a simple reason: Both Catholics and gnostics believed the Scriptures supported their 
teachings; and the gnostics, it should be noted, had developed sophisticated interpreta-
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tions and hermeneutics. T ertullian knew how well the gnostics went about their business 
and how skillfully they confused simple Catholics through a display of scriptural learning. 
So he short-circuited their claims by saying that according to the rule, which every 
Catholic knew, their case fell apart. It was not necessary in his opinion to refute them 
point by point from the Bible, showing how the Catholic view was correct and the gnos-
tic wrong. Tedious debates (as his longest work, Against Marcion) had their place, and he 
hardly feared that Catholics could not prove their case by the Scriptures. But gnostic 
views contradicted Christian faith at its core, as witnessed to in the rule, and their learning 
was merely a display which confused the issues. 
A more serious question may be embedded in our query about the relation of the rule 
to the Scriptures in Tertullian's thought: Have church traditions invaded and reshaped 
Christian teaching, so that they fundamentally contradict the Scriptures? Frequently, we 
hear the compJaint that second, third, and fourth century teachers of the church converted 
the Hebrew religion of Jesus and the apostles into the Greek one of historic orthodoxy. 
The complaint, however, is often driven by an agenda, so that the scholars object 
when the early teachers of the church failed to endorse their favorites views which they 
imaginatively find in the heroes the Bible. Adolf Harnack" is sure the ontological language 
of orthodoxy betrayed Jesus' simple gospel and made Christianity impossible for modern 
people. Anders Nygren '2 is sure Tertullian is little more than a Christian moralist and did 
not understand Paul and grace, as Luther did. G. E. Wright ') is sure the language of the 
creeds obscured the Old Testament's vision of the God who acts. The list could go on. I 
only make a few comments relevant to our present task. 
This complaint is wrong-headed and simplistic. There is no doubt that there is a clear 
attempt to translate the Gospel into language that conforms to the cultural environment 
the church lived in. But that is quite another thing from betrayal of its basic values. We 
can in fact argue the reverse: Unless the Church can translate its values into the language 
of its cultural environment, it has not really grasped the heart of these values. The perti-
nent question is: Does the church speak the language of the people and replace the val-
ues embedded in that language with Christian values? That is precisely what T ertullian 
attempted to achieve in the Apology. 
Using hellenistic categories and hellenistic terms as justice, treason, and sacrilege, 
T ertullian redefined what those concepts ought to mean, infusing them with Christian val-
ues. He did not argue that a nation can survive without justice; he did argue that the pure 
Gospel provides the best picture of justice. He did not argue that a nation can survive 
without divine worship; he did argue that Christians alone really know the true God and 
how to worship him. He did not argue that a civilization can survive without obedience; 
he did argue that Christian ethics offered the highest form of serving the state. Whether 
the new definitions he gave to the terms were correct, whether his arguments were con-
vincing, and whether he betrayed the Gospel at this or that point are not our major con-
cern. In The Apology T ertullian redefined in legally approved terms the values of Roman 
civilization according to his Christian understanding of justice, citizenship, and religion.'4 
In a little more than a century after T ertullian wrote, the Roman Empire officially 
became Christian. Measuring The Apology's role in converting the empire offers special 
difficulties, since the intellectual transformation of a culture is hidden from public view. 
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We can see events which suggest a transformation is happening; we cannot see the 
process itself or describe all the factors in it. It might be easy to assign more success to 
T ertullian than he merits; certainly others made great contributions. However, the nature 
of his treatise suggests that his work was more important than some wish to 
acknowledge.' 5 
The collapse of paganism's dominance in the Mediterranean world signifies more than 
purely political decisions or military acts. Paganism had lost its credibility; it no longer 
explained the world. The temples were empty and their priests went unpaid, because the 
values these institutions required for maintenance were no longer embraced. The intellec-
tual universe had shifted in a Christian direction. 
Several factors are involved in the intellectual foundation of a civilization: (I) What 
questions does its spend its intellectual energy trying to solve? (2) What criteria does it use 
to judge truth from error? (3) What terms does it use to embody its values? (4) What defi-
nitions do these cruical te rms possess? In The Apology Tertullian did not set the agenda 
for the first three questions. The Romans decided that service of the state through divine 
worship was crucial for the survival of the state, that judicial review could occur under an 
appeal to natural law, and that treason and sacrilege were criminal acts. It is in the last cat-
egory, the definition of these terms, that T ertullian made his contribution. 
Though many bemoan Constantine's act as the tragic time when the church invited 
the world into its sou l, it was inevitable. Certainly it was to his political advantage. 
Certainly the spiritual fervor of the church contributed; "the blood of Christians [was] 
seed" (chapter SOl. But the intellectual groundwork had also been laid. The case for 
paganism had been eroded. Rage against Christians for the crimes of treason and sacrilege 
could not be sustained, because huge numbers of people now understood these concepts 
in more Christian terms. The church had succeeded in transvaluing them. 
To take terms infused with pagan values and redefine them so they bear Christian val-
ues, as Tertullian attempted and in some degree accomplished in The Apology, is a 
supreme act of the loyal opposition.'6 
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CHARISMATIC PROPHECY AS 
LOYAL OPPOSITION IN THE 
SECOND-CENTURY CHURCH 
TED A. CAMPBELL 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the many reasons for honoring Professor Robert Lyon, one is the model 
he has set for so many students and indeed for more distant admirers (such as 
myself) as a dedicated advocate of "Loyal Opposition' in the Church and in the 
academy. From his example, I have come to understand "Loyal Opposition' as a spir-
it that opposes institutional compromise and lethargy, on the one hand, but on the 
other hand elects to work within the system for change. I am grateful for Professor 
Lyon's example, and pray that what follows may be helpful in continuing his work in 
making "Loyal Opposition" a living alternative for contemporary Christians. 
The notion of a "Loyal Opposition" has been illustrated throughout the history of 
the Christian church by a train of brilliant (jf sometimes eccentricl saints, including 
early Christian monks, the followers of Francis and Clare of Assisi, the Reformers of 
the sixteenth century, early Pietists, Moravians and Methodists, and a host of others. 
What I wish to offer in the essay that follows is an attempt to connect this on-going 
tradition of "Loyal Opposition' with its roots in the New Testament. The connection 
is made by way of the phenomenon of charismatic prophecy, which appeared in 
the New Testament period and continued to challenge early Christian communities 
through the end of the second century. 
The subject bears particular interest, I think, because in the second century the 
Christian communities began to face in a critical way the crises of institutional com-
promise and lethargy which would beset the Church so many times thereafter. The 
letters of Ignatius of Antioch and Polycarp of Smyrna (ca. the I lOs CEJ reveal a 
developing institutional structure to the churches of Asia Minor, where a three-fold 
order of deacons, elders, and bishops had emerged, with submission to the bishops 
seen as a key to church stability.l On the other hand, the Didache (jts date is much 
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disputed; probably from the first half of the second century) presupposes the existence of 
itinerant prophets who were expected to preside at eucharists, and the Shepherd of Hennas 
(written the 140s CE.l is in itself an account of prophetic visions received by a Roman 
Christian. By the time the Montanist movement emerged (ca. the 170s) charismatic 
prophecy had begun to be regarded as eccentric by many second-century Christians, but 
even later writers such as Irenaeus of Lyon and Hippolytus (both writing around 200 
c.E.l presumed that the gift of prophecy was sti ll exercised in some quarters of the 
churches. An examination of the phenomenon of charismatic prophecy, then, will illumi-
nate a significant transition in the life of the Christian communities, a transition in which a 
"Loyal Opposition" became necessary. 
CHARISMATIC PROPHECY IN THE NEW TEST AMENT 
In order to make clear the role of charismatic prophecy as a "Loyal Opposition" in the 
second century, it will be worthwhile to consider for a moment the role that charismatic 
prophecy had played in the New Testament age. Here we are in danger of belaboring a 
rather obvious point, namely, that the religion of the New Testament included charismatic 
prophecy as a central and distinctive element. 
Jewish author Geza Vermes has made an intriguing suggestion about the character of 
Jesus: Vermes points out that although Jesus did not fulfill the typical image of the first-
century rabbis of Jerusalem, he did in fact reflect the image of what we know of first-cen-
tury Galilean rabbis, a circle to which Vermes refers as first-century "charismatic Judaism."2 
Jesus appeared both in the role of rabbi (teacher) and of nabi (prophet) and his identifica-
tion with the movement of John the Baptist solidified his identification with the prophetic 
tradition in tension with the institutional Judaism of his day. 
Instances of Christian prophecy after Jesus are numerous in the New Testament. The 
prophet Agabus mentioned in the Acts, for instance, predicted a famine (Acts I 1:28); 
Paul himself records an ecstatic vision in which he (or the person whom he describes) 
was "caught up into Paradise' (2 Cor 12: 1-4l. Perhaps more importantly, Christian 
"prophets" (so called) were consistently enumerated as constituting a recognized caste or 
office within early Christian communities, typically enumerated immediately after the 
rank of "apostles" (I Cor 12:28, Rom 12 :6, Eph 4:11, Acts 13:J)J The consistency in 
these lists suggests that these designations (including that of "prophet") were not merely 
ad hoc designations of leadership roles, but were early on recognized as common positions 
across widely different Christian communities. The book of the Revelation, moreover, 
stands as an intact example of New Testament prophecy, and its position within the 
canon (not undisputed) signifies the importance of visions and prophecy within the con-
tinuing Church well beyond the New Testament period. 
Although the prophets of the New Testament age existed within the structure of the 
early communities as a distinctive caste or office, it is easy to see how their ministry took 
on an "oppositional" character. For Jesus, this oppositional character was expressed in ten-
sion with both ruling elites (Sadducees) and rabbinic experts (Pharisees), setting off the 
lowly and humble (the ptochoi, "spat upon'; Matt 5:3) against the high and mighty. In the 
Revelation, especially the letters to the seven churches of Asia Minor (Rev 2-3), prophetic 
opposition is directed against the churches' lethargy ("lukewarmness") and their compro-
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mises in the face of Roman oppression and Roman civil religious demands. In this we 
may see prophetic opposition in the context of second- or perhaps third-generation 
Christian communities, reacting no longer against the institutions of Judaism but rather 
against the existing institutions of Christian communities. 
It is important to note, however, that the Revelation's positive reliance on charismatic 
prophecy does not seem to have characterized all of the communities represented in the 
later New Testament literature. If the Revelation stands as an affirmation of charismatic and 
., oppositional" prophecy, the Pastoral Epistles and the letters attributed to Peter bear a differ-
ent character. [n these letters, "prophecy'" (when used positively) seems to denote only the 
writings of the Old Testament (or perhaps an occasional pagan "prophet," Tit I: 12l. There 
are consistent warnings about "false prophets" (2 Pet 2: 1-3), but the contemporary offices of 
the church listed in these works were deacons, "widows, and presbyter-bishops. The office 
of contemporary Christian "prophet" that had appeared prominently in the Pauline lists is 
notoriously absent in these letters. In this we may see a development that foreshadows 
Ignatius of Antioch's more institutional church structure in the early second century. 
The New Testament literature, then, indicates that charismatic prophecy was at first a 
central element of the Christian movement, typified in the ministry of Jesus himself, with 
a caste or office of "prophet" recognized consistently in the early Christian communities 
associated with Paul. The later New Testament literature suggests a growing division 
between those communities in which visionary prophecy was normative (viz., the com-
munity represented by the Revelation) and those other communities in which Christian 
prophets no longer appeared as recognized leaders (viz., the Pastoral Epistles and the first 
and second letters attributed to Peterl. 
CHARISMATIC PROPHECY IN THE EARLY SECOND CENTURY 
This divergence over the role of Christian prophecy continued into the early second cen-
tury, and the literature of the so-called "Apostolic Fathers' reflects both sides of the diver-
gence: On the more institutional side, continuing the tradition of the Pastoral Epistles, are 
the letters attributed to Ignatius of Antioch, generally dated from the II Os C.E.s It would be 
wrong to characterize Ignatius himself as "compromised," since the letters we have from him 
were written while he was being conveyed to Rome, under guard, to face martyrdom. The 
letters stand as a critical development in the polity of the early Christian communities, 
though, because in them the three-fold order of deacons, presbyters (presbuteroi, "priests" or 
"elders") and bishops appears plainly. Absent in them are the "widows" of the Pastoral 
Epistles, and the offices of "presbyter' and "bishop, confused or perhaps identical in the 
Pastoral epistles, appear in Ignatius as clearly distinct offices. The Ignatian letters presuppose 
throughout a congregational structure in the churches of Asia Minor in which there were 
many deacons and presbyters in each city-church, but a single bishop for each: 
Since, then, in the persons already mentioned I have seen your whole community 
in faith and have loved it, I exhort you: be eager to do all things in godly concord, 
with the bishop set over you in the place of Cod, and the presbyters in the place of 
the council of the apostles, and the deacons, most sweet to me, entrusted with the 
service of Jesus Christ...6 
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We should note Ignatius's reference to "the bishop set over you in the place of Cod" in 
this quotation from his letter to the Magnesians (6: 1), If there is a consistent theme to the 
Ignatian correspondence, it is the necessity of unity in the church grounded in obedience 
to a single bishop in each community, Ignatius consistently utilizes the parallelism given 
above, with the bishop in the place of Cod and presbyters and deacons subject to the 
bishop,7 
In one place (philadelphians 5 :2) Ignatius acknowledged his love for "the prophets, 
presumably Christian prophets (although this has been disputed), At this point, though, 
Ignatius affirmed the role of the prophets so long as they remained within the unity of the 
church8 Thus, although there may have remained Christian prophets in the churches of 
Asia Minor in Ignatius's time, they were never given a consistent place in Ignatius's under-
standing of the authoritative offices of the church, and he understood that their conduct 
and teaching had to be subject to local bishops, 
The situation is very different with the ancient Christian text called the Didache or 
"Teaching of the Twelve Apostles.' The date of this text is much disputed- estimates 
range from the middle of the first century to late in the second century- but the work is 
probably an early second-century compilation of earlier written and oral traditions, some 
of which may date from the first century9 On the one hand, the community described in 
the Didache had deacons and bishops (apparently multiple bishops) answering to the pat-
tern of the Pastoral epistles, and a distinction between bishops and presbyters is not made 
in the work (15 : I), On the other hand, the Didache describes a number of traveling 
Christian leaders: "apostles, "prophets, and "teachers, and gives fairly lengthy descrip-
tions of these (I 1-13), The bishops and deacons can be described as 'your honorable 
men together with the prophets and teachers ' (15:2),1 0 Since the prophets and teachers 
(and itinerant "apostles") are described separately, this passage indicates two different 
types of leadership in the Didache community: local deacons and bishops, and traveling 
(or "itinerant") apostles, prophets, and teachers, Although local congregational leaders are 
warned to test the itinerants carefully to be sure of their validity, there seems to have 
been a sense in which, once tested, the itinerants held authority over local officials, After 
a discussion of the method of celebrating eucharist, the Didache concludes, "but [allow] 
the prophets to hold Eucharist as they will" (10:7),11 
The fact that the Didache is concerned to root out false itinerants (apostles, prophets, 
and teachers) should indicate some level of tension between local and itinerant leaders in 
the community, But the community of the Didache seems to have integrated this tension 
in a different way than the communities of Asia Minor depicted in the Ignatian epistles, 
For the community of the Didache the "loyal opposition" of the itinerant prophets had 
become a part of the on-going life of the community, On the one hand, it can be argued 
that the Didache's community is closer to that of the Pauline churches of the New 
Testament, since the same sets of "primitive" offices appear in both (apostles, prophets, 
teacher, etc.; this makes the case for an early dating of the Didachel. On the other hand, 
it could be argued that the Didache represents a "Montanist" community because of the 
prominent role played by the prophets (this would make the case for a late second-centu-
ry dating of the work), Neither of these extremes is necessary, however, if we recognize 
an on-going tradition of charismatic prophecy that extended from the Pauline period 
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through the early second century right up to the Montanist movement (probably in the 
I 70s CE. and thereafter). This would conform to the most consistent scholarly datings of 
the Didache, and would indicate the importance of the work as presenting a picture of a 
more "charismatic'· early second-century community that stands in rather sharp contrast 
to the community represented in the epistles of Ignatius of Antioch. 
One other work reckoned among the" Apostolic Fathers'· can be considered here, and 
that is the "Shepherd of Hermas.' Mentioned in the Muratorian fragment as having been 
written 
quite recently, in our own time in the city of Rome, by Hermas, while his brother 
Pius was sitting on the throne of the church of the city of Rome ' 2 
the work may be dated rather accurately to 148 CE. (or the months immediately before 
and after it) in Rome. The work bears significance in our discussion because, like the 
Revelation in the New Testament, it is an intact example of early Christian prophecy. 
The "Shepherd of Hermas' contains a sundry collection of divine revelations given to 
Hermas involving a number of divine beings representing Christ (one figure for Christ is a 
shepherd, hence the title of the work) or the personification of the Church (the figure is 
of a woman, the "Bride'" of Christ). The work seems to presuppose the rather rigorous 
doctrine of many early Christian communities, that post-baptismal sins could not be for-
given (cf. Heb 6:4-6). One of the primary (and first) revelations of the work is that 
After you have made known these words to them, which the Master commanded 
me to reveal to you, all the sins which they have formerly committed shall be for-
given them, and they shall be forgiven to all the saints who have sinned up to this 
day, if they repent with their whole heart, and put aside doublemindedness from 
their heart. 13 
That is to say, Christ makes a one-time offer of forgiveness for post-baptismal sins if the 
church will repent sincerely. It is interesting to consider this as a prophetic message, for it 
does, in a sense, "liberalize" the church's earlier rigorism, and could be taken as a first sign 
of growing laxity in the early church regarding moral life. Nevertheless, the issue was 
apparently taken so seriously that only by a divine revelation such as this one could the 
church consider changing its approach. The "Shepherd of Hermas,'" then, shows how 
prophecy could influence the early church to change its accepted ways, even in a less rig-
orous direction. 
The early second century in general, then, presents a varied picture with respect to 
charismatic prophecy. Some communities seem to have been moving towards a formal-
ized local structure in which prophecy was pushed to the periphery of the community's 
life. The communities in Asia Minor represented by Ignatius of Antioch represent this situa-
tion. In other areas, though, prophecy seems to have persisted. We do not know of 
Hermas's influence in the Roman church (the Muratorian fragment treats it skeptically), but 
in the community represented by the Didache itinerant charismatic leaders seem to have 
played a central, perhaps defining role. We should be safe in concluding, I think, that 
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through the end of the second century the two strands represented in the New Testament 
and in these communities both continued as vital forms of Christian religious life. 
CHARISMATIC PROPHECY AND THE MONT ANIST MOVEMENT 
By the end of the second century, though, the more institutional and less prophetic tra-
dition represented by Ignatius of Antioch seems to have been winning the day. The rise 
of Montanism, or perhaps we should say the isolation of charismatic prophecy in the 
Montanist movement, gives clear evidence that by the I 80s charismatic prophecy was 
seen as increasingly "eccentric," i.e., outside of the centers of Christian thought and life. 
The Montanist movement was described by Eusebius of Caesarea, Epiphanius, 
Hippolytus, T ertullian, and other ancient Christian writers. 14 A consensus of ancient and 
modem scholarship places the origins of the movement in the I 70s C.E.IS The move-
ment was centered in Phrygia, headed by a prophet named Montanus and prophetesses 
Prisca (or Priscilla) and Maximilla. Attempts to prove that Montanism was grounded in a 
pagan Phrygian cult, or that the Montanists perpetuated theological or christological here-
sies have not received wide acceptance. 16 
The distinguishing mark of the Montanist movement, then, lay not in the area of doc-
trine, but in the claim that the gift of prophecy through the Holy Spirit was truly given to 
Montanus, Prisca, Maximilla, and other "prophets" of the movement. Not surprisingly, the 
movement was referred to by some ancient authors as "the new prophecy.' Secondly, at 
least in the Montanist community known to Tertullian, the movement stood for a rigor-
ous Christian morality reminiscent of older eras of the Church's life. In both of these 
respects, however, Montanism appears within the development of Christian polity not as 
an aberration from an originally institutional Christian church, but rather as a local expres-
sion of a tradition of Christian prophecy which, as we have seen above, extended from 
the age of Paul through the communities represented by the Revelation in the New 
Testament, and then by the Didache and the "Shepherd of Hermas" in the early and mid-
dle parts of the second century. Thus, Hans von Campenhausen refers to Montanism as 
"a reactionary phenomenon" insofar as it reflected this earlier strand of Christian prophet-
ic tradition. 17 
If this is true, though, it remains to be explained why the movement should have 
received such a consistently negative response from those communities that in retrospect 
have been identified as orthodox. Eusebius of Caesarea noted that the movement was 
condemned very early on: 
For when the faithful throughout Asia had met frequently and at many places for 
this purpose, and on examination of the newfangled teachings had pronounced 
them profane, and rejected the heresy, these persons were thus expelled from the 
Church and shut off from its communion.18 
But these councils did not carry weight beyond Asia, for T ertullian noted that at one point 
the Bishop of Rome (in the early third century) had briefly acknowledged the validity of 
the movement. 19 
Two more likely explanations for the isolation of Montanism as a "heresy' excluded 
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from communion with the orthodox can be offered. First, the ecclesiastical power struc-
ture centered in monarchical bishops and represented by Irenaeus of Lyons seems to 
have prevailed by the end of the second century in those communities that were also 
reckoned to be theologically orthodox.20 The older pattern involving itinerant prophets, 
which had been a living option up until the middle of the second century, seems to have 
been increasingly "eccentric," i.e., outside of the center of the churches' life, from that 
time. Second, the very use of charismatic prophecy by the Montanists seems also to have 
been regarded as unusual. Although some early Christian writers from the third century 
and beyond preserved the memory that prophecy had at one time been exercised in the 
Church, others frankly acknowledged that the age of prophecy had passed. Tertullian's 
contemporary Origen wrote, 
Moreover, the Holy Spirit gave signs of His presence at the beginning of Christ's 
ministry, and after His ascension He gave still more; but since that time these signs 
have diminished, although there are still traces of His presence in a few who have 
had their soul purified by the Gospel, and their actions regulated by His influence.21 
In both of these respects then, both in its rejection of episcopal authority and its continu-
ing use of the charismata such as prophecy, the Montanist movement represents a strand 
of earlier Christian tradition that had become dissociated with the communities reckoned 
as orthodox. 
But Montanism, perhaps especially as represented in T ertullian's later career, did func-
tion as a kind of "Loyal Opposition" in the later second century and beyond. It serves to 
remind us- and perhaps it should serve to remind the Faith and Order Commission of 
the World Council of Churches today- that the consistent three-fold ministerial orders of 
deacon, presbyter, and bishop were not established in the churches without considerable 
time, and not without considerable loss. The loss J refer to was the loss of living prophecy 
as a "normal" part of the life of the Church. The Montanist movement shows, if nothing 
else, the tragic reality that by the end of the second century the exercise of this kind of 
"loyal opposition' was regarded eccentric (at best) and heretical (at worst) for most 
Christian communities. 
CONCLUSION: CHARISMATIC PROPHECY AND "LOYAL OpPosmON" 
But the story of "Loyal Opposition" in the Christian community did not end with 
Montanism. Within months of Constantine's conversion to Christianity, St. Anthony and 
others in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria began withdrawing to the deserts where they could 
pursue a more radical vision of Christian faith. Francis and Clare of Assisi would call 
Christians in the twelfth century to obedience to the "apostolic poverty" of Christ and the 
earliest disciples. Sixteenth-century Reformers of whatever party (including many Catholic 
Reformers) would call for a return to "primitive" Christian conditions. 
The witness of ancient Christian prophecy as "loyal opposition" was not lost on all of 
these later reformers. John Wesley, for example, was well aware of the role of prophets in 
the early Christian communities, and in his sermon on "Prophets and Priests" he called 
upon the model of ancient Christian prophets to justify his use of laymen and laywomen 
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as preachers in the Methodist movement: 
I cannot prove from any part of the New Testament, or from any author of the first 
three centuries, that the office of an evangelist [which Wesley elsewhere identifies 
with early Christian "prophets"] gave any man a right to act as pastor or bishop. I 
believe these offices were considered as quite distinct from each other till the time 
of Constantine.22 
Moreover, Wesley believed that the Montanist movement, with its continued exercise of 
the prophetic office, reflected the true Christian faith in the later second century: 
By reflecting on an odd book which I had read in this journey, The General Delusion 
of Christians with Regard to Prophecy, I was convinced of what I had long suspected: 
( I) that the Montanists in the second and third centuries, were real, scriptural 
Christians; and (2) That the grand reason why the miraculous gifts were so soon 
withdrawn, was not only that faith and holiness were we ll-nigh lost, but that dry, 
formal, orthodox men began even then to ridicule whatever gifts they had not 
themselves, and to decry them all as either madness or imposture.2l 
Thus, although his understanding of the chronology of the decline of prophecy and other 
details about ancient Christian prophecy may have differed from our understanding, 
Wesley nevertheless had a clear sense of the continuity between the Methodist move-
ment's "loyal opposition" within the Church of England, and the "loyal opposition ' repre-
sented by itinerant teachers and then by Montanists in the ancient Christian communities. 
The Christian church is an "incarnational" institution: bearing the marks of its origins in 
Christ and the apostles, it lives from age to age in "the flesh," i.e., in the realities and vicissi-
tudes of history, and it faces the crises of an on-going human institution. But from time to 
time, Cod raises up brilliant women and men to challenge the institutional dilemmas that 
the Church faces. They are the "loyal opposition" that adorns and enlivens the life of the 
Church from age to age. They appeared even in the New Testament period, and as we 
have seen above, in the second century and then beyond. 
But the "loyal opposition" also appears in our own time, and we are blessed indeed 
when we come into the presence and under the influence of one of these brilliant and 
faithful pioneers of the Church. Such a person is Robert Lyon, and we offer thanks and 
praise for his consistent witness of loyal opposition, and for the challenge that his witness 
lays before us. 
NOTES 
I. Each of the authors or communities dealt with in this paragraph will be discussed in detail 
later. 
2. Geza Vermes, Jesus the Jew (London: Fontana, 1976), chapter 3, "Jesus and Charismatic 
Judaism," pp. 58-82. 
3. Gerhard Friedrich, "prophetes" in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament 6 :850 
(Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdman's, 1968). Quotation marks are used with the term "apostles" here to 
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denote that the term, in these passages, may not denote so much "the twelve," but a larger group of 
disciples who were "sent out" (apestalmenos) by Jesus. 
4. "Apostolic Fathers" (or "Apostolical Fathers") is the designation dating from seventeenth-
century European scholarship (jean Cotelier and then William Wake) to denote a diverse group of 
writings generally reckoned to date from the first half of the second century. On the designation, 
see Simon Tugwell, The Apostolic Fathers (Harrisburg, PA: Morehouse Publishing, 1989), p. viii. 
Robert M. Grant, An Introduction "The Apostolic Fathers: A New Translation and Commentary," (6 
vols.; New York, NY: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1964) deals with the history of the texts of the 
Apostolic Fathers (pp. 13-33 ) but seems unaware of the Cotelier edition in which the expression 
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title of Cotelier's edition) 
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Tugwell, pp. 104-105; Robert M. Grant, Introduction, pp. 47-63; Edgar J. Goodspeed, The Apostolic 
Fathers: An American Translation (New York, NY: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 203-205; and 
most definitively William R. Schoedel, Ignatius of Antioch: A Commentary on the Letters of Ignatius of 
Antioch (Hermeneia commentary series; Philadelphia, PA: Fortress Press, 1985), pp. 1-7. In w hat 
fo llows I have accepted a modem consensus (recognized since the middle of the seventeenth cen-
tury) that holds seven epistles of Ignatius to be genuine (what Schoedel ca lls the "middle recension" 
[of 3] although earlier works referred to it as the "shorter recension" [of 2]). 
6. Magnesians 6: I; translation is that of Schoedel, p. 11 2. See also Schoedel's comments on 
the three-fold order, pp. 22-23. The three-fold order found in Ignatius has been recognized as form-
ing the basis for contemporary discussions of Church polity, most notably in the World Council of 
Churches Faith and Order Commission document entitled Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry (Faith and 
Order paper no. I I I; Geneva: World Council of Churches, 1982), IIl:A: 19-21 , p. 24. 
7. For similar passages urging obedience to the bishop, see Ignatius's letters to the Ephesians 
2:2,3:2,4: 1-2,5 :1 -3; Magnesians 6 :1 -2, 7: 1; Trallians 7:2; Philadelphians 3:2,4: 1,7:1 -2,8 :1 ; 
Smyrnaeans 8 : 1-2, 9 : I; and to Polycarp 6: I. The theme of obedience to bishops does not appear 
prominently in the letter to the Romans, where Ignatius's primary concern was the preparation for 
his approaching martyrdom there. Not surprisingly, we might note, the authenticity of the Ignatian 
epistles was defended in the seventeenth century by Anglican bishops, defending episcopacy against 
the presbyterianism of Puritans (three principal Anglican defenders of the Ignatian epistles were 
James Ussher, Archbishop of Armagh, John Pearson, Bishop of Chester, and William Wake, 
Archbishop of Canterbury) . 
8. The very next passage (Philadelphians 6: I) goes on to state that prophets should not be 
accepted if they "interpret Judaism"; on this see Schoedel, pp. 20 1-203. 
9. On the dating of the Didache, see Robert A. Kraft, Barnabas and Didache. "The Apostolic 
Fathers: A New Translation and Commentary," vol. 3 of 6 vols.; (New York, NY: Thomas Nelson 
and Sons, 1964), pp. 76-77. Kraft argues that Didache is composed of a number of earlier docu-
ments and oral traditions (divisions between these can be seen easily in the text), and although 
much of this material dates from the first century, the present form of the Didache dates from no 
earlier than the early second century. To th is may be contrasted Tugwell (p. I), who asserts that the 
Didache was composed in the first century; but Tugwell consistently gives surprisingly early dates for 
the literature of the Apostolic Fathers. 
10. Translation is that of Kirsopp Lake, The Apostolic Fathers (2 vols.; Loeb Classical Library; 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, and London: William Heinemann Ltd.; 1912), 1:33 1. 
I I. Lake, I :325. Lake has "suffer" for epitrepete. The expression he translates "hold Eucharist" is 
simply eucharistein ("to give thanks"), although following the first six verses of chapter 10, it does 
seem to denote presidency of the weekly eucharistic celebration. 
12. Muratorian fragment; translation in Lake, 2:3. 
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"THE RIGHT USE OF THE APPROPRIATE 
MEANS"- THE DEBATE OVER STRATEGY 
AND GOALS AMONG NINETEENTH 
CENTURY EVANGEL REFORMERS 
DOUGLAS M. STRONG 
According to the eighteenth century Calvinist Jonathan Edwards, the spiritual 
awakening he witnessed in New England was completely unexpected, a "surprising" 
work of Cod unaided by human instrumentality. In the distinctly different theologi-
cal climate of the nineteenth century, Arminian Charles C. Finney was convinced 
that a revival was "not a miracle," but simply a natural result of Christians availing 
themselves of the resources placed at their disposal by Cod. To produce a success-
ful revival, Finney believed, all that his fellow preachers had to do was to engage in 
the "right use of the appropriate means.'" 
The so-called "appropriate means" to which Finney was referring were the con-
troversial "new measures' of evangelistic technique which he and other revivalists 
were at that time employing. Finney's new measures included the public participa-
tion of women, the overt display of religious emotion, and the promotion of revival 
meetings that would last for several days. Most importantly (for our purposes), 
Finney also insisted that revivals could flourish only when Christians had a proper 
attitude "in regard to any question involving human rights"-by which he was indi-
cating issues such as temperance and slavery. Unlike most evangelists (then and 
now), Finney was convinced that a preacher's engagement with the pressing social 
concerns of the day was an important accessory to the work of converting sinners. 
Nonetheless, Finney always viewed his commitment to social concerns as an 
"appendage" to revivals; it was never to take away from the primary task of personal 
evangelism.2 
Finney fully expected other revival preachers to understand and agree with the 
pragmatic parameters of his maxim to pursue the "right use of the appropriate 
means." Many of those who were inspired by Finney's revivalism, however, went 
beyond his rather cautious involvement with social reform and his opportunistic 
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standard for achieving successful results. These other reformers debated what specific 
"means" were appropriate and what, in fact, constituted the "right use" of those means. 
The outcome of this debate was a conflict among nineteenth century evangelicals regard-
ing social reform strategy, a conflict that was derived from their differing goals and theo-
logical presuppositions3 
Through their involvement in this struggle over strategy and goals, evangelical reform-
ers were attempting to resolve the ethical tension that exists between means and ends, a 
seemingly relentless quandary confronting those Christians of every era who are commit-
ted to seeking a more just society. Thus, a study of antislavery advocates (abolitionists) 
and other nineteenth century evangelical reformers provides us with an example of some 
of the challenges and pitfalls facing all of us as we try to live out our Christian vocation 
with integrity.4 
Specifically, nineteenth century reformers disagreed with one another over three relat-
ed questions. First, to what extent can Christians use power in order to achieve their 
desired outcome? That is, how should Christians relate to the "principalities and powers" 
of this age, given the strategy of "nonpower' that seems inherent in the gospe!? What is 
the correct stance, they asked, that one should take toward existing political and ecclesias-
tical institutions? Does one accept these institutions as legitimate; does one try to reorga-
nize and purify them; or does one stand over against them as a prophetic witness? At 
issue was the problem of who does the empowering in the reign of God- God himself, 
human beings, or some cooperative combination of them both? 
Closely related to this first question was a second: what is the appropriateness of using 
coercion to obtain desired results? This apparently straightforward query was complicat-
ed by the existence of various tactical options used by abolitionists- personal persuasion, 
political action, civil disobedience, rebellion, and even the threat of war- all of which 
could be defined as coercive strategies to a greater or lesser degree. Hence, the reformers 
questioned further, what amount of coercion is acceptable or unacceptable? Is any vio-
lence permissible? Where is the line between violence and nonviolence? Such topics 
became especially critical among antislavery reformers in the I 840s and I 850s with the 
escalation of anti-abolitionist vigilantism and the rise of sectional jingoism preceding the 
Civil War. 
A final question concerned the dilemma that reformers faced between their commit-
ment to religious principle and their utilitarian dependance on expedient methods. 
Simply put, evangelicals asked themselves which tactical model was to take priority: a 
reliance on pragmatic means (emphasizing the achievement of success), or an adherence 
to ethical principles (insisting on sanctified behavior, without the expectation of success)? 
Thus, in their desire to live out the implications of the kingdom of God within 
American society, abolitionists and other reformers had to contend with (at least) three 
fundamental tensions- power versus non power, violence versus nonviolence, and success 
versus nonsuccess. These three concerns certainly were not unique to nineteenth century 
reformers; indeed, Christians in every time period must deal with them. Nonetheless, 
such strategic questions take on different forms in different contexts- and the particular 
context within w hich nineteenth century evangelicals deliberated was the emerging 
democracy of the young American republic. 
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The early nineteenth century in the United States is often referred to as the "era of the 
common man," a period when the demand for greater democratization was felt through-
out all institutions of American society, including the Church5 It is not surprising, then, 
that the theological notion of the "kingdom of God" came to be known in America by a 
democratic euphemism-the so-called "moral government of God" -a term that referred 
to the extent of God's jurisdiction over human activities. The moral law of God's govern-
ment, according to nineteenth century thought, had an approximate equivalent in the 
civil law, if the civil law was democratically administered6 
By using this theological concept, evangelical preaching provided a religious vocabulary 
that coincided with the prevailing political discourse of the early American republic. 
Those nurtured under such preaching, particularly revivalistic reformers, appropriated the 
moral government language to frame their deliberations concerning the civil government. 
Among Northern social reformers (such as the abolitionists), the imminent "government 
of God" was identified with the government of the United States-but only after the latter 
had been democratically reformed and freed from the sin of slavery.7 
It was believed that sufficient human means were at the disposal of revivalists and 
reformers to help establish the divine government. With the assistance of these available 
means, each moral agent was free to choose to obey God. When practiced by regenerat-
ed individuals throughout the whole society, such obedience would eventually effect (or 
at least closely approximate) the harmonious millennial government of Goda 
This social optimism was made possible by the general spirit of millennial expectation 
that existed among the religious segment of the population. Millennialism is a theological 
concept regarding the prophesied reign of God on earth9 The most prevalent antebellum 
expression of this concept was postmillennialism. Postmillennialism asserts that Christ's 
second coming will occur after an idyllic thousand-year period. According to this belief, 
human beings are presently in the penultimate time prior to the millennium. It is the 
responsibility of humanity to assist in ushering in the impending millennium by approxi-
mating God's government as much as possible. On a personal level, the postmillennial 
goal assumes that individuals can become holy. By extension, the collated holiness of 
many individuals will eventually result in the millennial society. 'o 
The United States was viewed as the most suitable arena for God's unfolding millenni-
al drama. I I Abolitionist Jonathan Blanchard was convinced that "the world is on its return 
to God," with America leading the way. Blanchard foresaw that reforms would sweep 
the land, Though there was a great amount of work to be done, there was an exuber-
ance and a certainty that it would be accomplished, since it was God's work. Already, as 
revivalistic reformers pointed out, the temperance reformation had produced widespread 
results. Such success encouraged the reformers toward ever more ambitious endeavors in 
preparation for the millennium, For abolitionists, this meant the creation of a society free 
from slavery.' 2 
POWER VERSUS NONPOWER: THE PROBLEM OF INSTITUTIONALIZA nON 
In the early years of the abolitionist movement (before 1840), Northern evangelical 
reformers were in general agreement that their principal task was simply to persuade oth-
ers that slavery must be ended immediately. Within a few years, though, more definitive 
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strategic matters were broached. As one reformer reflected some years later regarding 
this important tactical juncture: "When a large body of the people were convinced of the 
truths abolitionists had taught them, the question arose, How shall they best be led to put 
their principles in practice?" Their predominant tack had been simply "moral suasion"-a 
term that referred to the voluntary convincing of others by the use of the press, the pulpit, 
various forms of education, and legislative petitions. Up to that point, abolitionists had 
eschewed overt political activity or any trappings of institutional power. l ] 
By 1840, however, the effectiveness of moral suasion was being questioned by many 
abolitionists. It seemed that more efforts were required just to produce the same results. 
For example, one of their original goals-the persuasion of slaveholders to emancipate 
their own slaves-was a dismal failure. In some ways, the South was more unyielding in 
its commitment to slavery than it had been prior to the rise of abolitionism. And the 
North was equally intolerant of antislavery agitation, as evidenced by unremitting mob 
violence directed against abolitionists. Abolitionists realized that their attempts to change 
the political and ecclesiastical structures by moral suasion had failed. 14 
Many abolitionists believed that they were bogged down by the ineffective tactics of 
moral suasion. Since "the motto of abolitionists should be 'onward,'" wrote a contributor 
to an antislavery paper, then "greater force should be immediately brought into the field. " 
One contemporary perceptively observed that, for such reformers, "moral persuasion' 
was no longer "potent enough, for their cause. Hence they are hurriE;d onward, like mad 
men, to grasp the civil arm to aid in accomplishing their purpose." Some abolitionists 
were now willing to embrace the tactics of power politics, tactics that had long been used 
by their opponents. Other abolitionists, however, were unwilling to sacrifice their high 
standards in order to play the political game.15 
Such disagreements among reformers were due to differing views about whether 
Christians should rely upon the power of human institutions to reach their goals and, con-
sequently, the degree to which human governments were to participate in the establish-
ment of God's government. Polemics among abolitionists consisted of deliberations about 
the role of organized structures in the emerging millennial order. Thus an understanding 
of the divisions that existed among abolitionists can be gained by analyzing the ways in 
which they understood and talked about God's government, human government, and the 
interaction between the two. Various formulations of abolitionism represented various 
degrees of support for or denial of the power of institutions. 
There was a spectrum of views regarding the arnount of institutionalization considered 
appropriate within the society. Differences among abolitionists were articulated in the 
language of their theological discussions concerning the appropriate structures for a demo-
cratic society. These differences can be sorted into distinct groups that existed along an 
"institutionalization continuum" -specifically, those who were supporters of traditional 
institutions, those who were mernbers of new abolitionist political parties and denomina-
tions, and those anti-institutionalist abolitionists who rejected all forms of human empow-
erment. lo 
At one end of the spectrum of antislavery views regarding institutionalization were 
evangelicals who supported traditional structures. These were the abolitionists who 
endorsed existing churches and traditional politics. They decided to rernain within the 
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established denominations and parties in order to reach their goal of the immediate end 
to slavery. 
Abolitionists who were institution-supporting felt that slavery was merely an evil blem-
ish that needed to be removed from a generally healthy society. They thought that by 
advocating antislavery from a position of power they could raise the religious conscious-
ness of the people within their churches and political parties. Many of them were con-
cerned about achieving realistic, practical results which, they hoped, could be obtained 
more readily by working within established structures than by staying aloof from power 
structures in an attitude of self-righteous purity. l? 
Institution-supporting abolitionists were convinced that human principalities and pow-
ers were ordained by God. People need to be controlled by coercive governments until 
the millennial government of God puts an end to inherent human sinfulness. 
Furthermore, following the dictates of Romans 13, citizens must submit to their civil lead-
ers as instruments of God's law on earth, for the external human law is equivalent to the 
law of God. I S Since institution-supporting abolitionists thought that God ordained the 
existing political organizations, they were dedicated to working through these extant struc-
tures, hoping that they could change the laws to conform to abolitionist goals. 19 
Evangelical leaders in the major denominations and political parties believed that human 
structures were a pragmatic means to a desirable end. Since such structures would never 
be perfected, significant social change would occur only when religious people were will-
ing to compromise their utopian principles. As a Whig partisan explained: "Politics is a 
game of expediency."2D 
Other abolitionists took a middle stance between institutionalism and anti-institutional-
ism21 They formed new abolitionist denominations, such as the Wesleyan Methodist 
Connection.22 They also formed an avowedly evangelical political pressure group called 
the Liberty Party, the first political party to be unequivocally committed to the elimination 
of slavery. Liberty Party leaders believed that democratic governments in church and 
state were divinely-established institutions, a part of God's moral government. God's 
influence, they asserted, is exerted "through the instrumentality of human governments." 
Yet, while they affirmed the divine intention for human government in general, they also 
condemned the existing governments as immoral. Liberty leaders contended that the 
established systems of power needed to be reorganized to conform to the standards of 
God's government. Their opponents were accurate when they asserted that the Liberty 
Party "invoked Divine authority to justify a use of political power in ... reforming the state." 
These political abolitionists were resorting to means that relied on a form of power (the 
legislative compUlsion of other people) while at the same time challenging the existing 
power structuresZl 
Contrary to those who maintained traditional institutions, Liberty leaders felt that polit-
ical parties and churches must be rigorously altered so that the organizational power of 
human structures was carefully limited. But contrary to the anti-institutionalists, Liberty 
leaders felt that there was a need for Christians to exert some power within social struc-
tures so that society could function in an orderly manner. Their tactic was to come out 
from existing "despotic" institutions and to literally "re-form" them along sanctified lines. 
They described their strategy as "secession and re-organization." In their view, it was pos-
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sible to exert a limited degree of democratically-elected power while still maintaining their 
distance from those who used power in an arbitrary or capricious manner24 
Liberty Party leaders began with the premise that human cooperation with God was 
essential for the successful establishment of the divine government on earth. One Liberty 
man asserted the importance of human initiative in the form of a rhetorical question: 
"Are not Christians themselves a part of those means which God makes use of to carry 
forward his moral government[?]" On the societal level, this synergistic theological con-
cept led to the view that some human institutions were divinely-ordered, but that such 
institutions needed to be democratically reorganized and carefully circumscribed. The 
Liberty Party agreed with anti-institutionalists that existing human governments (both civil 
and religious) were corrupt. At the same time, they agreed with the supporters of institu-
tions that some power structures should not be destroyed, but maintained. They believed 
that human governments should be reordered to correspond w ith God's democratic 
moral government. When that occurred the millennium would commence, for God's 
government would be coterminous with human government: a "perfect state of society' 
would exist.25 In both ecclesiastical and political matters, the members of the Liberty 
Party were trying to hold a delicate balance between their desire to renounce institutional 
tyranny and their perception of the need for some structure. They thought that it was 
important for abolitionists to find a "middle ground." 
At the other end of the abolitionist spectrum of views regarding the use of institutional 
power were the followers of the prominent antislavery advocate, William Lloyd Garrison. 
The Garrisonian abolitionists asserted that the only legitimate strategic measure for reli-
gious reformers was moral suasion. These nonresistants, as they were called, believed that 
coercive actions of any kind were sinful. Since human governments are based on the 
premise that legalized compulsion could be used to back up their legislative actions, non-
resistants defined such structures as inherently sinful. "Political action, by voting, even for 
the abolition of slavery, under a civil government based on physical force,·· was regarded 
as sinful by the Garrisonians. Their religious consciences were to have no involvement 
with partisan politics26 
According to the Garrisonians, it was fruitless to attempt to legislate change, because 
human institutions (both civil and ecclesiastical) would never be purified. God's moral 
government would be actuated in God's time, and only through the agency of individual 
moral influence. According to Garrison, "political reformation is to be effected solely by a 
change in the moral vision of the people, not by attempting to prove that it is the duty of 
every voter to be an abolitionist."27 
The Garrisonians shared a common assumption: the radical sovereignty of God's rule 
over human behavior and institutions made external human law superfluous. Human 
institutions such as religious denominations, political parties, and even the government of 
the United States, all of which mediated between God and humanity, were unnecessary if 
Christians would completely obey God's law. Since the Garrisonians believed that God's 
law could be perceived directly and comprehended adequately by any unrestrained indi-
vidual, no other person or human institution could or should attempt to define that law. 
In fact, divine law was intended to supersede and replace all mortal laws, rules and institu-
tions. The interposition of any human element whatsoever between an individual and 
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God was considered an unwarranted assumption of divine authority, 
Human authorities were considered wrong because they were coercive, External 
human law required restraint in order to force compliance, and thus denied an individual 
complete freedom of conscience, Slavery was the prime example of a coercive institu-
tion, Once slavery was viewed in this paradigmatic way, it was not difficult for 
Garrisonian abolitionists to believe that tyrannical institutions of any kind, and especially 
those connected with slaveholding, were the source of society's imperfections. They 
understood the "the disorder, confusion and misery, which every where prevail" in society 
as caused by worldly power exercised by unnatural, artificial, sinful institutions28 Church 
polities, in particular, were problematic, because "the present organized church associa-
tions and organizations, as they are, are not only in the way of humanity ... but in the way 
of Christianity itself."29 
All of the abolitionists believed that human society could and should approximate the 
millennium- the eventual and inevitable rule of the government of God on earth, This 
millennial rule would be established by the incremental perfection of individuals until the 
entire society was perfected, But according to the Garrisonians, human structures stood 
in the way of the establishment of the divine order; therefore, those structures should be 
abolished in preparation for the millennium. Continued adherence to human institutions 
among Christians impeded the consummation of God's millennial rule, and, according to 
Garrison, "whatever the gospel is designed to destroy at any period of the world, being 
contrary to it, ought now to be abandoned,"lo The only appropriate response for a 
Christian was to "come out from among them, and be ye separate." For Garrisonians that 
meant severing all connections with human structures, including support for political activ-
ities or local Christian congregations, since they imposed unnatural restraints upon individ-
uals,l' 
According to the Garrisonians, any attempt at reforming or restructuring human orga-
nizations was not only wrongheaded, it was wicked, A somewhat improved situation 
brought on by reforms would only delay the eventual necessary destruction of all human 
devices, and thus delay the harmonized society of the millennium. The type of govern-
ment that they proposed was to be "immediately exercised by God" rather than orga-
nized by humans, since such a human structure would inevitably be based on coercive 
restraint. The harmony of this divine government would result in a new society in which 
individual self-mastery held sway and in which the moral law was obeyed on a purely 
voluntary basis.l2 Eventually, the Garrisonians withdrew from human institutions, They 
developed a strong antipathy toward all those who continued to support the established 
structures. Since "government is upheld by physical strength, and its laws are enforced at 
the point of the bayonet," the nonresistants repudiated "all human politics," Churches, 
which were shams of true religion, were also to be discarded, Organized religion was to 
be replaced by each individual's own religion of the heart, unmediated by any creed or 
c1ergyman,ll 
VIOLENCE VERSUS NONVIOLENCE: THE PROBLEM OF COERCION 
Coincident with the problem of institutional power was the problem of coercion, 
Initially, the majority of abolitionists were pacifists; they viewed all war as unjustified 
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aggression-similar in its barbarism to the enslavement forced upon African Americans. 
The abolitionists' pacifist position became most forcefully articulated in the mid-1840s 
during the Mexican War. The Mexican War was a baldly expansionistic enterprise that 
soon became a divisive domestic policy issue within American society. In response to the 
War's proponents, who hoped to extend slave territory by confiscating Mexican land, the 
abolitionist Liberty party took a firm stand against the conflict. )4 
Likewise, abolitionists within the evangelical denominations used the widely-perceived 
immorality of the Mexican War as a springboard for their declarations of disgust toward 
all wars. The Rochester Annual Conference of the Wesleyan Methodist Connection (an 
abolitionist denomination), declared in 1847 that "the gospel of Christ is eminently the 
gospel of peace,. . .whereas war in its spirit and practice is antagonistic to the gospel." In 
this vein, they resolved "to maintain tal high and uncompromising opposition to war as 
an inhuman and anti-Christian practice and as one of the sins in the sisterhood of evil 
now rife throughout our common country and desolating our poor fallen world." Even 
more strongly worded was their statement of 1852, in which they resolved 
that the Gospel of Jesus Christ is opposed to all forms of war, that every war is the 
crime of the nation or people that wage it, that every battle is a bloodstained blot, 
that every victory is a loss, and that we will do all in our power to oppose war, and 
to promote the principles of peace, until the time shall come in which we have 
good hope, when men shall beat their swords into plow shares and their spears into 
pruning hooks, and learn war no more. 
As late as I 860, they reiterated their 
ever avowed principles upon the inhuman system of war. We regard it to be in 
direct conflict with the first principles of Revealed Religion- as having its origin in 
selfishness, lustful, and revengful [sicl passions- a relic of a barbarous age, and the 
stronghold of despotism and slavery.)5 
It was during this same time period, however, that abolitionists (including the 
Wesleyan Methodists) were becoming increasingly involved in the Liberty Party, which 
was an attempt to use political power to extirpate slavery36 As these abolitionists became 
more and more comfortable with the idea that the exercise of political power was justi-
fied during the (supposedly) limited interim before the millennial government of God was 
established, it became easy to slide down the slippery slope of coercion towards other 
forms of empowerment, such as civil disobedience, the armed insurrection of slaves and, 
eventually, the necessity of war in order to crush the rebellious slavocracy of the South. l7 
Consequently, over the years that led up to and beyond the Civil War, evangelical aboli-
tionists significantly altered their former posture of unconditional pacifism38 
By 1863, for instance, at the height of the Civil War, the Wesleyan Methodist's 
Rochester Conference declared that they were "for God and our country, and this with-
out evasion, condition or exception. The Conference resolved, in an abrupt about-face 
from their earlier explicit opposition to all war, that "while regretting, the necessity of an 
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appeal to arms ... yet we justify such appeal, and offer .. our prayer for the further success of 
our arms. Similarly, in 1864, the Wesleyans stated: 
We stood for coercion when Sumpter [sicJ was fired upon, and the history of th[is] 
'War for the Union' has taught us that Subjugation needs to take the place of coer-
cion .. .. While [weI regard ... War as in itself undesirable, and even an evil-yet as a part 
of a great National Police System, we hold it legitimate; and in defense of imperiled 
rights fully justifiable. Our present War being provoked for the Support of 
Constitutional Freedom, and the rights of man, has our unqualified approbation, 
and our Prayers for its success in supressing [sicl Rebellion39 
At the end of the war, the Wesleyans reveled in the presumed divine implications of 
the Union victory. They declared that they were "doubling [theirl diligence' for social 
reform work now that the imminent day was close at hand when "God shall break every 
chain and let the oppressed go free that we may sing literally, The year of Jubilee has 
come.'" As historian James Moorhead has stated, Yankee Protestants such as the 
Wesleyans were convinced that the Civil War was the final apocalyptic shedding of blood 
needed to atone for America's original sin of slavery-a necessary evil in order to bring 
about the conditions requisite to inaugurate God's millennial govemment40 
As the century wore on, the Wesleyan Methodists moved even farther away from 
their previous pacifism. During the Spanish-American War- America's imperialistic foray 
into Cuba (and elsewhere)-the Rochester Conference resolved that, although they were 
opposed to war for aggression or conquest, and deprecating a necessity of a resort to 
arms, yet seeing in the present crisis, or issue, our beloved land reaching out the hand of 
help to the suffering Cubans, illustrating the great principle of human brotherhood, we 
hereby, place ourselves on record as endorsing the statesmanlike, patriotic and above all 
Christian attitude of our Chief Magistrate, and pledge our loyal support, and earnest 
prayer, in his, and our Nation's behalf of larger conception of human relationship, and 
Christian civilization. 
In this resolution, the Wesleyans were affirming the right of the United States to con-
duct a war in order to extend the so-called "white man's burden" of Christian civilization. 
They even went so far as to "pledge [theirl unswerving loyalty to our government" during 
war, certainly a far cry from their earlier statement that they were d opposed to all forms 
of war, that every war is the crime of the nation or people that wage it."41 
SUCCESS VERSUS NONSUCCESS: THE PROBLEM OF MOTIVES 
A final problem facing evangelical reformers in the nineteenth century was the tension 
that existed between achieving success for their cause and maintaining the purity of their 
principles. This tension was felt most acutely by the Liberty Party. The party was com-
posed of politically inexperienced Christians who wanted to explore the potential use of 
electoral power in order to obtain a righteous objective. In the end, however, many of 
them were uncomfortable with their involvement in the exercise of that power. How 
could they succeed politically, they asked themselves, and yet remain pure, without 
becoming immersed in the muddy waters of partisan campaigning? 
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On the one hand, those Liberty men with a practical bent were convinced that in 
order to assure eventual victory it would be politically shrewd for the Liberty Party to 
compromise its radical views and soften its strident moralism. After several years of rela-
tively poor performances at the polls, the dilemma within the Liberty Party became clear: 
in order to reach their goal of establishing a government that was pure, it seemed neces-
sary for Liberty men to make concessions regarding their own purity. Evangelical aboli-
tionists stressed holy motives and each individual's uncompromising attitude toward all 
sin. Yet they also emphasized practical moral action and the tangible achievement of 
social iustice. Eventually the stress on sanctified means seemed to preclude the achieve-
ment of the party's ends, since political victory required compromise with those of dubi-
ous religious credentials and impure political motives. The choice for Liberty leaders 
became the practical achievement of a reduced goal using impure means, or the contin-
ued espousal of uncompromising means with only the vague hope of an eventual divine 
consummation (especially with the continued disappointment of the Party at the polls). 
How does one persevere in the arduous work of establishing a millennial society, they 
asked themselves, when the promised inevitable outcome does not seem to materialize? 
On the other hand, there were some antislavery reformers (a minority of the Liberty 
Party) who cared less about political success than they did about the prophetic challenge 
that abolitionism attempted to deliver to the structures of society. 
That this [Liberty] Party will be popular, we do not claim. That corrupt men- men, 
who are more for numbers than principles- for ballot-box victories than for truth-
will approve of it, we do not expect.. .. That Cod will be on its side is our firm 
belief:-and, humbly and fervently, do we pray, that He will condescend to make it 
a means of hastening the time, when oppression and war shall be unknown, ... when 
"the earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the Lord, as the waters 
cover the sea."42 
These principled activists of the party would not support candidates of questionable 
moral qualifications or issues of popular interest merely for the sake of expediency4] 
They were not willing to risk the use of unsanctified means even if those means might 
result in the possible fulfillment of sanctified ends. Cerrit Smith, for example, a prominent 
Liberty Party congressman, was alarmed by the "immodest self-advancement" represented 
by some of the pragmatists at a Liberty Party convention. He declared that true Liberty 
men were those who 
profess to be conformed to what is right. With them, expediency is not the rule of 
right- but right the rule of expediency. The organization of the Liberty Party was a 
novel and bold experiment. To form a political party on the basis of an honest, 
uncalculating, adherence to the right and the true, was an undertaking so foreign to 
custom-so utterly unprecedented- that there is no wonder it was stared at as 
impracticable and fanatical. The experiment was well worth making, even if it had 
been made in the face of all probability of success44 
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For Smith and other abolitionists like him, faithfulness to righteous principles was infinitely 
more important than political success. 
Similar to other Christians throughout the Church's history, there were a few nine-
teenth century evangelical reformers who tried to be consistent in their application of the 
principles of non power, nonviolence, and nonsuccess. They refused to use unworthy 
means, even for what seemed to be worthy ends. These reformers existed as a type of 
"loyal opposition" to the American political and religious establishment, presenting a chal-
lenge to the "principalities and powers' of the era while simultaneously working to create 
new structures for a just society. In this way, they fulfilled the dual Christian responsibility 
to provide both (what john Howard Yoder has described as) "conscientious objection" 
and "conscientious participation" in the world: 5 Such a twofold commitment was due to 
their belief that, by following in the radical way of jesus, they were called to be a con-
structive- but dissenting- voice within American society. 
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THE ETHICS OF JERUSALEM AND THE 
MORALS OF ATHENS: ASSESSING HANS 
KONG'S THEOLOGICAL ETHICS 
KEN BREWER 
This essay will present and assess Hans Kung's theological ethics. Kung is now 
retired from the University of Tubingen, but he continues to write prolifically. The 
first part of Kung's career was devoted to ecumenical concerns between divided 
Christians. The middle stage saw a broadening interest in ecumenical issues 
between Christians and the world's religions. Now, as his last legacy, Kung is occu-
pied with an even greater ecumenical challenge between the world's religions and 
the world's political ideologies '. The thesis of his latest project is stated tersely in this 
way: world survival depends upon a global ethic; a global ethic is not possible with-
out religious peace; and religious peace is dependent upon interreligious dialogue.2 
This proposal requires that Kung somehow combine specifically Christian ethics (the 
ethics of jerusalem) with non-Christian and non-religious ethical systems <the morals 
of Athens}. 
The plan here is to first sketch the specific Christian component of Kung's ethics. 
What makes Kung's ethics 'Christian'? Then, Kung's proposal for a global ethic will 
be presented. Can there be a consensus between religious and non-religious peo-
ples about a minimum of shared ethical principles? Afterwards, attention must be 
given to the components by which Kung connects these seemly disparate ethical 
visions. just how does Kung hold his ethical vision together? Remarks will be made 
along the way critically assessing Kung's theological ethics. 
1. THE ETHICS OF JERUSALEM: JESUS AND THE NEW HUMANISM 
1. If we ask, "What makes ethics 'Christian'?," Kung would simply reply, "What is 
specifically Christian .. . is the fact that all ethical requirements are understood in the 
light of the rule of the crucified jesus Christ ... jesus, to whom we are subordinated 
once and for all in baptism by faith, must remain Lord over US. "3 jesus himself is the 
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specifically Christian criterion for all ethical behavior. This position follows directly from 
Kling's theological methodology, where Jesus is heralded as the norma normans (norma-
tive norm) for Christian theology4 For Kling, all Christian moral reasoning and practice 
must be derived from the Gospel narratives and centered on the life, death and resurrec-
tion Jesus of Nazareth. It is, therefore, important to give a profile of Kling's Jesus before 
proceeding to how Kling's christology functions in making ethical proposals. The connec-
tion between christology, ethics and ecclesiology should also be noted. The praxis of the 
Church in any age or culture, Kling maintains, should be grounded and guided by the 
pattem of radical discipleship modeled in Jesus of Nazareth. Kling employs the notions of 
"loyal opposition" and "critical catalyst" to depict the Christian relationship to the Church 
and the world. The ideas of "loyal opposition' and "critical catalyst" flow out of Kling's 
reading of the Gospel narratives and his interpretation of Jesus. 
A. Jesus: Apocalyptic Prophet of a New Humanism 
If all ethical requirements are to be understood in the light of the crucified and resur-
rected Jesus, as Kling argues, the question arises, "Which Jesus?" Kling's Jesus is derived 
from a narrative reading of the "characteristic features and outlines of Jesus message, 
behavior, and fate."s He is confident that historical-critical methods of interpretation pro-
vide a relatively adequate record of Jesus from the NT documents. Kling observes two 
essential features about the "real" Jesus from his investigation of the Gospels6 First, Jesus 
was Jewish and was loyal to the Jewish tradition. Second, Jesus was opposed to the way 
Judaism was practiced. 
Kling's "real" Jesus is essentially an apocalyptic Jewish prophet who preached the king-
dom of God, taught a radical ethic of love and showed solidarity with moral failures, the 
exploited, the marginalized, the non-religious, the demonized, children and sick people. 
Kling sums up the teaching of the "real" Jesus as: "Jesus made the cause of the God of 
Israel his own, govemed by the typically apocalyptic expectation of living in an end-time, 
in which God himself will very soon appear on the scene and impose his will, establish his 
rule and realize his kingdom. Jesus wanted to announce in advance this kingdom, this rule, 
this will of God, with a view to human salvation. This alone he made the criteria." 7 
Kling goes on to summarize the ethical component of Jesus' teaching in this way: "So 
he [Jesus] called not only for the renewed observance of God's commandments but for a 
love which in individual instances extends to unselfish service without hierarchy, to 
renunciation even without receiving anything in return, to boundless forgiving. It is a love 
which even includes the opponent, the enemy: love of God and love of neighbor in 
accordance with the criterion of self-love ('as yourselfl."B Jesus did not preach himself, 
but the cause of God, the will of God, God's program. God's program, Kling maintains, is 
absolutely congruent with the cause of humanity. It was not a "new law' which may be 
reduced to Halakhah nor separated from Haggadah. God's program, in fact, becomes the 
basis for a radical new humanism where being a Christian means being fully human, not 
less human. 
The life and message of Jesus were opposed by the leading Jewish options within 
Judaism. Jesus functioned as a "critical catalyst" within his own Jewish social context 
because he did not belong to any of the reigning ecclesiastical groups of his day. Kling 
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expresses it this way, Jesus was "caught in the cross of co-ordinates of options within 
Judaism."9 What is meant is that Jesus is not presented in the NT as a priest of the reli-
gious-political establishment like the Sadducees; nor as a political revolutionary like the 
Zealots; nor as some kind of ascetic monk like the Essences. Moreover, the NT does not 
situate Jesus within the company of the devout moralists, the Pharisees. So, Kling con-
cludes that: "it shows considerable understanding of Jesus if we do not attempt to inte-
grate him within the quadrilateral of establishment and revolution, emigration and com-
promise: He fits no formula. He is provocative, both on the right and on the left: appar-
ently closer than priests to Cod. At the same time freer than the ascetics in regard to the 
world. More moral than the moralists. And more revolutionary than the 
revolutionaries." 10 Jesus' life and teaching led to his crucifixion. Despite Jesus' loyalty to 
the house of Israel, he was crucified as a criminal of the State. Nonetheless, the cross 
became a summons to discipleship, to a life of self-giving and service to others. In fact, 
according to Kling, the cross is now the normative element and pattern for determining 
what is Christian about ethics. 
B. The Call to Discipleship: "Follow Jesus!" 
Kling maintains that the entire practice of individual Christians and Christian churches 
should be oriented toward the message and behavior, the cross and resurrection of Jesus 
as the model for what is Christian. Following Jesus in one's moral life, therefore, is basic 
to Christian discipleship. Kling heralds Jesus as the standard, the supreme norm, the chief 
source and final criterion for what it means to be Christian- not an infallible pope, the 
magisterium, church councils, church tradition, natural law or canon law. Kung departs 
from traditional Roman Catholic moral theology at this point. While it is not the theme 
of this essay, it must be said here that the parallels between Kling's Jesus and his own 
stance toward the Roman Catholic Church are unmistakable. It was Kung's christology, 
not his ecclesiology, that ultimately led to the removal of his missio canonica, his official 
license to teach Roman Catholic theology I I 
The specific Christian norm, then, is the concrete, historical person, Jesus of Nazareth, 
not some abstract ethical system or universal moral code. Kung points out that what dis-
tinguishes Jesus from the founders of other religions or ideologies is that the person and 
teaching of Jesus cannot be separated. He says, "the following of Christ is what distinguish-
es Christians from other disciples and supporters of great men, in the sense that Christians 
are ultimately dependent on this person, not only his teaching, but also his life, death, and 
new life."'2 Jesus was more than a rabbi or teacher. Jesus was the living, normative 
embodiment of the cause of Cod. In fact, Kling asserts that there was a harmony of will 
and revelation between Jesus and Cod without any contradiction. The one who pro-
claimed the kingdom, also embodied the kingdom. On this basis, Christians are able to 
justify and substantiate a new attitude, a new way of life, a new approach to life as well as 
a different set of values and a radical new humanism. The focus upon Jesus, Kung argues, 
is much more convincing than an impersonal idea, an abstract principle, a universal norm 
or a purely theoretical system of ethics. Indeed, the genius of Christian ethics, Kung 
maintains, is that it is rooted in a concrete, historical person. For, the person of Jesus pos-
sesses an "impressiveness, an ·'audibility" and a "realizability'· that is lacking in eternal 
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ideas, abstract principles, universal norms, conceptual systems and in unattainable, unreal-
istic ideals. ' J 
To say that Jesus is the specific, supreme norm of C hristian ethics, however, needs to 
be qualified in order to be more precise about how Jesus functions as the norm of 
C hristian ethics. Kung argues: .... it is of little use to appeal to absolute norms and simple 
rules, deduced from natural law or Scripture, in order to solve the apparently almost insol-
uble problems and conflicts of humanity .. ,, "14 Kung does not think that Jesus gives 
absolute answers to every moral dilemma humanity faces. The formation of Christian 
ethical norms and moral attitudes occurs within the larger context and process of social-
ization within the Christian community. This means that the specifically Christian aspect 
of "following Jesus" must be worked out tensively in one's own existential situation and 
not by universa lizing or absolutizing some particular ethical demand of Jesus. Technically, 
Kung suggests, we are not called to "imitate Jesus" but to "follow Jesus" (nachfolgenl. Jesus 
illuminates our situation. Our situation, however, shapes how we are to apply the norm 
of Jesus. The ethical process, therefore, is reciprocal, not one-sided. What is essential is 
that the Christian look to Jesus and allow him to inform and shape his or her action in a 
given situation . The context where the Christian learns this process is the C hristian com-
munity. The role of the Church, however, is not to dictate or mandate moral action. The 
C hurch's role is simply to teach and preach the Gospel and model C hristian behavior. 
C Is Something Missing from Kung 's Christian Ethics? 
Two specific remarks need to be made regarding Kung's specifica lly Christian ethics. 
First, I applaud the fact that Kung's theological ethics are essentially christocentric. The 
norm of Christian moral behavior is located in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus. 
While questions may be raised about aspects of Kung's historical reconstruction of the 
"real" Jesus, he is right to place Jesus within the context of Palestinian Judaism and stress a 
fundamental continuity between Jesus and Judaism. Kling also correctly points out that 
Jesus had serious tensions with Judaism due to unfaithfulness to the higher th ings of the 
Law. Kung's Jesus is an apocalyptic prophet calling for love, justice and mercy, a reversal 
of values and non-violent resistance that led to his crucifixion (very similar to the Jesus of 
E. P. Sanders' S). It is this historically reconstructed Jesus that is the norma nomans of 
Kling's theological ethics. Herein lies a problem. Kung's historically reconstructed Jesus, 
"real" o r not, is too fragile and too narrow a foundation to build a robust Christian under-
standing of the moral life. It is fragile in that historical inqui ry can only yield tentative and 
conflicting results, whereas ethical living requires a high degree of moral authority and 
conviction to motivate and sustain moral action. I agree with Richard Hays' comment 
that: ' .. . it makes sense to claim modestly that New Testament ethics will find a more sta-
ble starting place if we begin with the moral visions of the individual texts than if we try 
to begin by reconstructing Jesus."'6 Moreover, Kling's reconstructed Jesus is a narrow 
foundation in that Christian ethics is bound not only to the Gospels but to the entire NT 
witness as canon. Hence, the full canonical text of Scripture is missing in Kung's theologi-
cal ethics. 
Second, wh il e Kung emphas izes following Jesus and the cross as normative for 
Christian discipleship and ethics, there are ethical components of C hristian doctrine that 
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are either muted or completely ignored. For example, one does not find in Kung's discus-
sion any extensive treatment of the ethical implications of human bondage to sin, Cod's 
power to liberate us from the power of sin, or Cod's provision for the possibility of obedi-
ence through the empowerment of the Holy Spirit. Jesus is for Kung a concrete moral 
example and he challenges us to follow Jesus in our concrete discipleship. One gets the 
impression, however, that Kung's call to follow Jesus is an unconditional ethical demand 
that Christians can simply apply to their situation and live successfully from the their own 
human resources. Jesus is our extemal model, norm and standard for discipleship and 
ethics. But something more than an external model is needed for humanity to act and 
behave after the pattern of Jesus. The same Spirit who empowered Jesus is available to 
moral failures to help them do what they cannot achieve in their own strength. As 
Cordon Fee correctly observes, "truly Christian ethics can only be by the Spirit's empow-
ering."' ? The Spirit's empowering presence is fundamental to any Christian ethic. 
Without the Spirit, we are powerless and weak to overcome our sinful nature and habits 
by our own human resources. 
2. THE MORALS OF ATHENS: SEARCH FOR A GLOBAL ETHIC 
Some aspects of Kung's Christian ethics sound as if an Anabaptist ethicist could have 
written it. But things get more complex when we turn to his project for a global ethic. 
Hans Kung's interests have always been world scale and comprehensive. Even in Kung's 
early period, when he wrote predominately on ecclesiology and received the Nihil obstat 
and Imprimatur, Kung never lost sight of the world horizon or the fact that the Church 
exists " ... in the world for the world."'B This is true of Kung's theological ethics, as well. He 
is not content to write as a Christian theologian exclusively for the Church. Nor has 
Kung aspired to be a "theologian's theologian," one who writes to assuage the exclusive 
interests and inquiries of the academy. Kung is a practical theologian. He writes pro-
grammatic theory with concrete and pragmatic ends in view. The proposal for a global 
ethic is an extension of the fact that Hans Kung is self-consciously a "catholic" (i.e., univer-
sal) theologian. We will first deal with the development of Kung's global ethic as a pro-
grammatic agenda. Then, we will see how Kling's proposal for a new world ethic devel-
oped into a declaration about the world's religions. Finally, we examine how Kung's glob-
al ethic addresses global politics and economics. 
A. The Proposal for a New World Ethic 
The concept of a "world ethic' (Weltethos) developed gradually in Kling's thought. The 
first stage of formation was the connection Kung made between world peace and interre-
ligious dialogue. World peace, Kung realized, is contingent upon establishing peace 
among the world's religions '9 At an interreligious conference at Temple University in 
1984, Kung condensed his thoughts into programmatic theses: "No world peace without 
peace among the religions, no peace among the religions without dialogue between the 
religions, and no dialogue between the religions without accurate knowledge of one 
another."20 These theses were the driving force behind Kung's two major books on inter-
religious dialogue, Christianity and the World Religions2 1 and Christianity and Chinese 
ReligionS2 As Kung reflected further upon the world situation, he was convinced that 
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these theses must be developed into a formal program, one that could make a significant 
contribution towards world survival. He tested his initial proposal for a global ethic twice 
before UNESCO (1989, 1991) and once before the World Economic Forum (199m. 
The latter meeting included a trialogue with Kung, Hans Jonas and Karl-Otto Apel. 
The project for a new world ethic was programmatically presented in Kung's book, 
Projekt Weltethos (199m. It has the English title, Global Responsibility: In Search of a New 
World Ethic. The word "ethos,' translated here as "ethic," does not so much denote a sys-
tem of ethics as a way of life. The first part of the book outlines the paradigm shift from 
modemity to postmodernity and deals with the threat to world survival and the need for 
a global ethic. He explains that after the failure of "State socialism, ' "neocapitalism' and 
"Japanism," we are at an end of the great modern humanistic ideologies of "political-social 
revolution" and "technological evolution." The ideology of progress has been "demysti-
fied" in this century of two world wars and the Holocaust. The survival of the world is 
now threatened by proliferating military aggression, hunger, extinction of animal life, 
world economic catastrophe, depletion of rain forests and increased global warming. 
Concomitant with these issues, Kung assesses that the world is in moral crisis. Many peo-
ple no longer know a basis from which they may make moral decisions. Consequently, 
they are confronted with personal and social nihilism in every facet of human existence. 
The paradigm change from modernity to postmodernity is disruptive. 
Given this analysis of the world situation, Kung proposes that what the world needs is 
some kind of "minimal basic consensus" that affirms core values, norms and attitudes. 
Otherwise, there can be no possibility of peaceful coexistence, let alone any real democ-
racy. What is needed is an ethic that is global in perspective and mandates "planetary 
responsibility' as a Kantian categorical imperative. Kung acknowledges that this task is 
too great for anyone religious tradition. It requires, by its very nature, a coalition between 
believers and non-believers, religious and secular people alike. Everyone has a stake in 
world survival; so everyone is responsible to work to achieve it. The world's religions play 
a particularly important role in providing the foundation and resources for a global ethic. 
Kung's proposal for a new world ethic and global responsibility requires a transcendent 
ground, a ground that is not itself conditioned. Kung is confident that such a transcen-
dent ground may be discovered among the world's religious traditions. He queries, 
... .who would be better suited today than the world religions to mobilize millions of peo-
ple for a world ethic? To mobilize them by formulating ethical aims, presenting key 
moral ideas and motivating them both rationally and emotionally, so that the ethical 
norms can also be lived out in practice?"23 The world's religions, then, serve as the source 
and foundation from which a basic consensus of universal moral values, norms and atti-
tudes may be derived. But will the world's religious traditions accept Kung's proposal for 
a new world ethic? 
B. The Declaration of a New World Ethic 
After much experience in interreligious dialogue and extensive research into the 
world's religions, Kung was convinced that the world's religions could supply the moral 
basis and spiritual resources needed for a new world ethic. But how could Kung make 
his programmatic agenda for a new world ethic concrete and realizable in a global con-
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text? He could only do so if leaders in the world's religious traditions would embrace and 
promote the idea of a global ethic. But where was there a forum to present the idea of a 
new world ethic to a wide variety of religious traditions and their leaders? Kung found 
that forum at the Parliament of the World's Religions which met in Chicago in 1993. He 
was invited to draft a declaration for a common ethic that could be adopted by the vari-
ous religious traditions attending the Parliament.24 
Kung's draft was discussed by the Council of the Parliament and by others from vari-
ous religious traditions. Eventually, Kung's text was accepted by the Board of Trustees 
(with some minor revisions) as what would become the "Declaration Toward a Global 
Ethic." The delegates attending the Parliament would discuss and debate the prospects 
for a global ethic and be asked to endorse the declaration formally. The real test for 
Kung's global ethic was whether or not such diverse groups as Muslims, the Fellowship of 
Isis, Greek Orthodox Christians, Shintos, the Theosophical Society and neo-pagans could 
come to a consensus about a minimum of shared ethical principles. After a number of 
objections were considered, the "Declaration Toward a Global Ethic' was signed by the 
majority of the delegates, including the Dalai Lama, the Roman Catholic Cardinal of 
Chicago, the Vatican representative, the representative from the World Council of 
Churches and many other wide ranging groups and individuals. Evangelical and conserv-
ative Christian groups did not attend. They were suspicious of the syncretistic nature of 
the Parliament. Moreover, Evangelicals and conservative Christians had serious problems 
participating in some of the planned activities (such as neo-pagan moon worship). 
As for the declaration itself, it began by citing the need for a global ethic in our con-
temporary world and by calling for commitment to "a minimal fundamental consensus 
concerning binding values, irrevocable standards, and fundamental moral attitudes" as a 
basis for a global ethic.25 A basic demand of the declaration is: "Every human being must 
be treated humanely.' The declaration then put forward some "irrevocable directives" of 
human behavior to promote a more humane world. The minimal ethic proposed for a 
global ethic is summed up in the following general principles of the Declaration: 
I. Commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life. 
2. Commitment to a culture of solidarity and a just economic order. 
3. Commitment to a culture of tolerance and a life of truthfulness. 
4. Commitment to a culture of equal rights and partnership between men and women26 
Each of these directives is followed by explications and representative examples of 
how to live out the directive in concrete human experience. The conclusion of the decla-
ration calls for a fundamental "transformation of consciousness" whereby all men and 
woman are encouraged to commit themselves " ... to a common global ethic, to a better 
mutual understanding, as well as to socially-beneficial, peace-fostering, and Earth-friendly 
ways of life."27 Kung was encouraged by the interest in and support of a global ethic by 
those attending the Parliament of World Religions and by the serious consideration it 
received in the aftermath.28 Yet it remained for him to be more specific as to how a glob-
al ethic could be applied to our world situation. To address this, Kung turned his atten-
tion to the practical domain of global politics and economics. 
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C. The Application of a New World Ethic 
Kung selected the arenas of global politics and economics to demonstrate the applica-
bility of his proposal for a new world ethic. His book, A Global Ethic for Global Politics and 
EconomicS", reads more like a book from a poli tical science or economics professor than 
from a theologian. The first section deals with global politics while the second treats glob-
al economics. In both sections, Kung surveys and analyzes the historic background to the 
present world situation. In typical Kungian fashion, he posits two extreme positions and 
suggests a via media. His proposed paradigm of poli tics and economics is centered 
around the theme of responsibility. In conclusion to each section, Kung suggests several 
specific proposals indicating how a global ethic could benefit global politics and econom-
ics. Kung adds a chapter discussion to the section on global politics that indicates the pos-
itive role the world's religions could play in the practice of d iplomacy and the peace 
process. Space is available only to give a summary sketch of how Kung's new world ethic 
applies to global pol itics and economics respectively. 
Kung envisions two opposite poles in global politics. One side of the pole emphasizes 
realism and power poli tics. Th is is represented by the power politics of Henry Kissinger, 
the Machiavellian politics of Cardinal de Richelieu, the practical Realpolitik of Otto von 
Bismarck and the power management theory of Hans J. Morgenthau. At the other pole is 
the idealistic politics of Woodrow Wilson, who sought to subordinate politics to morality. 
Kung proposes an ethic of responsibi lity where the "political calculation' of realistic poli-
tics is combined with and tempered by the ethical judgments of an idealistic politics. 
Kung bases his thinking here on the ethics of responsibility outlined by Max Weber and 
Hans Jonas30 His logic is that a global society needs a global ethic where some consensus 
on moral values, criteria and attitudes inform our global political decisions. Without a 
global ethic informing global politics, democracy in the globa l village will not survive 
Machiavellian power politics. But where do we fi nd global ethical standards? He gravi-
tates toward the political theory of Michael Walzer, and away from those of Rawls and 
Habermas. Walzer, like Kung, seeks to fi nd a via media between realist and idealist poli-
tics by building upon a "core morality: a "mi nimal" or "thi n" ethic31 Kung, however, goes 
beyond Walzer to suggest that a more universal ethic for politics is the golden rule (= "do 
to others what you want them to do to you"), which is expressed in different ways in vari-
ous traditions. In addition, Kung suggests that the four general ethical directives of the 
Declaration Toward a Global Ethic (noted above) would also provide moral orientation 
for global politics. 
Next, the global economy is divided up into two opposite poles as well. Kung believes 
that the globalization of the world economy is "unavoidable," "ambivalent," "unpre-
dictable" and able to be "controlled."12 His logic in economics is the same as that in poli-
tics. If the world is moving toward a global economy with global businesses and technol-
ogy, then the world needs a global ethic based on a basic ethical consensus to guide hon-
est business practices and a just distribution of wealth. On the one side of this pole is the 
failed welfare state system. Sweden provides Kung with an example of a welfare state in 
shambles with poor economic growth, high unemployment and weak currency. Kung 
does not want to abandon the welfare state system tota lly, however. His idea is to 
restructure it for greater effectiveness. At the other pole is the neocapitalism of the USA 
Assessing Hans Kung's Theological Ethics 109 
and England. Kung does not think that neocapitalism, with its emphasis upon the profit 
motive, has produced a better model for responsible economic life than that of the wel-
fare state. 
After examining the American situation, Kung agrees with the analysis of Zbigiew 
Brzezinski, former Security Advisor to President Carter, that the balance sheet on neocapi-
talism reveals major flaws: financial indebtedness, trade deficit, low savings, noncompeti-
tiveness, low productivity, poor health care, deficient public education, decaying social 
infrastructure, a greedy upper class, heightened litigation, race and poverty problems, per-
vasive crime and increased violence, a massive drug culture, social helplessness, sexual 
license, moral corruption through the media, divisive multiculturalism, decline in civil con-
sciousness, political gridlock and spiritual emptiness.ll In the light of this list, Kung con-
cludes that economic policies need moral direction. Kung pleas for responsible economic 
policies that work toward more just social conditions and ones that factor in environmen-
tal concerns. 
In addition to collaboration between cultures and shared commitments of those cul-
tures to human rights and democracy, Kung points to the moral and spiritual values of 
the world's religions as an indispensable resource for a responsible global economics. The 
religious traditions speak in one way or another about serving others, a commitment to a 
just economic order, dealing honestly and fairly in business and prohibiting theft. Kung 
implores businesses, business managers and business ethicists to tap into the ethical 
resources of the world's religions. He offers this parting piece of advice: "In the long term 
an immoral way of doing business does not pay."l4 
D. Is Kung's Global Ethic Project Plausible? 
Hans Kung must be commended for his efforts toward a global ethic. Who can dis-
agree with the ideal of world peace, treating people more humanely, just economic distri-
bution, responsible attitudes toward the environment or more friendly relations between 
the world's religions? The world is in moral crisis. Human society certainly needs help. 
Kung is to be credited not only for these efforts but also for alerting statesmen and politi-
cal leaders to the positive value and role that religion can play in reaching these moral 
goals for society. Nonetheless, there are two aspects of Kung's project that present plausi-
bility problems. 
First, Kung's quest for minimal values, norms and attitudes from particular religions and 
cultures that are at the same time universally binding ethical values, norms and attitudes is 
strained. Kung hopes to discover common categorical imperatives that are trans-national, 
trans-cultural, universally binding ethical values, norms and standards from a consensus of 
religions and cultures as the minimum foundation for a global ethic. In addition, Kung 
seeks to ground these common ethical values, norms and attitudes in a transcendent 
ground, which he calls "Cod." Without this ground, he admits, ethics and morality are at 
best relative. Yet, Kung also says that he is not seeking absolute standards of morality or a 
unitary ethical ideology, but only a sober and modest way to address the needs and wor-
ries of the modern age by striving for "a new basic consensus of integrative humane con-
victions."J5 Kung here backs away from absolute, universal moral standards grounded in a 
transcend reality and retreats to the notion of human ., consensus:' The dilemma is that it is 
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impossible to derive divinely grounded universal standards of morality from relative human 
consensual convictions found in world religions and cultures. Religions and cultures are rel-
ative. Thus, Kung is looking for universal standards, norms and values among relative stan-
dards, norms and values. To acknowledge that universal, trans-national, trans-cultural cate-
gorical moral imperatives exist and need to be grounded in a transcendent reality is to con-
cede that some particular objective, absolute standard of moral truth exists, is knowable 
and is to some extent known in human history. This is exactly what the Jewish and 
Christian traditions c1aim.16 But this is certainly not the moral understanding of "consensus' 
thinkers in Westem culture. Nor is it the teaching of many world religions. Kung's talk of 
"consensus" suggests that he is vulnerable to the same criticisms he made against Habermas 
and Rawls. Here, I agree with the critique of Nicholas Rescher, who forcefully argues that 
consensus "is not a criterion of truth, is not a standard of value, is not an index of moral or 
ethical appropriateness, is not a requisite for co-operation, is not, in and of itself, an appro-
priate ideaL"]? While the ideals of Kung's project are worthy, "consensus' is not a valid 
ideal upon which to found universal ethics. It is, therefore, difficult to see how Kung's pro-
ject provides a plausible framework for a global ethic by setting the foundation for univer-
sal moral imperatives upon the shifting sands of human consensus. 
Second, the four irrevocable directives for human behavior in the Declaration Toward 
a Global Ethic are so general that as each tradition interprets these directives, there is little 
real gain on "consensus. The problem is that as we shift from the general principle to 
more specific definitions, interpretations and concrete applications of the directive in the 
specific religions and cultures, then irreconcilable differences begin to emerge. For exam-
ple, the first irrevocable directive suggests a commitment to a "culture of non-violence and 
respect for life." This is based upon the religious-ethical prescript "Thou shall not kill'" or, 
stated positively, "Have respect for life'" We are told that "armament is a mistaken path; 
disarmament is the commandment of the times" and that humans, animals and plants 
deserve "protection, preservation, and care."]8 There is no consensus among Christians, 
let alone the other world religions, on what 'Thou shall not kill" or "Have respect for life" 
means. One need look no further than the death penalty and abortion issues in the USA 
to realize that this directive itself is not sufficient to settle heated and sometimes violent 
disagreements among Christians. Moreover, is not this directive admittedly easier for 
Theravadin Buddhists than for Shi'ite Muslims and most Christians (with the exception of 
the Anabaptist tradition)? And what does it mean practically to protect, preserve and 
care for animals and plants? Does this mean that animals and plants are not to be killed 
for food, clothing, medical testing or other human uses? If not, what practical guidelines 
are given for ethical treatment of animals and plants? These and other such problems can 
be raised about the four irrevocable directives of the Declaration Toward a Global Ethic. 
Due to their very general formulation, the irrevocable directives lose moral force as they 
are interpreted and contextualized. 
With all this emphasis upon global ethics, world religions, politics, and economics, 
some might be wondering if Kung has forgotten a specific commitment to the Christian 
faith. In the middle of his book on global politics and economics, however, Kung offers 
this personal confession: "in the face of all the darkness of the world and the Church, 
Jesus Christ stands as 'the light of the world', 'the light of men', as 'our light' : The light (of 
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life} shines in the darkness and the darkness has not overcome it'.. . . In company with 
many others I openly concede that during the long decades of my life as a theologian I 
personally would hardly have survived so long in the face of so much darkness in the 
world and the Church without this light, which in my fragile humanity has always been 
for me 'the way, the truth and the life'."J9 It is from this Christian center that Kung has 
sought to construct a global ethic. He meets the world on its own turf and in its own 
terms. Kung does so, however, as a Christian theologian. But how does Kung relate this 
project for a global ethic to his specific Christian ethics and following Jesus? This question 
is the theme of the next section. 
3. BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN JERUSALEM & ATHENS 
Kung is conscious of the apparent disparity of combining the ethics of Jerusalem 
(specifically Christian ethics) to the morals of Athens (non-Christian and non-religious 
moral thinking). He finds no contradiction, however, in joining these two into a unified 
ethical vision. In addressing this issue, Kung comments: "Clearly a universal human ethic 
and a specifically Christian ethic are not mutually exclusive."40 But the question of how 
Kung couples a general, universal ethic to a specifically Christian ethic is not clear. On 
what basis does he bridge the gap between Jerusalem and Athens? And how does he 
retain a unified ethical vision? 
There are at least five features of Kung's theology that serve as bridge components 
between his specifically Christian ethics and his global ethic project. Kung nowhere pre-
sents these features of his theology in a coherent system. However, these components 
are entirely commensurate with his thinking and aid in understanding how he unifies his 
ethical vision. The five bridge components are derived from aspects of Kung's natural 
theology, anthropology, theological method, conception of truth, and his employment of 
Hegel's dialectical method. These five components are likened to a bridge with five 
planks. A brief exposition of how each functions will reveal that these bridge compo-
nents are the essential components that provide cohesion to Kung's theological ethics. 
A. The Natural Theology Plank 
The first bridge component of Kung's theological ethics is derived from his natural the-
ology. Kung takes neither a strong "foundationalist" approach to natural theology charac-
teristic of Vatican I nor a "fideistic" approach along the lines of Karl Barth. God, as the 
creator of the world, may be discovered in a limited way from creation. This means that 
God's self-revelation and human experience of that revelation are not antithetical. 
Revelation occurs through human experience, not apart from it. Kung finds support for a 
"soft" natural theology within Scripture (Rom 1:18-21 , 2:14-16; Acts 14:17, 17:27; John 
I :9; Hebrews I I) . His conclusion is that a true, but limited, knowledge of God may be 
derived from creation apart from the special revelation of God in Jesus Christ. 
Knowledge of God, therefore, is, in principle, universal in scope and can be a resource for 
ethical principles as well as provide a basis for moral action. Belief in God is nourished by 
an ultimately justified fundamental trust in reality. God is not only the guarantor of the 
reality of reason and the rationality of reason, but also is the ground upon which ethics 
and the moral life are ultimately founded. He says, 'The very last and first reality, God, 
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must be assumed if a person in the last resort wants to live a meaningful moral life. Cod's 
reality is the condition of the possibility of a moral autonomy of man in secular society."41 
Kung maintains that theonomy is the essential condition for the possibility of moral 
autonomy. In this way, a "soft" natural theology provides one plank of continuity 
between specifically Christian ethics and a universal global ethic. 
B. The Humanum Plank 
The second cohesive bridge component is Kung's conception of the humanum. He 
believes that there is a continuity between being Christian and being human. While he 
does not simply equate being human with being Christian, Kung thinks that being 
Christian does not mean that one is less human. Being human and being Christian are 
complementary and mutually beneficial to one another. True religion, Kung affirms, and 
true humanity exist in dialectical tension. He remarks, ''True humanity is the presupposi-
tion for true religion' and "true religion is the fulfillment of true humanity."42 The concept 
"humanum" denotes human dignity, worth and value. It is the central ethical criterion by 
which Kung evaluates and determines what is good and bad, true and false, valuable and 
va lueless in the world's religions and ideologies. If something promotes and protects 
human dignity, value and worth, then it is regarded as true, good and valuable. If, howev-
er, something destroys or suppresses human dignity, value and worth, it is false, bad and 
valueless. The concept of the humanum functions in this way as a general ethical criterion 
for all religions and ideologies. As a result, Kung views the humanum (human dignity, 
value and worth) as a universally binding and unconditional eth ical criterion. Moreover, 
the general ethical criterion, the humanum, is not regarded by Kung as being in conflict 
with the specific ethical criterion for Christians, Jesus Christ. In fact, Jesus Christ is consid-
ered the supreme concrete example of the formal category "the humanum. Jesus C hrist 
gives an impressive, audible and realizable quality to the abstract notion of the humanum. 
Since Jesus provides the supreme example of human dignity, value and worth, there is no 
disjunction for Kung between Christian ethics and a global ethic oriented toward the 
humanum. 
C The Correlation Method Plank 
The third bridge component that brings cohesion to Kung's theological ethics is his the-
ological methodology. Kung's theological methodology stands in the tradition of revision-
ist theologians Paul Tillich, David Tracy and Edward Schillebeeckx. Each of these, in dif-
ferent ways, employs the method of correlation. The method of correlation suggests two 
main sources for Christian theology: divine revelation and human experience. This 
method also posits a basic continuity between divine revelation and human experience. 
This basic continuity, however, does not imply that divine revelation and human experi-
ence never conflict. What it does suggest is that there is a relative harmony between the 
revelation of Cod in creation and the revelation of Cod in scripture. The method of cor-
relation, therefore, is congruent with a "soft" natural theology and accounts for why Kung 
takes seriously the world horizon within Christian theology. The world situation with its 
varied human experiences is viewed as a potential source for the knowledge of Cod. 
Kung's theological method, however, departs from the correlation tradition in one very 
Assessing Hans Kung's Theological Ethics I I 3 
important respect. It includes alongside a "mutually critical correlation" space for a "mutu-
ally critical confrontation,"4] Divine revelation and human experience, Kung maintains, 
are not always compatible, What is one to do if there exists a critical confrontation 
between divine revelation and human experience? This is an interesting problematic for 
any theological method, but especially for methods of correlation. How exactly does one 
adjudicate the truth of conflicting moral claims between divine revelation and human 
experience? Kung argues that Christian theologians must opt for the norm of truth found 
in Jesus Christ in a critical confrontation, He says, "What then should decide the issue in 
the crucial first-and-Iast questions affecting man and humanity? The biblical experiences, 
the Christian message, the Gospel, Jesus Christ himself. For this Christ Jesus is in person 
the 'essence of Christianity, the 'Christian message, the 'Gospel' itself, indeed God's 
'Word: 'made flesh."'44 Kung's theological method of correlation, even while affirming 
Jesus as the ultimate norm for assessing truth, advocates a basic continuity between the 
moral truth in Jesus and moral truth found in human experience. 
D. The Differentiated Truth Plank 
If Jesus Christ is the norm of moral truth, how is he related to the moral truth found in 
the global context? This question leads to the fourth bridge component of Kung's theologi-
cal ethics, his differentiated conception of truth, Kung discusses his conception of truth 
while formulating ecumenical criteria for determining truth in the world's religions. The 
question of truth is important to him because the issue of conflicting moral truth claims 
arises in the search for a moral consensus among believers and non-believers. Kung is of 
the opinion that truth is ontologically unified. He maintains: "The truth cannot be differ-
ent in the different religions, but only one: through all the contradictions, we have to seek 
what is complementary; through all the exclusions, what is inclusive."4s There is no consen-
sus on what criteria could be employed to adjudicate the conflicting moral truth claims 
among the religions. Nonetheless, Kung assembles a set of criteria for evaluating truth in 
the world's religions. The criteria he employs are: (I) the general ethical criterion of the 
humanum; (2) the general religious criteria of the authentic or canonical; and (3) the specifi-
cally Christian criterion- Jesus Christ. The first criterion is ethical in nature and has already 
been discussed above, In sum, a religious claim or behavior cannot be true if it does not 
promote human dignity, value and worth. The second criterion suggests that for religious 
beliefs and practices to be true, they must at least measure up to their own authoritative 
teachings or canons. The third criterion, Jesus Christ, applies to Christian believers only. 
These three criteria are augmented by two perspectives of truth, which results in a "dif-
ferentiated" conception of truth, The first dimension of truth is the external or outside per-
spective. From this standpoint, the "objective" outsider view, there are many different true 
and good religions. The extemal dimension of truth is correlated with the search for a 
global ethic where the general ethical criterion of the humanum and the general religious 
criterion of the canonical function as "minimal requirements" for the truth of any religion, 
From this perspective, Kung comments, "As a religion Christianity appears in world history 
just as relative as all other religions."46 There exists, however, another dimension of truth. 
Kung calls this the internal or inside perspective from the Christian point of view. This cor-
responds to Kung's specificaUy Christian ethics and the specifically Christian criterion of 
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jesus Christ. From the Christian standpoint, there is only one ultimately true ethical criteri-
on- jesus Christ. Kung is quick to add that the truth of Christianity does not monopolize 
or diminish truth in other religions. That is, as long as Christian truth claims are not flatly 
contradicted. Kung does not mean to suggest by his differentiated conception of truth that 
truth itself is pluralistic or differentiated. He means that our human perceptions of truth 
are relative in nature. Only God has an objective, undifferentiated view of truth. Because 
human perception of truth is differentiated, Kung reasons, true ethical teachings within 
Christianity may be combined, although not completely harmonized with, the moral teach-
ings and ethical practices found in the world's religions toward a world ethic. 
E. The Hegelian Dialectic Plank 
The fifth and last bridge component to consider is Kung's use of Hegel's dialectical 
method of "sublation. Hans Kung is a theologian of the via media. Hegel's dialectical 
method is one of his favorite devices for navigating the via media and has been employed 
in each of the four bridge components above either explicitly or implicitly. This fact is 
key to understanding how Kung combines a specifically Christian ethic with universal-
global morality from the world's religions and secularist thought. The Hegelian dialectical 
method of sublation is Kung's primary tool for resolving conflicts and incompatibilities in 
interreligious dialogue. He says: ' .. . the goal [of interreligious dialogue] is not a com-
pounding of various features from various religions, nor a mingling of gods (theocracy), 
nor a fusing of religions, but, rather, a dialectical 'transcending' (Aufhebenl of conflicts 
through inner mediation, which at once includes affirming, denying, and overcoming 
antagonistic positions."4? What is said here about interreligious dialogue applies equally 
well to how Kung couples his Christian ethics to his project for a global ethic. The link is 
Heger s dialectical method of sublation. 
The word "sublation' is derived from the German Aufhebung, which is very difficult to 
translate into English. Kung nowhere explains the concept in detail, but comments that 
sublation means more than the combination of thesis, antithesis and synthesis. He sug-
gests that sublation is "the affirmation of a truth that tums into a denial and then again 
into a transcending of both affirmation and denial."48 Edward Quinn, one of Kung's trans-
lators, thinks that "sublation'" is best understood as something that cancels, preserves, ele-
vates and transfigures all at the same moment.49 The dialectical method requires that no 
proposition be wholeheartedly denied or uncritically affirmed without qualification. 
Moreover, sublation has the positive aim of mediating polar opposites. It is easy to under-
stand why Kung employs Hegel's method of sublation in his global ethic project. For by 
it, he hopes to take all the moral teachings found in the world's religions and secularist 
thought, affirm the relative truth found in each, deny the absolute claims of each, and, 
then, transcend and elevate each into a unified global ethic. Each of the bridge compo-
nents above is contingent upon the success of Hegel's dialectical method of sublating 
opposites and rendering antinomies compatible. 
F How Stable Is Kung's Bridge? 
Kung is an ecumenical theologian par excellence. What makes him such is his keen 
insight into what divides Christians, the world's religions and secular worldviews. He is 
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quick to get to the heart of issues. Kung's mind habitually locates the central antinomies 
between views. In fact, most of his books deal with problematics that are construed as 
polar opposites. It is also Kung's natural impulse to formulate a mediating position 
between polar opposites. The assumption that underlies Kung's mediation impulse is that 
God is the ultimate source of all truth and our capacity for knowing anything at all in the 
world stems from God. It is from this viewpoint that Kung can affirm a fundamental con-
tinuity between natural and revealed revelation, between being human and being 
Christian, between divine revelation and human experience and between truth in the 
world and "Christian" truth. There is much to agree with here. However, space only 
allows for two critical remarks regarding these bridge components between Jerusalem and 
Athens. It is possible to cross from Jerusalem to Athens on the planks provided. But it is 
much like crossing over a great chasm on a wobbly rope bridge with two very weak 
boards. The two major weak planks are Kung's conception of truth and his use of 
Hegel's dialectical method. 
First, Kung's differentiated conception of truth has two major flaws. The first major 
flaw is that his conception of truth is contingent upon a false distinction between ., objec-
tive" (the outside perspective) and "subjective" truth (the inside perspective). The subject-
object debate has been long standing in epistemology, especially since the Enlightenment. 
Kung himself has criticized at length the Enlightenment view of truth as "objective" math-
ematical certainty and acknowledges the subjectivity of all human reason, including scien-
tific rationalism.so There is no realm of rationality that is privileged to "objective" knowl-
edge, while all others must be relegated to the status of "subjective." All objects of ratio-
nal inquiry are related to knowing subjects, which means that one's knowing faculty can-
not be separated from the willing, feeling, imagination, temperament, emotions and pas-
sions of the person doing the knowing. In addition, Kung has argued that the rationality 
of reason must be presupposed by a "prior act of trust" in order to execute any rational 
inquiry. This pre-scientific decision that precedes all rationality is classified in Kung's 
thought as "fundamental trust. "SI Moreover, if finitude and sin are factored into human 
knowing, then it is extremely difficult to say that some perspectives are "objective" and 
others are merely "subjective' in nature. The other major flaw of Kung's differentiated 
conception of truth is that it is difficult to see how it evades the charge of practical rela-
tivistic perspectivalism. As noted above, Kung himself does not think that truth itself is 
relative, differentiated or pluralistic in itself. He definitely believes in one ultimate reality, 
which he calls "God." He also affirms that truth cannot be different in different religions. 
It, therefore, defies logic for Kung to say that Christians possess a criterion for truth (jesus 
Christ) that is not at the same time a criterion for truth in other religions and ideologies. 
Second, Kung's use of Hegel's dialectical method of sublation to resolve antinomies 
does little to explain how polar opposites are mediated. Kung's writings are brimming 
with appeals to Hegel's dialectical method of sublation as the key to mediating antagonis-
tic positions. There is no question that the dialectical method of sublation has the positive 
aim of mediation of opposite positions. Yet Kung nowhere provides a nuanced definition 
or explanation of the inner dynamics of sublation other than appealing to the very gener-
al formula that it involves an affirming, denying and overcoming of both affirmation and 
denial in some kind of nondescript mediation. Without some kind of explanation of how 
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antinomies are mediated and at the same time preserved, Kung's conception of truth and 
his dialectical joining of antagonistic positions suffers the same problem of Hegel's philoso-
phy. Hegel's dialectic conceived of Cod and truth more dynamically, to be sure. 
However, it is virtually impossible to distinguish truth from the process of human history 
or God from the world and human consciousness in Hegel's philosophy. This is due to 
Hegel's use of the dialectical method of sublation. In a similar way, it is difficult to distin-
guish an essential difference in Kung's thought between being Christian and being human, 
between Jesus and the humanum, between revelation and human experience, between 
modernity and postmodernity, between specifically Christian ethics and global ethics, 
between Jerusalem and Athens. The reason is that Kung employs Hegel's dialectical 
method of sublation to mediate these antinomies. In the end, it is hard to avoid the criti-
cal judgment that Kung's employment of Hegel's dialectical method of sublation as affirm-
ing, denying and overcoming is little more than a crude and mechanical way to sweep 
unraveled theological loose ends under the proverbial carpet. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that Hans Kung has made significant contributions to theology 
during his career. He will be remembered as one of the distinguished theologians of the 
twentieth century. Kung is reviewed as "a unique phenomenon is twentieth-century the-
ology" for "no other theologian has been published, translated and read so widely in this 
century; no other theologian has been the focus of such a major controversy; no other 
contemporary theologian has covered such a broad spectrum of theological themes."12 
Hans Kung is essentially an ecumenical theologian. And it is perhaps in the field of ecu-
menics that Kung has made his most significant contributions. This has led John Cobb to 
exclaim that "Hans Kung has contributed more than any other Christian to interreligious 
dialogue."13 Moreover, even though we have found significant theoretical problems with 
his Christian ethics, his global ethic project and the components by which he bridges the 
gap between the two, Kung remains an outstanding example of a thoughtful and imagi-
native Christian theologian. He desires to engage the world in order to make a pragmatic 
and responsible impact. He does so unashamedly as a committed Christian. Future ecu-
menical theologians in the Third Millennium are not only indebted to his ecumenical 
research, but even more to his ecumenical passion. 
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JUSTICE OR "JUST US"? 
ALLOCATING RESOURCES IN 
AN AGE OF AIDS 
JOHN F. KI LN ER 
During the I 980s, many in the Christian community were characterizing AIDS as a 
punishment from God and stigmatizing people with AIDS (however they contract-
ed the disease) as modern-day lepers. It was against this backdrop that Robert W. 
Lyon wrote the jarring article, "Becoming the New Testament Church to Serve 
These 'New Lepers,'" in the journal Engage/Social Action. I It challenged the Church 
to be radically different from the rest of the world by exhibiting vulnerability and 
fostering love toward the neediest. Many in the Church were deeply moved by this 
challenge, and during the years that followed, numerous ministries and ministry pro-
posals appeared 2 
Directly serving people ravaged by HIV3 infection and AIDS, though, was just the 
first step. It was an essential first step, because without it the Church would have no 
credible basis for asking anything significant from society at large. However, with 
many members of the body of Christ now willing to join Christ in associating with 
those commonly despised, the time has come to examine more carefully what the 
Church needs to be saying to a society that controls the majority of monetary 
resources potentially available to help those who have or could contract HN / AIDS. 
Professor Lyon has long persuasively argued that the ethics of Cod's Reign (or 
"Kingdom"') tends to place believers at odds with their societies as well as their eccle-
sial cultures. If that is true, then an ethical challenge not only to the Church but also 
to society at large must be expected in a full account of the ethics of God's Reign. 
This article represents an attempt to look beyond the Church and to ask what an 
ethics of God's Reign can contribute to current social struggles to determine what 
resources should be expended in behalf of present and future persons with 
HN / AIDS. Accordingly, it concentrates on the social dimension of the demands of 
love- what the Bible often refers to as "justice." Shortly after Jesus summarizes God's 
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expectations for people as loving Cod and lovi ng neighbor (Luke 10:27-28), he is pic-
tured challenging the Pharisees to love Cod and do justice (I I :42). Justice lies close to the 
heart of what loving one's neighbors entails. 
As I explain at greater length in Life on the Line, justice has a prominent place in the 
ethics of Cod's ReignS When the psalmists reflect on Cod, they recognize that God "loves 
justice" (Ps 99:4) and that justice characterizes Cod's own actions in the world (Ps 10: 18; 
35:10; 76:9; 103:6; 146:7-9), Rooted in the character of Cod, the importance of justice 
does not wane with time. In his day, Je remiah insisted that knowing God necessarily 
entails knowing the importance Cod attaches to doing justice (jer 9:24; 22: 15-16). Jesus 
similarly insisted that those who overlook the doing of justice have tragically misunder-
stood Cod (Matt 7:21-23; 25:34-45).6 Justice, then, is central to what Cod expects of 
people in the social order. 
Needless to say, the notion of justice is not a purely theological term; it is widely 
acknowledged in society at large. This familiarity is both a blessing and a curse. It is a 
blessing in that society is at least to some degree receptive toward considering the merits 
of anything that purports to be a requirement of justice. However, it is also a curse 
because what society means by justice and what Scripture means by justice are not the 
same. Such a predicament comes as no surprise-the Bible repeatedly warns people about 
"the wisdom of the world" (I Cor I :20) and "human arguments" (Rom 3:5), People are 
not wise to "lean on" their own understanding (Prov 3:5-6; cf. 14: 12), for Cod, who loves 
all, has different values and views than human beings, whose minds are unavoidably 
biased by self-centeredness. 
Justice in the hands of self-centered individuals all too easily becomes a sword to fend 
off the claims of others so that our rights can be protected to the full. It is more a "just us' 
attitude than what the Bible terms "justice," Nowhere is this unbiblical outlook more evi-
dent than in the arena of AIDS. Those with HIV/ AIDS are "someone else"-perhaps to be 
feared, more likely to be forgotten when it comes time for us to pursue the resources we 
need and want for our own concerns, 
When AIDS-related resource allocation decisions are being made, a "just us" orienta-
tion predisposes decision-makers, along with the public who elects them, to underesti-
mate the resources that should be provided, This same orientation undoubtedly skews 
allocation decisions in other arenas as well. So, although it will not be possible here to bal-
ance the funding claims of HIV I AIDS against all other legitimate claims, an examination 
of the AIDS arena will underscore the difference between a justice and a "just us" per-
spective as the basis for society's distribution of its limited resources. The examination 
taken here will begin with a consideration of various arguments for justice and assump-
tions about justice, and will conclude by probing several aspects of justice. 
ARGUMENTS FOR JUSTICE 
"Arguments for justice, as this term is used here, refers to reasons why the notion of 
justice should be central to the issue of resource allocation in the midst of the HIV I AIDS 
pandemic. Such reasons are rooted in the close relationship between justice and human 
need. In the biblical writings, Cod is repeatedly observed to have great concern for those 
in need (e.g., in Exod 22:21-25; 23:6; I Sam 2:8; Ps 107:39-41; Prov 14:31 ; 19:17l. 
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Their basic needs are to be met as a matter of justice (job 29: 14- [6; Ezek [8:5-9). Such 
needs can include food, clothing, and shelter (Deut 10: 18; Isa 58:7) as well as the land 
essential to sustain the meeting of those needs (Jsa 5:7-8). Whatever the need, the under-
lying principle of justice is the same: as people have need, so they should receive {Acts 
4:35; 2 Cor 8: 13l. 
The more important the issue at stake, the more relevant justice as a governing con-
cept becomes. Concern is rarely expressed, for example, when the glass of water that one 
person receives at a restaurant has a minute amount more in it than that received by 
another. However, if people's lives and financial well-being are found possibly to depend 
upon that amount, the notion of just allocation suddenly becomes much more important. 
Questions of justice are at the heart of the AIDS pandemic for the same reasons: the 
predicament is expansive- fatally affecting vast numbers of people-and quite expensive 
as well. 
The predicament is expansive. Consider first the expansive nature of HIV infection and 
AIDS. By the beginning of the year 2000, 18.8 million people had already died from 
AIDS, and another 34.3 million people were living with HIV / AIDS. In 1999 alone, 2.8 
million of those deaths occurred and 5.4 million people were newly infected. 'These data 
represent a 'best-case' scenario and may underestimate actual death rates. Because AIDS 
may kill several members of a household, it can destroy households completely, with the 
result that some of the deaths will not be captured in subsequent household surveys."? 
One of the tragic results of such widespread death has been over [3 million orphans 
{who have lost their mother or both parents to AIDS before they reached the age of 
15)- a number projected to double in the next ten years8 
Certain parts of the world have been especially hard hit. In India, some four million 
people are infected with AIDS. In Russia, the number of HIV-infected people has dou-
bled in the past two years. In the Caribbean and much of Latin America, AIDS numbers 
are rising "to frightening levels."" However, the crisis in Africa is unparalleled. Every 
minute II people worldwide are infected with HIV-and 10 of those are in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Annually, the world's wars kill only one tenth as many people as AIDS kills in 
Africaw Of the world's children orphaned as a result of AIDS, 95% currently live in 
Africa. More than 12 million sub-Saharan Africans have died of AIDS- two million last 
year alone-6,OOO more just today. I I 
There are now 16 countries in which more than one-tenth of the adult population 
aged 15-49 is infected with HIV. In seven countries, all toward the southern end of the 
continent, over one-fifth of the adults has the virus. 12 The country of Botswana is particu-
larly hard hit, with 35.8% of its adult population infected. Rather than the life expectancy 
of 71 years that its citizens would have without the disease, life expectancy has dropped 
to 39, and is expected to drop to only 29 in the next 10 yearsU In Namibia, Swaziland, 
Zimbabwe, and South Africa, one third of the children will be orphaned by 20 I 0 .14 
Uganda, with the highest number of AIDS orphans in the world (I. I million) already has 
some areas in which this is the case. IS 
The scope and seriousness of the problem are immense. 'This is undoubtedly the most 
serious infectious disease threat in recorded human history;· notes Oxford University's 
Roy Anderson. 16 Moreover, in the words of the recently-released report "Children on the 
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Brink 2000," 'The HIV/ AIDS pandemic is producing orphans on a scale unrivaled in 
world history."'7 The predicament is indeed expansive. But it is also expensive. 
The predicament is expensive. In the United States, for instance, annual costs of HIV dis-
ease have long crossed the $50 billion mark. Such figures have included approximately 
$13 billion in direct costs and $38 billion in indirect costs (the value of lost productivity 
due to sickness and death).' 8 The public health care sector has been especially hard hit. 
Because of the health and insurance profile of patients using public hospitals, public hospi-
tals lose more than twice as much per AIDS patient per year as do private hospitals. '9 In 
recent years, the federal government has directly spent $6.8 billion- $1.8 billion for 
research, $.54 billion for prevention, and $1.2 billion for treatment, in addition to $3.3 bil-
lion for AIDS care under Medicare and Medicaid.20 AIDS is draining whatever private 
resources many individual patients have. As a result, whereas patients have used private 
physicians more often than hospital clinics before they developed the illness, once they 
have develop AIDS the number of persons with AIDS who need to resort to hospital 
clinics has been almost five times as great as the number of those who have been able to 
continue to see their private physicians2 1 
In some respects the public impact on other countries may have been even greater 
than it is in the U.s. One study, for instance, documents that patients with AIDS have 
tended to be hospitalized significantly longer in Europe than in the United StatesZl Less 
developed countries, with far fewer resources available for health care, typically have 
experienced an even greater financial burden.n To date, Africa has been especially hard 
hit. The majority of all people with AIDS have lived there, but less than 2% of the money 
spent on AIDS globally has generally been expended there24 Of the $1 -2 billion needed 
specifically for AIDS prevention in Africa, only a small fraction of that amount is being 
spent.25 National health services in Africa have been swamped. One recent study of 16 
African countries has found that public health spending for AIDS alone has exceeded 2% 
of gross domestic product (COP) in 7 of the countries- a staggering figure in countries 
where total health spending accounts for 3-5% of CDP.26 
During the years ahead the predicament will only get more expensive. Not only will 
the number of people affected continue to grow, but newer treatments will also add addi-
tional costs to the care of HN-infected persons. Experience with drugs such as AZT has 
been instructive. People with HN have been able to live longer due to prophylactic treat-
ment with these drugs, which can postpone the onset of AIDS and also lengthen life after 
AIDS develops.27 The amount of hospital use over the course of a patient's lifetime, how-
ever, does not appear to be reduced by the use of such drugs28 The HIV / AIDS predica-
ment, then, is both expansive and expensive-two compelling reasons why a just alloca-
tion of resources is critical. 
ASSUMPTIONS ABOUT JUSTICE 
With these two arguments for justice in view, two assumptions about justice can now 
be clarified: I) that justice is comprehensive, and 2) that justice is collaborative. These 
assumptions are at least implicit throughout the biblical writings. 
Justice is comprehensive. To observe, first of all, that justice is comprehensive is to under-
score its far-reaching character. The word in the biblical texts is often a translation of the 
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Hebrew sedaqah or the Greek dikaiosyne, both of which can also mean "righteousness," 
with its stress upon rightness and right relationship. A just situation is one in which every-
thing important has been taken into account and placed in proper relationship with 
everything else. Justice is typically invoked when it is perceived that the interests of some 
are being duly considered, while those of others are not. 
A just allocation of resources so understood must take into account a much broader 
array of considerations than at first might appear relevant. It is not concerned merely with 
medical care for those with AIDS but also with preventive efforts such as the provision of 
drugs, vaccines, and information that are required in order to render that care unneces-
sary (at least for a while). It is concerned about the research needed to improve both 
medical care and preventive efforts. 
Moreover, from the comprehensive perspective of justice, medical care will include 
not only physician care but also multidisciplinary teams to address the broad range of 
needs that arise in the context of AIDS. It will include palliative care as well as curative 
patients both to die as well as possible and to live as well as possible. To in-
patient care will be added in-home care, with attention to the full range of psychological, 
family, social, employment, financial, legal, and other services needed by the patient. 
Justice calls on a society to do more than provide necessary funding. A just allocation 
of resources calls forth the outpouring of time and energy and tears that many patients 
may need more than anything money can buy. In fact, without such a personal commit-
ment, even a just financial allocation is not likely to occur. 
Justice is more than a mere abstract ideal. It is a moral mandate striving to be heard 
above the clamor of a thousand injustices at work in any situation. Implementing justice 
entails locating and silencing those injustices as much as it does promoting a just way for-
ward. So a just allocation of resources in the face of AIDS requires addressing the larger 
context of health care. If tens of millions of people are without health insurance, as in the 
United States, or the level of care available to people differs significantly in different sec-
tions of the country, as in many countries of the world, then justice will constantly be urg-
ing attention to the broader picture with its many injustices when making allocation deci-
sions about a particular disease such as AIDS29 Justice also mandates that other diseases 
be given due consideration, and that allocation decisions not depend, for example, on 
what disease happens to capture the media's attention at the moment. 3D 
Justice is collaborative. Implicit in the assumption that justice is comprehensive is a sec-
ond assumption: that justice is collaborative. When only one person is in need of some-
thing, the concept of justice has little relevance. It is when the needs of various people 
come into conflict with each other that justice becomes so important. 
Justice provides a way for people to live together. It presumes that people ought to live 
together, and suggests concrete ways to enable community to exist. It is concerned about 
the needs of all, recognizing that at one time or another, in one way or another, everyone 
is in some way vulnerable.31 So it endeavors to protect people at their weakest points as 
an integral part of facilitating the flourishing of all. 
It is here that the close link between justice and love becomes particularly evident. 
Love seeks mutuality in community. We are to love our neighbors as ourselves. What this 
means in practice is self-sacrifice, because we are constantly prone to think of ourselves 
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more highly than is warranted (Mark 7:2 1-22; Rom 12:3, 16; I john 3: 16-18l. But the 
goal is interdependent community. Paul commends jesus' self-sacrifice (Phil 2:6-8), yet 
interprets its message to believers as fo llows: "each of you should look not only to your 
own interests, but also to the interests of others" (v. 4) . The needs of all are to be met in a 
community in which "your plenty wi ll supply what they need, so that in turn their plenty 
will supply what you need. Then there will be equality" (2 Cor 8 : 14l. Moreover, commu-
nity is to be understood inclusively, embracing those usually considered to be "different" 
(Luke 10:29-37; john 4:9, 27; CoI3:1 1). l2 
While enabling the community to serve the individual, justice also gives the communi-
ty itself an excellence that warrants service on the part of the individual. From this per-
spective it is unfortunate to subordinate the community to the individual in any general 
sort of way, as is sometimes done in the United States, or to so subordinate the individual 
to the community, as is sometimes done in more communitarian nations3J As funda-
mentally collaborative in nature, justice works to bring together not only the needs of vari-
ous individuals, but also those of the individual with those of the community. There are, 
however, potentially conflicting understandings of the ways that justice pursues this task, 
as will be examined later. 
Because justice is collaborative, the language of justice is also collaborative. 
Accordingly, it contrasts sharply with much of the language that is common in the con-
text of AIDS. Much AIDS language is riddled with metaphors such as those of crime, sin, 
war, and the divided society- inherently divisive metaphors that undermine a sense of 
community. 
The last of these metaphors is the most explicit in this regard, present every time there 
is talk about what . we' (those without AIDS) must do about "them" (those with AIDSl. 
The motivating concern here appears to be more "just us' than justice. Achieving a just 
approach to resource allocation does not require ridding language of metaphor- an 
impossible task in any case. However, it does require taking care that the very language of 
the discussion does not subtly create a separation between those of us deciding how best 
to allocate resources and those of us with AIDS.J 4 
That justice is collaborative as well as comprehensive means that it will strive to foster 
community at all levels. It is not unusual in the context of just resource allocation to think 
only nationally. Yet justice also has local concerns, e.g., regarding the just access of patients 
with AIDS to whatever limited number of intensive care beds (if any) are available to sim-
ilarly sick patients35 
Similarly, justice has an oft-neglected international point of view. From the earliest days 
of the Church- and long before that- people have readily adopted a "just us" attitude 
when Cod's blessings are at issue. Even Paul (Saul-Acts 9) and Peter (Acts 10) had a 
hard time accepting that all peoples of the world are cared for by Cod. But such is the 
case, as much so today as in the earliest days of the Church. Accordingly, were the rate of 
new HIV infections in North America and Western Europe to cease climbing, the implica-
tion for justice would not automatically be that fewer North American and Western 
European resources should be devoted to AIDS. Rather, justice would likely insist that the 
escalating HIV-related needs in less developed countries could now be attended to more 
aggressively. 
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ASPECTS OF JUSTICE 
To this point two arguments for justice have been made- that the HIV / AIDS predica-
ment is expansive and expensive- and two assumptions about justice have been suggest-
ed- that justice is comprehensive and collaborative. The concept of justice itself, though, 
has yet to be examined. This task is complicated by the different ways that people use the 
term "justice." Each of these ways represents a different aspect of the concept. Since each 
aspect is not necessarily relevant in every situation, and those that are relevant may agree 
or conflict, a circumspect examination of each is necessary. Four major aspects will be 
examined here in turn: equality, liberty, responsibility, and efficiency. 
Equality. One widely-held understanding of justice is that it somehow involves the 
notion that people should be treated equally. The notion of equality lies at the heart of 
justice in the biblical writings as well. The ultimate basis for the egalitarian treatment of 
people is that each is precious in the eyes of God. The concern for such treatment sur-
faces concretely in the Old Testament in the context of insuring that the original egalitari-
an distribution of land be preserved. Rooted in God's unwavering love for all, this egalitar-
ian vision remained alive through the centuries. In the time of Ezekiel, God was still 
directing that any return from exile be marked by an egalitarian distribution of land (Ezek 
47: 14). The ultimate hope, described by other prophets, was that all people would have 
their own vine and fig tree (Mic 4:4; cf. Zech 3: 1 Q). 
In light of this background, it is not surprising that Paul should find a situation intolera-
ble in which some people went without the basic necessities of life while others had more 
than enough. In 2 Corinthians 8: 13-14 Paul explicitly invokes the notion of equality to 
argue that the Corinthians should share their resources with others. After all, God is not 
partial to some and satisfied that others should lack what they need to live36 Moreover, 
true community is hampered when the lives of some are in effect valued more than the 
lives of others since some have access to life-sustaining resources while others do not. 3? 
In the context of AIDS an egalitarian understanding of justice often undergirds the 
concern that AIDS is receiving too much funding, compared with other diseases that 
afflict more people. If each person is to be accorded equal weight, it is assumed, then the 
disease affecting the most people should receive the most resources. 38 
Because of the moral significance of equality as a basic aspect of justice, this argument 
potentially has considerable force. However, an egalitarian approach need not merely 
adopt the perspective of today, i.e., "just us.' A more biblical perspective would also con-
sider the situation over time. God's love extends across time to all generations. So God is 
sensitive to injustices that become evident only when one takes a longer-term point of 
view. Over time, for example, some Israelites suffered economic hardship and lost their 
land. To protect the original distribution, God mandated a jubilee year every fiftieth year 
in which all land would revert to its original owner (Lev 25). In addition, every seventh 
year was to be a sabbatical year in which debts were canceled, even to the extent that 
those sold into slavery on account of their debts would be set free (Deut 15), 
A longer-term point of view makes significant difference when allocating health-related 
resources. Since AIDS is a relatively recent disease, it has not received as much total fund-
ing over time (e.g., for research) as some diseases that now receive less annual funding 
than AIDS. The greater current funding for AIDS may, then, be justified in order to 
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achieve more of an equality over time. In fact, even further funding increases may be 
called for when a disease is infectious. The infectious nature of AIDS will most likely 
result in increasing numbers of people with AIDS for many years to come. The costs 
involved in these numbers will be disproportionately high relative to other major fatal 
conditions such as heart disease and cancer, in that AIDS deprives people, on average, of 
about 25 years of life more than does either of these conditions.39 
A perspective over time also reveals the uncertain factual basis of the egalitarian argu-
ment against increased funding for AIDS. There are a variety of reasons why the size of 
the AIDS pandemic is probably understated-at least understated in official national fig-
ures. Many AIDS cases are incorrectly diagnosed as something else because the immune 
deficiency underlying the more obvious disease present is not recognized. Women in par-
ticular have been overlooked because their symptoms have not fit the symptom profile 
defining AIDS, which was developed in the United States based on early experience with 
the disease there among men. Furthermore, many cases (an estimated 10- 1 5% in the 
US) are never reported to governmental authorities. The effectiveness of antiretroviral 
therapies in delaying the onset of AIDS has also led to a sense that the numbers of people 
who are in the process of developing AIDS is smaller than it really is.<o 
Equality, then, is an important aspect of justice that may at first glance suggest the 
appropriateness of limiting AIDS funding, at least if the focus is on today- on "just us. 
However, a more careful examination of all that equality may entail over time reveals that 
an allocation of resources based on justice may instead entail increased funding. 
Liberty. A second aspect of justice is liberty. The Bible is filled with references to God's 
commitment to human freedom (e.g., Deut 7: 15; Ps 146:7; Isa 49:9; John 8:32; 2 Cor 
3: 17). One common understanding of liberty, particularly in the US today, is that people 
should be as free as possible from society's interference in their lives. According to this 
view, people generally live in societies primarily to protect their resources and their free-
dom to live their lives as they wish. Having AIDS is unfortunate, and it is commendable if 
some individuals and groups want to help patients in need. However, justice requires that 
no moral or legal demands be made on people's resources in order to ameliorate the 
plight of others. 
This so-called libertarian view is one way of understanding the place of liberty in a just 
allocation of resources. But there is also a liberation view which reveals that liberty has 
much more to say in the resource allocation debate. The liberation perspective observes 
that a libertarian approach is based on an unbiblical concept of freedom as "autonomy" 
(literally self-law), according to which there are ultimately no obligations that people have 
toward God or others. This approach to resource allocation merely protects the liberty of 
those who have resources at the expense of the liberty of those who do not. If justice is 
to pay special heed to anyone's liberty, according to a liberation view, it should pay spe-
cial attention to those who have traditionally been most marginalized in terms of access to 
basic resources. Justice, in other words, resists a liberty that is for "just us.' 
This liberation view of justice is radically different from the prevailing mindset in soci-
ety today, according to which the most marginalized people are the most readily and easi-
ly neglected.4 1 Commitment to liberation is rooted in Jesus' understanding of what the 
Reign of God- and Jesus' own ministry as a manifestation of that reign-are essentially 
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about: "good news to the poor . freedom for the prisoners .. sight for the blind 
release [forJ the oppressed" (Luke 4: 18l. While a certain measure of freedom to control 
one's own resources appears to be allowable, a state of affairs in which some people are 
left without basic life-sustaining resources is portrayed as intolerably unjust. As explained 
earlier when examining "arguments for justice" were examined, God is deeply distressed 
when people's true needs are not met. That health is included in such needs is suggested 
among other ways, by the characterization of Jesus' healing ministry as a justice ministry 
(Matt 12: 15-18l. A liberation understanding of justice, then, insists that the basic needs of 
the most marginalized in society require special attention if the freedom of all is to be 
respected in a meaningful way. 
This understanding of the place of liberty in just resource allocation may point not to 
less funding for HIV / AIDS but to greater. One of the marginalized groups in society that 
has been most seriously afflicted by HIV disease is IV drug users.42 A commitment to lib-
eration in this context would not merely involve support for more resources to care for 
HIV-infected drug users because of the disproportionate burden they bear as a group. It 
would even more energetically support providing the resources so desperately needed for 
better IV drug education and more widely available drug treatment in order to spare 
them the HIV burden altogether.4J 
In some countries, certain ethnic minority groups are also disproportionately burdened 
by HIV / AIDS. Afro-American and Hispanic-American persons in the United States, for 
example, have had an infection rate that is several times as high as that for others, espe-
cially among their children 44 A recent report reveals 80% of wormen diagnosed with 
AIDS to be from these two groups. Compared with white women, the HN incidence is 
19 times higher for African-American women and 7 times higher for Latinas45 
Poor people generally are at special risk of HN infection. Without the opportunity for 
good health care or treatment of other sexually transmitted diseases, the risk for contract-
ing HIV multiplies about eight times: 6 As a result, AIDS incidence is highest among the 
very poor4? AIDS, in turn, makes people's poverty even worse by undermining economic 
productivity, creating huge numbers of orphans who tend to become malnourished and 
inadequately educated, and in some countries even dangerously depleting the young 
adult generation that normally would economically support children and elderly per-
sons48 
A liberation-minded justice perspective would seek the resources necessary to free dis-
advantaged minorities not merely from the disproportionate burden of AIDS, but also 
from those conditions so influential in creating that burden in the first place. It may also 
justify allocations for research in the more developed countries that go beyond what 
would seem appropriate merely in comparison with other national needs, because the 
hardest-hit lesser developed countries will not be able to afford such research in the near 
future. 
Responsibility. Among those most critical of the liberationist outlook on justice are those 
who argue that people who use IV drugs or practice homosexuality are responsible for 
their illness. These critics emphasize not so much the equality or liberty aspects of justice 
as the responsibility aspect. Justice demands that people pay the price for their unwise 
behavior.49 
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The notion of taking responsibility for one's actions is a persuasive one, especially in 
light of the collaborative nature of justice discussed earlier. Moreover, the biblical writings 
from the early moral codes (e.g. Exod 21; Lev 5) to New Testament moral teaching (e.g., 
Rom 3 :5-8) explicitly affirm the importance of personal responsibility. Nevertheless, the 
conditions under which this idea of responsibility is morally legitimate do need to be spec-
ified. One condition is that those involved must have been aware of the strong possibility 
that their actions would produce the negative result in question. In the case of AIDS, 
many people with the disease today actually became HIV infected before there was 
much public education about AIDS, or they are part of populations (e.g., homeless per-
sons) who are not effectively reached by standard forms of education. Another condition 
on the notion of responsibility is that people with one disease (e.g., AIDS) not be pun-
ished for their contributing lifestyle choices if there is no intention that people with other 
diseases (e.g., heart or lung diseases) be punished for theirsSo No such intention is appar-
ent at present. 
Were these and other such conditions to be satisfied, responsibility would seem to 
point in the direction of limiting the resources allocated to HIV / AIDS- at least as long as 
the focus remains on the single patient as the responsible party. A different picture of 
responsibility begins to emerge, however, when the focus widens (as the comprehensive 
nature of justice requires) to include the responsibility of society. Again, the difference 
between a justice and a "just us" mentality comes to the fore. 
The question now becomes: Which of the various parties potentially involved has 
some responsibility for the action through which the HIV was transmitted? The cases 
where the proportion of the infected person's responsibility is clearest appear to be those 
in which that person has virtually no responsibility-e.g., infants born infected and people 
infected through blood transfusions. Women intimidated by men into having sexual inter-
course without the use of condoms is at least an ambiguous case.SI Even an activity like 
IV drug use is not so simply a matter of personal choice, at least not when the user has 
previously been abused by a life of poverty and discrimination. As time goes on, many 
who are able to alter risky behaviors are doing so. One result is an increasingly large pro-
portion of those infected with HIV who are infected because of the irresponsibility either 
of other individuals (e.g., parents of newborns) or of society at largeS2 
It is bad enough, as some international observers have noted, that people governing 
various less developed countries devote such substantial amounts of their countries' limit-
ed resources to protecting the blood supply-the source through which they themselves 
most fear becoming HIV infected. The tragedy is compounded, however, if the citizens at 
large are then held accountable for infections that are as much products of grinding 
poverty, limited opportunities for happiness, and little access to protective measures as 
they are products of free personal choices. In more developed countries it is similarly 
morally dubious whenever people are not only victimized by poor social conditions but 
also denied treatment for their addictions because sufficient resources have not been allo-
cated-and then held entirely responsible for their predicament. 
If responsibility is to be invoked as an aspect of justice, both the responsibility of the 
society and that of the single patient need to be considered. In the current context of 
AIDS, the result is not likely to be a merely punitive justice, in which people are punished 
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for their individual actions. A restorative justice, in which people are recompensed for the 
ill they have received at the hands of society, is the more probable outcome. That people 
should be well-compensated when they have been wronged is an expectation voiced 
repeatedly in the Old Testament (e.g., Exod 22:1 -14, Lev 6:1 -7; Num 5:5-8; 2 Sam 12:6; 
Prov 6:31l. The same expectation is implicit in the New Testament, for example, in the 
exemplary conversion of Zacchaeus (Luke 19: 1-9). Anyone whom he has cheated in his 
capacity as an agent of the government (tax collector) he pledges to repay fourfold. 
Restorative justice entails a special claim on the part of those with HIV now and those 
most at risk of infection- a special claim to a society's finances, to its problem-solving 
capabilities, and to its compassion. Not only does this form of justice involve liberty from 
ongoing burdens, as in the case of liberating justice, but it also entails recompense for past 
wrongs done. Affirming restorative justice, moreover, does not release individuals from 
personal responsibility-a point that needs to be emphasized-for justice is collaborative. 
Rather, this affirmation recognizes that the ethical context for holding people responsible 
to the needs of society is one in which society is duly responsive to the needs of the indi-
vidual. Within such a context, educational efforts stressing the individual's responsibility to 
live a healthy lifestyle are bound to be more persuasive than they would be otherwise. 
Efficiency. Many of those who resist the claim of people with AIDS to special treatment 
appeal to a still different aspect of justice, that of efficiency. Their concern is that not too 
much money should be spent on anyone group of people. The good of the whole, they 
insist, must be kept in view. A sort of utilitarian ·'greatest good for the greatest number" 
perspective seems to be at work here.53 
The emphasis on the importance of the common good is laudatory. However, this 
way of thinking can be dangerous if it is not tempered by other aspects of justice. The 
greatest efficiency of all may be to rid society of certain types of people considered unde-
sirable by those in power. History can attest to the horrors of such "just us'" thinking. 
If a concern for efficiency, however, is joined with a commitment to the needs of all, 
including those most looked-down-upon in society, then efficiency may direct resource 
allocation in a very different way. Instead of sanctioning spending less it may actually justify 
spending more. Sometimes spending more in the near term can produce better, more effi-
cient results in the long term. Accordingly, the child endures painful discipline now for a 
happier life later (Prov 22:6), the man spends everything he has to buy a field now so 
that he may have its hidden treasure later (Matt 13:44), and believers give up home or 
brothers or sisters or mother or father or children or fields knowing that they will receive 
a hundred times as much back (Mark 10:29-30). (They will also receive persecutions in 
this age, but in the age to come they will receive something much better: eternal life-cf. I 
Cor 15:30-32,) 
In the struggle against HIV / AIDS, spending more in the near term may accordingly be 
justified, particularly in certain areas. For example, more funding for research may be 
more efficient in the long run than less funding, since a vaccine or cure would reduce dra-
matically the resources required for medical care. Some funds are likely to continue to be 
allocated to research until a vaccine or cure is found. So postponing funding does not 
necessarily save money; rather it subjects the eventual costs to inflation and allows the 
pandemic with all its costs to continue longer. It is also counterproductive in that it post-
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pones access to the wealth of knowledge about viruses, cancer, the brain, and the 
immune system that is being gained through AIDS-related researchs4 At the same time, 
however, efficiency necessitates carefully monitoring plans for increased spending to be 
sure that there is sufficient research capacity (labs, scientists, good proposals, etc.) to use all 
allocated funds productively. 
Other examples of increased spending that efficiency might sanction include larger 
allocations for prevention, home care, and perhaps even comprehensive health care. 
Prevention (e.g., through the provision of education, protective measures, or prophylactic 
drugs) can not only keep the initial HIV infection from occurring, but can also forestall the 
progression of HIV infection to full-blown AIDS or at least minimize the disability and 
pain caused by AIDS. Home care is less expensive and, at times during the course of 
AIDS, more comfortable for the patient than hospital care-as long as sufficient coordina-
tion is provided among hospital-based, community-based, and home-based servicess ) 
And providing comprehensive care for patients with AIDS may not be as expensive as it 
might seem, even in a de-centralized health care system like that of the United States. 
Some element of the system, often Medicaid in the U.s., ends up assuming many of the 
costs anyway. Moreover, there are great savings to be gained in better coordination of ser-
vices, avoidance of the expensive practice of cost-shifting, and better protection of the 
sexual partners of those who would now have a greater incentive to be tested for HIV 
infection because of the improved health care available.56 
The efficiency aspect of justice, then, might seem to imply spending less on AIDS and 
HIV infection. However, spending more in the present, if spent well, can lead to less 
spending in the long run. 
In sum, then, justice is crucial in resource allocation because the HN I AIDS predica-
ment is expansive and it is expensive. Justice is influential in resource allocation because it 
is comprehensive and it is collaborative. And justice is controversial in resource allocation 
because there are competing notions of equality, liberty, responsibility, and efficiency at 
work in it that can easily stymie allocation decisions. 
Yet, the voice of justice in the midst of the current pandemic may not be so ambiva-
lent or unsupportive after all. Whereas each aspect of justice, viewed from the perspective 
of "just us," can be construed to justify limiting the resources allocated to this arena, the 
view from the Reign of God is quite different. A more generous allocation may well 
instead be warranted. 
Professor Lyon is right. In many ways a person with AIDS today is like the leper of 
Jesus' day- despised, feared, avoided-certainly not "one of us." Jesus met lepers' needs 
without distinction- needs of Samaritans (who deserved their fate in the eyes of many) as 
well as Jews, unbelievers as well as believers (Luke 17: I 1-19). How likely is the justice of 
God's Reign to demand less of people today? 
Nevertheless, the tentativeness of the language throughout this discussion has been 
intentional. As explained at the outset, many of the arguments presented here in the con-
text of HIV I AIDS could also be marshaled in behalf of resources to meet other basic 
human needs, especially where a "just us" mentality has limited resources available to 
date. In other words, the justice orientation characteristic of God's Reign challenges a vari-
ety of current allocation priorities- not only those related to HIV I AIDS. Nevertheless, the 
Justice or "lust Us"? Allocating Resources in an Age of AIDS 13 1 
HIV / AIDS arena has been so riddled with "just us" thinking that it represents an excellent 
place to illustrate the need to attend more carefully to the justice that God requires. 
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LOYAL OPPOSITION AND THE 
EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE 
WILLIAM ]. ABRAHAM 
A crucial question which generally faces all rational minorities or individuals who 
do not fit into the intellectual mainstream is this: how do they justify the moral 
claims that they advance in the face of opposition and even ridicule? In other words, 
how do they make good their claims in the teeth of widespread contrary opinion?1 
In this exploratory paper I shall argue that one of the best ways to respond to this is 
by a theory of conscience. En route to this I shall attempt two other tasks. First, I 
shall briefly indicate why it is a good thing to have some kind of theoretical base for 
our minority reports. Second, I shall draw attention to the weaknesses of four com-
mon ways of dealing with the epistemic status of minority opinion. On the other 
side of my proposals concerning conscience, I shall conclude with a brief comment 
on the role of conscience in the empowerment of Christian minorities. 
In posing the issue in the sharp manner represented by my opening question, I 
am not assuming that what is right is determined by majority opinion. That thesis is 
so obviously mistaken that there is no need to argue the negative case involved. 
What is at stake is more subtle than this, and it is more profound. What we want to 
know revolves around a series of concerns which are naturally directed towards 
those who stand outside the mainstream. How do they know they are right? What 
warrant do they have for their proposals? What ground(s) do they have for their 
confidence? 
A clear example that comes to mind is the predicament faced by John Wesley 
and the early Methodists who challenged the prevailing theology, spirituality, morali-
ty, and evangelistic practices of the Anglican tradition of the eighteenth century. 
Wesley and his friends faced a barrage of objections which sooner or later had to be 
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answered. Once this process began, they were driven to deal with the whole range of 
fundamental questions w hich lie below the surface of the initial controversies. This is far 
from being a merely political or prudential operation, for in time new insights emerge or 
old truths are rediscovered; invariably a whole new tradition arises to enrich our ecclesial 
and cultural life. 
To be sure, a good case can be made that all opinions must face this kind of query soon-
er or later, for majorities as much as for those in the position of the loyal opposition. 
Moreover, there is a long and distinguished school in epistemology which has insisted that 
we can know nothing, including nothing in the field of morality, unless we have first estab-
lished our position on a sound basis. Hence foundationalists of one kind or another have 
long maintained that nobody, not even an intelligent majority, has the right to claim they are 
correct unless they can logically trace their position back to adequate foundations represent-
ed by self-justifying or secure premises, axioms, first principles, and the like. Immanuel Kant's 
categorical imperative and John Stuart Mill's principle of utility seek to provide precisely such 
a secure foundation. Hence on at least one reading of our epistemic situation, everybody, 
and not only minorities, is required to explain and justify their position. 
However, no such theory lies behind the present request for warrants. Moreover, it 
would be question-begging to rest on such a set of assumptions. What some minorities 
rightly will want to challenge is this whole approach to the foundations of morality. It is 
precisely this challenge against a central feature of the modern Enlightenment which puts 
them outside the mainstream in the first place. Hence they will correctly protest that their 
position is the kind of radical position that calls this line of inquiry into question. We had 
better have other reasons for pressing the issue before us than merely an appeal to some 
kind of classical foundationalism. 
It is also worth noting that in some quarters the very idea of suggesting that minorities 
of any sort should be asked to give an account of their proposals of the kind envisaged 
here is otiose. We are all aware of the extent to which it has become fashionable to see 
this kind of request as a disguised form of oppression or violence; such questioning is per-
ceived as a type of dominance in which those in the majority make demands of the 
minority as a means of keeping challengers out of the discussion and eventually out of 
positions of power.2 
Not all minorities are prepared to take up this kind of defensive posture. For example, 
it is more than significant that many Evangelicals are extremely reluctant to playa card of 
victimization by oppression. There can be no doubting the historical reality behind their 
systematic exclusion from the academy and from crucial centers of power within main-
line Protestant churches. Mature observers can readily identify the academic, poli tical, and 
theological ideologies which have been developed to provide intellectual explanations for 
such exclusion. In these circumstances there is great temptation to take on the status of 
the victim and seek to gain power on the basis of past discrimination and exclusion. Some 
have succumbed to this strategy, but I suspect that it is thoroughly uncharacteristic of the 
Evangelical tradition as a whole. At least two important convictions underlie this hesita-
tion . 
First, Evangelicals deep down are committed to the search for truth as a logically distinct 
value or good which cannot be reduced to political or social interest. This is deeply incom-
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patible with any move which would make the formal commitment to truth equivalent to a 
quest for power. To be sure, Evangelicals are only too aware that the reality is often differ-
ent.) Human beings, especially those in positions of power, all too easily can dress up the 
quest for dominance and power in the form of a quest for truth. Any tradition which takes 
sin seriously will be aware of such possible self-deception. However, the very claim that 
such self-deception is possible or actually has happened is a claim to truth which cannot be 
reduced to one more quest for power if we are to take it seriously. Hence any global theo-
ry of truth which reduces truth itself to power is self-referentially destructive. 
Secondly, Evangelicals have learned over the years that the social institutions of the 
church and society depend on confessional claims which need to be sustained across the 
generations. These confessional claims are held to embody not just the reality of majority 
victory or the attainment of raw power; they are taken to embody nothing less than the 
revealed truth of Cod. Hence Evangelicals have very deep theological warrants for refus-
ing to play the ideological card of victimization when they are hard pressed to do so by 
the example of other minority groups in the neighborhood. 
Why, then, do we raise this deep question of warrant at all and present it as especially 
acute for minorities? On a general level we raise the matter because a rejection of foun-
dationalism does not for one moment mean the end of the debate concerning the justifi-
cation of moral claims. All it signals is that one way of resolving this complex matter has 
been abandoned. Moral foundationalists, like Kant and Mill, are sometimes wont to be 
perplexed by the rejection of their position. Somehow they think that if we reject their 
position we have rejected morality proper and maybe even epistemology proper. Worse 
still, they may think that we have automatically embraced some sort of relativism or 
nihilism. This is an illusion. All we have abandoned is one family of solutions for questions 
about the deep structure and justification of morality. We have simply rejected an impor-
tant and illuminating alternative in the debate about the foundations of morality. 
Consequently, what we have before us is a tremendous moral and epistemological chal-
lenge. We now have to work out an alternative to what has stood as a prevailing consen-
sus in the field. 
As to the special case of minorities, there are three considerations which relate to their 
responsibilities. First, because they stand outside the mainstream, the onus of proof falls 
on them in the dynamic of debate. At the very least there is psychological and social pres-
sure to explain their position. Indeed it is this sort of pressure which makes minorities 
such a valuable part of the social order. Often they provide the alternatives which are 
needed when the mainstream becomes exhausted. They constitute a kind of monastic 
renewal for the wider world they inhabit. Moreover, the vigor and urgency with which 
they usually present their claims can open up the issues and provide new perspectives in 
a refreshing manner. 
Secondly, the courtesies of debate require that they explain the deeper convictions 
that lie behind their position. After all, the majority hold the territory in part because in 
years gone by they won the debate about the field as a whole. They earned the right to 
be heard because once upon a time they delivered the relevant goods. Indeed at one 
time they probably were the minority opinion. Hence the onus is now on the relevant 
minority to come through with the intellectual goods. 
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Thirdly, without some kind of critical check or some kind of reasoned account of their 
position, those in opposition repeatedly fall into various forms of fanaticism. They simply 
end up in the position of the dogmatist or zealot who requires us to take what they say as 
correct merely on their word. This helps nobody in the debate. It puts the opposition in 
the awkward position of having nothing substantial to say beyond repeating the point at 
issue; it prevents the majority from benefiting from the serious discussion of an altemative 
scenario; and, worst of all, it misses a golden opportunity to advance our understanding of 
the logic and justification of moral claims. 
Christian minorities have an additional incentive to develop their position. They owe it 
as constitutive of their love of their neighbor. To misuse a standard text in apologetics, 
they have a duty to give a reason for the hope that is within them. They are called to 
think through and share their convictions so that the Cod they serve may be glorified and 
honored. In the past they have generally seized on this option gladly. 
This does not mean that it is easy. There is always the temptation to take the line of 
least resistance and find an excuse to avoid answering hard questions or to short circuit 
the debate by turning the whole issue into an affair of sociology and politics. The latter is 
all too visible when the debate is transformed into a power struggle to be resolved by 
votes, caucuses, intrigue, and the like. Political action is always inescapable and sociologi-
cal analysis is generally invaluable; yet without the patient attending to the moral, theolog-
ical, and philosophical considerations which swirl around the discussion, the results can be 
socially disastrous. Such debate is not a substitute for war or violence; it may at times be 
part of the cure for our social and ecclesiastical strife. 
II 
Let me pursue now our query in a quasi-historical manner. How might a loyal opposi-
tion resolve the question of the warrants for its position? Let us look very briefly at four 
possibilities. They involve in turn an appeal to one's identity in a community, to divine 
revelation, to intuition, and to empowerment. 
In the first case we envisage that the grounding of one's decisions go back to one's for-
mation in a community. Thus the minority may simply appeal to its membership in a 
community; it appeals to its identity in a particular tradition, group, or class. On the sur-
face this appears a hopelessly simplistic solution to our problem. However, it would be a 
mistake to take it simplistically. What usually underlies the appeal to community is a 
much wider story about the human condition, about the formation of our moral identity, 
about the nature of human community itself, about the character of morality, and about 
the virtues and vices identified by a community in the pursuit of its preservation and wel-
fare. It is precisely because the appeal to community can be spelled out to embrace such 
a rich network of material that it has become exceedingly attractive of late. 
Unfortunately, this richness does not begin to deal with the fundamental objection that 
is naturally lodged against it. The chief problem with this proposal is that we want to 
know how we can be sure that our favored community is right. Explaining in great detail 
the various elements which are buried in this option does not begin to grapple with this 
problem, for the same question will break out with respect to these claims too. All along 
the line the critic will want to know: "What are the warrants for the particular claim or set 
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of claims proposed by the community in question?" Clearly this takes us right back to 
where we started. 
Alternatively, as a second possibility, the minority might appeal to divine revelation. In 
this instance one's position is grounded in what God has revealed, say, in Scripture or in 
Christ. The warrant is the fact that God has spoken definitively and has made known 
what we should morally do; or, less strongly, we can infer what we ought to do from 
what God has told us to do. However, in this case, too, problems immediately surface. 
First, questions will arise as to which revelation should be used. Which of the many 
putative revelations available should one accept as genuine? Unless this question is 
resolved, one will be at a loss as to how to proceed. Secondly, and more importantly, 
even if this issue is resolved, we will have to face the age-old question developed in tanta-
lizing fashion by Plato in the Euthyphro. Granted that we now know what God requires 
of us, does God require action 'x' because it is good, or is 'x' good because it is required 
by God. If we take the first option, then morality is logically independent of religion, and 
we do not need to appeal to divine revelation to ground our moral claims. If we take the 
second option, the foundations of morality become purely arbitrary, for our moral claims 
are decided by the whim of the deity without there being any moral constraints on what 
can be deemed as required even by God. 
If we cannot appeal to community or revelation as the way ahead, then what about an 
appeal to intuition? Here we meet a third epistemic scenari04 This would fit very naturally 
with our quest, for it is characteristic of minorities to take a stand at a very deep level on 
their convictions. In the end they often claim just to see the truth of what they are pro-
claiming. There is nothing below their claim on which it rests. As the legendary Luther put 
it in his famous phrase, "God help me, I can do no other." This strategy would fit nicely 
with the reluctance to argue. In this analysis there is no argument; arguments presuppose 
fundamental premises or axioms which in the nature of the case are taken for granted; so 
it would be futile to argue for their acceptance. In other words, it is the very expression of 
these fundamental premises or axioms which are at issue on this reading of the situation. 
These are seen to be true intuitively; they need no demonstration or support. 
Once again it is not difficult to identify the difficulties with this sort of strategy. As the 
history of the debate about the value of intuitionism shows, critics have latched on to two 
primary objections. First, intuitionists are generally divided on the kind of propositions 
which they profess to see. Some see particular instances and then from these attempt to 
build general rules. Others claim to intuit the general rules and then apply them to partic-
ular cases. If intuition is a reliable faculty, there should be no such deep disagreement 
between those committed to its use. This defect in the formalties of what is perceived is 
then further compounded by the second objection. When we move from the formal to 
the material content of the supposed perceptions, we find even more disagreement. 
Intuitionists notoriously see different propositions to be true, whether the propositions 
have as their subject general rules or particular cases. They cannot agree on which cases 
genuinely count as examples of good or evil action or on which rules embody good or 
bad principles. In these circumstances, it is extremely tempting to look for non-rational 
causes of the beliefs of intuitionists, say, in terms of gender or class analysis. 
A fourth altemative is to ground one's proposals in the fact that they will be instrumental 
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in bringing about the empowerment of the oppressed or the marginalized. Here one argues 
that the ultimate norm or warrant for action is the potential changes embodied in the moral 
action proposed; the envisaged changes are constituted by the liberation or full personhood 
of the victimized group. However, once again, difficulties meet us at every tum. 
First, this proposal rests on projected predictions which are precarious in the extreme. 
Merely because someone says that a particular moral stance will liberate some group or 
other is no guarantee that such a moral stance will actually do the job envisaged. We 
need some sort of empirical generalization or evidence that things will turn out as we 
think. Secondly, this option surrenders the epistemic value of our moral claims. It treats 
moral proposals as purely instrumental, as a means to an end, thus stripping them of any 
categorical content. Finally, this alternative begs the questions from the outset. It already 
assumes that we know that the end in view is morally obligatory, and it does this without 
tell ing us why we should take this as a given. [t does not secure this end as justified or 
warranted. Note that the objection here is not that the end may not be in fact morally 
obligatory; on the contrary, it may well be morally required. The objection is that we have 
not advanced one whit in knowing whether the proposed liberation is morally obligatory. 
The obvious lessons to be learned from this review is that any account of the warrants 
for our moral claims are likely to be highly ramified. Even though I have raised questions 
about the viability of each option, I do not at all hold that they should be rejected in toto. 
To the contrary, I want to suggest that each of them may well have a contribution to 
make to any comprehensive account of our moral existence. The challenge is to develop 
the kind of rich vision which will do justice to the relevant insights hidden in these pro-
posals, while at the same time facing up to the epistemic queries with which we began 
our deliberations. Moreover, we need a central concept which can enable us to bring 
these insights together in coherent and natural manner. I suggest that we can make 
progress in this by deploying and developing the idea of conscience. 
III 
The root idea of conscience is that we are endowed by Cod with the competence to 
engage in moral discernment. In classical renderings of conscience such discernment has 
characteristically been constituted by our ability to see that we should do good rather 
than evil, a very formal first principle of morality, and by our ability to see what the good 
requires of us in various moral situations, the material content of morality. 
Crucial to this understanding of conscience is the claim that conscience is a capacity 
given to us in creation by God. Minimalist descriptions of conscience as a moral sense, a 
faculty of the soul, the candle of the Lord, the voice of Cod, and the like, are really hope-
lessly reduced accounts of this very substantial metaphysical and theological proposal. 
Even less satisfactory are those accounts of conscience which reduce it to some abstract 
right to dissent from current orthodoxy or establishment opinion. In this case the appeal 
to conscience, seen in such expressions, "Well, I have a right to my conscience on this 
matter," is simply the dogmatic claim of an individual to hold to the contingent opinion of 
the moment. [t does not begin to do justice to the epistemic weight assigned to the con-
cept of conscience in the pre-modern Christian world. 
Few have captured the issue in modern times as forcefully as John Henry Newmans 
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His central points are laid out with characteristic forcefulness . To begin, conscience is root-
ed in a clear doctrine of creation. 
I say, then, that the Supreme Being is of a certain character, which, expressed in 
human language, we call ethical. He has the attributes of justice, truth, wisdom, 
sanctity, benevolence and mercy, as eternal characteristics in his nature, the very 
law of his being, identical with himself; and next, when he became creator, he 
implanted this law, which is himself, in the intelligence of all his rational creatures. 
The divine law, then, is the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong, a 
sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the presence of men and angels .... This 
law as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called ., conscience'; and 
though it may suffer refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each, it is 
not therefore affected so as to lose its character of being the divine law, but still has, 
as such, the prerogative of commanding obedience6 
For Newman this view is shared across denominational boundaries. 
When Anglicans, Wesleyans, the various Presbyterian sects in Scotland, and other 
denominations speak of conscience, they mean what we mean, the voice of God in 
the nature and heart of man, as distinct from the voice of revelation. They speak of 
a principle planted within us, before we have had any training, although training 
and experience are necessary for its strength, growth, and formation. They consider 
it a constituent element of the mind, as our perception of our ideas may be, as our 
powers of reasoning, as our sense of order and the beautiful, and our other intellec-
tual endowments. 
Moreover, both Protestants and Catholics recognize the deep and fundamental role 
conscience plays in moral deliberation. 
The rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor expedience, nor the happiness of 
the greatest number, nor state convenience, nor fitness, order, and the pulchrum. 
Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with one-
self; but it is a messenger from him, who both in nature and in grace, speaks to us 
behind a veil and teaches and rules us by his representatives. Conscience is the abo-
riginal vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness, 
a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood 
throughout the church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would 
remain and would have a sway? 
This conception of conscience must be resolutely distinguished from the antagonistic 
accounts proposed by various philosophers. 
We are told that conscience is but a twist in primitive and untutored man; that its 
dictates is an imagination; that the very notion of guiltiness, which the dictate 
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enforces, is simply irrational, for how can there possibly be freedom of the will, how 
can there be consequent responsibility, in that infinite eternal network of cause and 
effect, in which we helplessly lie? And what retribution have we to fear, when we 
have no real choice of good or evil?8 
Equally it must be distinguished from the vulgar conception of conscience often found 
in the popular mind. 
When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of 
the creator, nor the duty to him, in thought and deed of the creature; but the right 
of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, according to their judgment or their 
humour, without any thought of Cod at all .... Conscience has rights because it has 
duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and free-
dom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a lawgiver and judge, to 
be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a license to take up any or no 
religion, to take up this or that and let it go again, to go to church, to go to chapel, 
to boast of being above all religions and to be an impartial critic of each of them. 
Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been superseded by a coun-
terfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have 
been mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will." 
Finally, despite the fact that one's conscience can be distorted and that the very idea of 
conscience can be easily misunderstood in the popular mind, Newman is adamant about 
the finality of the deliberations of conscience in the moral life. For Newman we have" a 
duty of obeying our conscience at all hazards."'o Even the authority of the pope, who for 
Newman is nothing less than the medium of divine revelation, must take second place to 
the authority of conscience. "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner 
toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink, - to the pope, if you 
please, - still, to conscience first, and to the pope afterwards."" 
IV 
We can see in these remarks of Newman some of the themes which caught our eye in 
our earlier survey of the options often developed by cognitive minorities in the face of 
opposition. More precisely, we can see a place in the development of our moral existence 
for intuition, for divine revelation, and for community and tradition. 'I What is so attractive 
is the way in which these are held together in a compelling vision of morality. More espe-
cially, Newman's remarks open a door for the application of recent developments in epis-
temology which scarcely got a hearing in Newman's time. Before taking up this latter 
topic, I would like to restate in my own terms the crucial components of the moral vision 
suggested here by Newman. ') It has four central elements. 
I. First, in moral deliberation it is impossible to escape the tracing of our moral deliber-
ations back to basic moral principles, insights, and judgments which form the foundations 
of our moral arguments. In moral debate, there simply comes a point where either we see 
or do not see the rightness of what is before us, whether that be a principle, a particular 
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state of affairs, or a particular moral judgment. There is no further reason or axiom which 
is more basic that we can summon in our attempts to persuade an opponent. We either 
see, or we do not see. This constitutes the natural resemblance there is between a theory 
of conscience and intuitionism. In both what is envisaged is a basic capacity, a fundamen-
tal competence, a non-reducible ability to know what is the case morally speaking. 
2. In a developed theory of conscience, this capacity is construed in theistic categories. 
Conscience is understood as given by an all-good and almighty Creator who has made 
human beings in his own image and has thus transmitted to them his own capacity to 
know what is good and evil. This immediately provides a deep warrant for taking con-
science with the utmost seriousness. Because conscience is given by God, to go against 
conscience is to rebel against the voice of God given to us by nature in creation. More 
positively, to obey conscience is to fulfill one's destiny as a creature designed to operate in 
a certain way by one's Creator. 
Given the way that the nature of conscience is embedded in a theistic universe, it is not 
at all surprising that the very idea of conscience should become suspect or even be trans-
formed beyond all recognition, once the theistic universe it inhabits is abandoned. Thus we 
should expect thorough-going secularists, whether Marxists or Durkheimians or Freudians, 
to provide a radically different construal of what theists will identify as conscience. They 
will see the deliberations of conscience as merely the outcome of economic, social, and 
psychological forces which have no causal relation to truth. Hence they will reject the 
deliberations of conscience as radically misguided. Now, to be sure, if we knew that these 
secularist positions were metaphysically correct, then this consequence would follow. In 
reality, however, these remain at best thoroughly contested proposals; a mature theist will 
have her own reasons for rejecting them or for accepting them only in a deeply modified 
form. 14 Moreover, as a theist, she will have her own reasons for adopting a theistic concep-
tion of the universe. Hence the minimalist, reduced accounts of conscience so popular in 
current philosophical and popular circles will be rejected as radically inadequate. 
3. In this account of conscience, conscience is construed in thoroughly dynamic terms. 
It is not an all-or-nothing capacity. It is a divinely given competence which clearly devel-
ops in infancy, through adolescence, and beyond. Conscience can be hurt and healed; it 
can be distorted and sharpened; it can be lost and regained; it can be dulled and 
renewed. Hence a full description of the growth and inner dynamic of conscience is an 
extraordinary achievement. Moreover, any attempt to plot the relation, say, between con-
science, intellect, sentiment, guilt, remorse, and the like, will be a major undertaking 
requiring exquisite perceptual and conceptual skill. 
4. Fourth, it is precisely because conscience is construed as a capacity or as a compe-
tence that it can be corrected and healed by divine revelation and rightly influenced, for 
good or ill, by tradition and community. 
Thus Christian theists will insist that the ultimate norm of good is revealed in the life 
and work of Jesus Christ, the etemal Son of God. In him are hidden the full riches of holi-
ness. Through the working of the Holy Spirit, fellowship with Christ in the body of the 
church so heals and enriches human agents that eventually they share the very mind of 
Christ and see the world as he does. ls Hence the Christian looks to the saints of the 
church as models of enlightenment to be emulated and consulted on moral issues. In 
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these circumstances the inner voice of Cod enables one to discern the moral authority of 
Christ and his saints; in turn conscience itself is healed and corrected by the Word of Cod 
enshrined in the Scriptures and made fully manifest in Christ. In these circumstances, 
there can be no playing of conscience off against divine revelation. ' 6 Special revelation in 
the Word of Cod confirms, corrects, and deepens the natural revelation given through 
the light which enlightens everyone who comes into the world. '7 From the point of view 
of our moral experience, such transformation is not a quick and easy matter either for the 
individual or for the Christian community. Individuals may need years and the Christian 
church may need centuries before the rightness and wrongness of certain moral claims 
are recognized. Such moral development is entirely natural on this account of our compe-
tence in moral discernment. 
V 
We are now in a position to tackle the last segment of our project. The reader will 
recall that our fundamental concern was ultimately to address queries about warrants 
which naturally arise with the appearance of cognitive minorities. In terms of our vision of 
conscience the question which arises is this: How do we know that appeal to conscience 
provides us with adequate justification or warrant for our moral claims? To this we now 
turn. 
The point of entry is Newman's claim that conscience is ·'a constituent element of the 
mind, as our perception of other ideas may be, as our powers of reasoning may be, as our 
sense of order and the beautiful, and other intellectual endowrnents."' B Newman's sugges-
tion is that we should construe conscience as similar to such other intellectual capacities as 
perception, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and the like. Thus, just as we 
have recourse to memory in making judgments about the past, so do we have recourse 
to conscience in making judgments about the moral worth of actions. How does this help 
us in developing our account of conscience so that it addresses the quest for knowledge? 
In recent years epistemologists have been recovering and exploring an approach to 
knowledge in general which is especially pertinent to this issue. From the time of 
Descartes and Locke, the two great pillars of the Enlightenment experiment in epistemol-
ogy, the general tendency has been to construe knowledge in terms of true, justified 
belief. The most troublesome element in this tradition has been the problem of securing 
justification. The favored approach to this matter has been to pursue the quest for justifi-
cation in internalist categories. Thus a person is justified in holding to a particular proposi-
tion, p, if that person has good reason for holding p, and that reason is known to the per-
son as a reason for p. On this analysis justification for a belief is secured by being aware of 
good propositional evidence for that belief. 
An obvious difficulty which attends this proposal is how to secure the foundations of 
one's beliefs. After all, every time one cites a reason for any belief, that reason itself consti-
tutes a further belief, and questions will naturally arise about the status of that belief. 
Justification, on this view, becomes a chain of inference and argument which either goes 
on forever or which must come to a halt at an appropriate foundation . In moral theory 
intuitionism represents an attempt to stop the infinite regress of argument by insisting that 
at some point the agent just sees something to be the case. Not surprisingly, philosophers 
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have seen such a move as empty theorizing, as a kind of intellectual hand-waving to flag 
down questions. Equally, attempts to speak of a moral sense, of a faculty of discernment, 
and the like, have been construed as vacuous proposals which verbally fool their propo-
nents into thinking that they are making epistemic progress. In this intellectual environ-
ment a theory of conscience will appear thoroughly dubious. 
However, in recent years we have become acutely aware that all is far from well with 
this kind of internalist account of justification and its attendant account of knowledge. 
Thus many have turned of late to explore an alternative, externalist account of knowl-
edge which proceeds in a radically different direction. The crux of the turn is this. Rather 
than look for propositional evidence, say, for our basic perceptual or mernory beliefs, we 
ask a very different question. We ask if the practice of memory or the practice perception 
is a reliable one. If it is, then we can prima faoe take the beliefs which arise from such 
practices as knowledge. This conceptual shift utterly transforms the way we think about 
knowledge and justification. 
It also transforms the way we should weigh the epistemic status of conscience. On the 
old internalist model the question we asked was how we could find further propositional 
evidence for those beliefs arising from conscience. On this analysis the concept of con-
science was useless. On the new externalist model we ask if we have good reason for tak-
ing conscience to be reliable. Once we ask that question, the answer is obvious. For the 
Christian theist the answer clearly must be yes. Conscience is a God-given capacity; it is a 
constituent part of our nature given by a gracious and loving God. Hence, other things 
being equal, conscience is a reliable medium of moral knowledge. It is this simple and rev-
olutionary notion which makes manifest the extraordinary epistemic significance of con-
science. Prima facie, conscience is to be trusted to yield knowledge because it is a basic 
competence given to us by God. 19 
A consequence of this analysis is worth noting. On the internalist account of knowl-
edge, one can only know something if one also knows how one knows. Thus I know p, if 
and only if I believe p, if p is true, if p is justified, say, by q, if I know q, and if I know that 
q justifies p. The obvious problem with this analysis is that it eliminates a host of things 
which most normal people would insist they knew. For instance a child can know that it 
is raining, or my dog can know that she is about to go for a walk without satisfying such 
stringent conditions. On the externalist account one knows p if one has arrived at p 
through a reliable process. It is not at all essential that one also know how or why the 
process is reliable, although clearly knowing why the process is reliable may enhance 
one's epistemic status. It is precisely this feature of our externalist account of conscience 
which shows why conscience has been taken so seriously in the Christian tradition. Even 
the conscience of the unbeliever, that is, the deliberations of one who may explicitly deny 
its divine origin, is to be taken seriously. The reason for this is that one may well know 
moral truth even though one may not know how one knows such truth. Just as through 
perception I may know immediately that it is snowing, even though I may not have a 
clue how to defend the reliability of perception, equally through conscience I may know 
immediatedly that it wrong to roast people for fun, even though I may not have a clue 




In conclusion we can now connect this account of conscience to the empowering of 
Christian minorities. We noted earlier that the concept of conscience has had a precarious 
place in the moral theorizing of the last two centuries. As Newman rightly suggested, both 
philosophical and popular conceptions of conscience in his day totally failed to convey 
the full force of the idea as developed in the Christian tradition. Since then the situation 
has not improved; on the contrary, the progressive secularization of Western culture has 
made talk of conscience even more precarious than it was in the nineteenth century. 
With the increasing secularization of the Church, it is now common to find the idea of 
conscience treated as a hostile stranger even within its sacred precincts. As Christendom 
collapses, and as mainline churches loosen their intellectual moorings from Scripture and 
tradition, then those committed to talk of conscience and to its healing by the grace of 
Jesus Christ will become even more of a minority than they have been in the past. The 
gap between the working conscience of serious believers and their neighbor is likely to 
grow wider and wider. 
In these circumstances retrieving the riches of the tradition buried in and around the 
idea of conscience is a salutary exercise in at least two ways. First, it wi ll help keep alive 
the Christian tradition in bleak and difficult times. One cannot take conscience seriously 
without also taking seriously a whole range of theological themes and convictions which 
naturally circle round it. Secondly, it will put heart into Christians as they live and witness 
in a hostile environment. At one level a sound grasp of the nature and role of conscience 
wi ll give intellectual and spiritual protection from the moral degeneration which is so 
clearly visible in the world around us. At another level it will help Christians cultivate a 
deep respect for the neighbor. On the reading of the human situation proposed here, 
even enemies are to be respected and heard. Even though one's opponents may be radi-
cally different in outlook, even though from a Christian perspective they may be corrupt 
in their conscience, and even though they may be totally opposed to a theistic account of 
conscience, they are to be treated as agents made in the image of God who can always 
be redeemed and transformed- or as Newman says, they are to be urged to obey their 
conscience against all hazards. In the meantime Christians can draw on the full resources 
of grace made available in the gospel and in the teachers and members of the church. 
Among the latter I am pleased to acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor Robert 
Lyon whose strong and sensitive conscience as a scholar, as a teacher, and as Christian 
believer leaves so many of us in his debt. 
NOTES 
I . I limit my concern here to moral claims. Our question easily can be extended to encom-
pass theological and other claims. 
2. This is so much a part of the contemporary mainline academic scene that documentation 
would be superfluous. It has become so embedded in some circles that merely to question the new 
status quo will be seen in terms of backlash. See for example, Susan Thistlethwaite's "Beyond dual-
ism: Rosemary Radford Ruether's New Women/ New Earth," The Christian Century (April 24, 
1993): 339-402. 
3. George Marsden's work on the secularization of the academy and on the history of funda-
mentalism are especially helpful treatments of aspects of this theme. See George M. Marsden, 
Loyal Opposition and the Epistemology of Conscience I 47 
Refonning Fundamentalism: A History of Fuller Theological Seminary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987) 
and George M. Marsden and Bradley L. Longfield, eds., The Secularization of the Academy (New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992). 
4. Note that I am using "intuition" here as almost a technical term in moral philosophy. I do 
not mean by intuition some kind of non-rational hunch. On the contrary, intuition is intended to 
signify the kind of rationality appropriate to morality. 
5. John Henry Newman, Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered 
(London: Pickering, 1976), pp. 246-26 1. 
6. Ibid., p. 246. 
7. Ibid., pp. 248-249. 
8. Ibid., p. 249. 
9. Ibid., p. 250. 
10. Ibid., p. 259. 
I I. Ibid., p. 26 I. 
12. I leave aside for the moment any reference to empowerment. 
13. Needless to say the account which follows will be much more Protestant in orientation and 
content than what one will find in Newman. 
14. Some modern Protestant treatments of conscience all too readily succumb to the implica-
tions of entirely secular, non-theistic conceptions of human agents at this point. See, for example, C. 
Ellis Nelson, Don't Let Conscience Be your GUIde (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1978), 
15. This is beautifully captured in Romans 12: 1-4. 
I 6. That we may be tempted to do this, that is, insist on one and only one source of moral 
e nlightenment, in this case either conscience or Christ, is part of the legacy of standard 
Enlightenment epistemologies, such as we find in Descartes, which posit one final, certain source of 
moral inquiry. In a sense there is ultimately only one source for the theist, namely the creative activi-
ty of the living God. However, it is an elementary truth of Christian theology that the triune God's 
creative activity is not confined to conscience. 
17. John 1:9. 
18. Newman, Difficulties, p. 248. 
19. It is worth noting that Descartes makes exactly the same epistemic suggestion with respect 
to ordinary perception. See for example his Meditations on First Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 
1980), p. 94. 
